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WHY A
CHINESE MONETARY TIGHTENING COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A GLOBAL DEPRESSION
by Thomas P. Au,
CFA
Author & Market Analyst
May 23, 2007
As the world’s largest
holder of dollars, the People’s Bank of China is now the world’s de
facto central bank. That’s a scary thought because China is a nouveau
riche nation that is not ready for a principal role in global
economy. But in 1929, the United States was similarly a parvenu, a
country that held 50% of the world’s monetary reserves (in the form of
gold) even though its central bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of the
United States (or Fed for short), was all of sixteen years old; this
adolescent outfit had been created only in 1913 after the passage of the
16th Amendment to the Constitution.
Moreover,
China is facing the essentially same dilemma today as America did in
1929. The United States in the 1920s flooded the world with liquidity in
order to hold down a fundamentally strong dollar and prop up a weak
pound at the behest of Britain’s central banker, Montague Norman, and
a Treasury Minister named Winston Churchill (who failed at everything he
did in public life before winning World War II). China has been
similarly accommodative until recently to support the weak U.S. dollar,
despite making heroic efforts to “sterilize” these dollars. But some
of the liquidity inevitably found its way into the Chinese and global
economies, helping to bring about torrid (and probably unsustainable)
double-digit percentage growth in China.
This
growth is also taking place in a relatively unbalanced fashion. For
instance, Chinese consumer spending growth is only about half of
industrial spending growth—in the mid-teens. The high single digit
percentage difference has to be made up by exports, which led to the
problems just alluded to, large trade surpluses for China, and large
trade deficits for the United States, causing major imbalances for both
countries. If the trend continues, via more deals like Chinese buying of
a $3 billion stake in Blackstone, they could become “Siamese twins,”
(the original of whom were literally ‘joined at the hip’ and
impossible to separate without killing one or the other). More likely,
“excess capacity” in industrial goods would lead to an economic bust
in China, at about the same time that the U.S. came from downward
pressure on consumer spending because of the collapse of the housing
bubble.
Such
runaway growth is also threatening to overwhelm China’s relatively
primitive commercial and physical infrastructure. The country has some
of the most modern industries in the world, side-by-side with Stalin-era
state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—and a banking system that has to serve
both sectors. Accounting is equally sporadic, state-of-the art in a few
instances, archaic in most others, meaning that only a few companies can
be really sure about what they are earning. World-class economic
officials exist at the highest levels of the government, alongside
corrupt local bosses that threaten to derail the economy for their own
ends. And even the smooth functioning of basic utilities can’t be
taken for granted, given periodic brownouts in major cities.
As a
result, the Chinese stock market is waking up from a long slumber. One
to two million brokerage accounts are being opened every week in China.
Even with a population of 1.3 billion, 100 million brokerage accounts a
year would mean that 50% of China’s population would have such an
account only six and a half years from now. (It took over a century for
America to achieve that level of penetration.) What’s more, these
accounts are being opened by all the usual suspects of a market top,
“cab drivers, house cleaners, college students, and Buddhist monks,”
according to Adam Shell of USA Today. Meanwhile, Chinese stocks are now
selling at 30 to 40 times earnings, bubble levels. And the passage of
new legislation to allow Chinese to invest overseas, may give a
temporary lift to other markets including that of the United States.
That’s not a comforting thought, given the lack of sophistication of
investors like those just noted, because the change of stock ownership
that we’re now seeing is called “distribution.” We’ve seen this
movie before.
It’s
easy to say with the benefit of hindsight that the U.S. Fed erred in
keeping monetary policy too tight in the 1930s. But that came about
because the Fed was too loose in
the 1920s, as has been the case in the 1990s, and so far this decade.
And the most immediate threat in the Western world prior to 1929 was the
German hyperinflation of the early 1920s (which destroyed the German
economy and middle class and ultimately brought Hitler to power). It was
in avoiding the Scylla of such inflation, that the Fed opted for the
Charybdis of deflation; in tennis lingo, that was a “forced error.”
China had a similar, and first-hand, experience with hyperinflation in
1949; more than anything else, it brought the present (Communist)
government into power. With that heritage, China is going to err on the
side of tightness. In fact, the country is using all three major
monetary tools, open market operations, raising discount rates, and
raising reserve requirements in a concerted effort to cool down its
economy. Such a confluence of policies is seldom seen in the western
world.
It’s
possible that a more seasoned Fed in the 1930s might have barely avoided
the depression that resulted from the 1929 crash. But to hold the 1930s
Fed to the elevated standards of today would have been too much to ask.
(When was the last time parents you know tore out their hair because
their sixteen-year old was incapable of acting like an adult?) Likewise,
more experienced hands at the helm of the People’s Bank of China might
possibly avoid the oncoming bubble and crash. But that is asking a lot
of an institution and country that are just beginning to make the
transition from Communism to capitalism.
The
problem with experience, someone once said, is that it comes along only
after you need it most. The American central bank has experience, but
it’s not the one needing it. The Chinese central bank is now in the
driver’s seat, and hasn’t yet had experience come along. It’s
about as seasoned today as America’s Benjamin Strong-led Fed was just
before 1929. More to the point, it’s not about to listen to the U.S.
because we are a major part of the problem in other respects.
I
believe that China is setting a massive tightening of the global money
supply in progress, and that this tightening could soon be followed by a
global depression. Either event may happen or ultimately fail to happen.
But in either case, it is basically out of America's control. Like a lot
of other goods that Americans now import, the modern 1929 (or a somewhat
better outcome), will have been “Made in China.”

© 2007 Thomas P. Au
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