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WHEN
CRUMBLING CREDIT
MEETS DEADLY LEVERAGE
by
Richard Benson
Benson's Economic & Market Trends
October 28, 2007
If our
country’s debt problems in the private sector were simply limited to
the $1.5 trillion of subprime mortgages that needed to be repaid,
restructured or foreclosed, the situation might be manageable. But they’re
not, and it isn’t. It’s widely understood now that this mess was
caused by a Federal Reserve that pumped up home ownership (for everyone
in America) and then proceeded to cut interest rates too low for too
long, and by credit market participants who threw common sense and basic
loan underwriting to the wind.
In looking back at this era of easy
lending, the orgy was effectively facilitated by Wall Street's ability
to irresponsibly underwrite loans and then look the other way. Risky
mortgage securities were packaged and sold in the secondary market to
suckers who bought into the theory that the housing market would only go
up.
As equity extraction becomes a thing of
the past, a recession seems inevitable. I predict there will be
continued credit surprises – mostly on the downside – as employment
weakens, jobs are lost, and bills go unpaid. As a consumer-led recession
unfolds, personal income and corporate revenues won’t cover many
debts, and the game of always being able to refinance has ended. So, for
many borrowers the game is already over; they just don’t know it yet.
The credit cycle has clearly turned.
Financial institutions, such as banks, have only begun to add to the
massive loan loss reserves they’ll need to shelter from the storm of
at least $2 trillion of consumer, commercial real estate, corporate, and
single family mortgage loans, that could easily roll over into default.
And that’s not all. Loan loss reserves are also being set aside as
banks brace for the stress that has begun to appear in commercial
mortgages and mortgage securities. See the chart below:
No Shortage of Loans That
Can Go Bad
(Federal Reserve Flow of Funds), June 30, 2007
| Loan Type |
Dollar
Amount in Trillions |
| Single and Multifamily |
11 |
| Corporate Credit |
6 |
| Commercial Mortgages |
2.4 |
| Consumer Credit |
2.5 |
| Note:
These are loans we can see, so the magnitude of the risk is
known as the debts above have actually been recorded on
individual and corporate balance sheets. The scary part is the
magnitude of the derivative loans we haven’t seen yet. |
In the world of easy money and the
exponential increase of artificial liquidity and credit, there is also
the "shadow world" of derivatives.
A derivative allows a market
participant to make money or hedge a position as if they owned a
financial instrument, yet they’re not required to put the asset
on-balance sheet (or post the capital) the same way they would have
to if the asset were on-balance sheet.
Why is this important? As Hank Paulson,
Secretary of the Treasury, runs around trying to bail out the Structured
Investment Vehicles (“SIVs”), it’s become pretty obvious. These
SIVs provided a way for huge banks, like Citibank, to hold another $400
billion of assets but conveniently keep them off-balance sheet. Up until
a few weeks ago, the financial press hadn't even heard of a SIV. Now,
suddenly, they’re threatening the core of the financial system because
the loans might have to go back on-balance sheet and tie up precious
equity capital!
The big players love derivatives because
they allow massive off-balance sheet leverage. However, the hedge funds
and mortgage companies that have all blown up recently (along with some
Wall Street firms and Bear Stearns) have learned a hard lesson: mixing
massive credit losses with high leverage is a formula for quick and
definitive financial death. While leverage may be positive to the bottom
line on the upside, it can quickly kill on the downside.
While SIVs are continuing to rock the
system, they are a mere rounding error compared to Credit Default Swaps
(“CDSs”) and other major derivatives. (CDSs are the most widely
traded credit product.) See the Table below:
Over the Counter
Derivatives
Bank for International Settlements, Notional Amounts – December 2006
|
Dollar Amount in
Trillions |
Interest Rate
Contracts
(Bets on interest rates) |
292 |
Foreign Exchange
Contracts
(Bets on foreign currency) |
40 |
Credit Default Swaps
(Bets on corporate credit) |
28 |
$28 trillion of CDSs is a staggering
number! It’s more than double the U.S. GDP, and is more than four
times the total of all outstanding corporate debt. The off-balance sheet
“shadow world” of credit actually dwarfs the on-balance sheet
visible world.
As the Music Man says, "There is
a lot of gamboling going on here in River City".
In real speak this means the financial players
reap all of the benefits on the upside, while the investors assume most
of the risk on the downside. The “gamboling”
going on is off-balance sheet and, therefore, hidden from the investor’s
view.
In July and August we all learned how
cruel the markets can be. When the market value (gain to one party, and
loss to the other) of mortgages and mortgage derivatives spiked in value
very quickly, quite a number of firms, and funds, simply failed. It was
very sudden. Derivatives are by design extraordinarily leveraged, so
small changes in the financial markets can affect their value in a big
way. A sizable wave in the financial markets can easily be magnified and
turned into a tsunami of market losses. With the current level of credit
derivatives all sitting off-balance sheet (and unnoticed like the SIV's
recently were), unsuspecting investors could wake up to discover more
alarming losses amounting to a few trillion dollars that were neither
anticipated nor welcome.
Finally, the financial institutions that
have exposure to on-balance sheet credit risk are the Who's Who of major
hedge funds, major banks, and Wall Street investment banks. Guess who
the major counterparties are in the derivatives market? Why, they’re
the same major players! So, while Bear Stearns has become the poster boy
for all that's wrong with subprime mortgages, don't worry. Other firms
like JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Citibank, Merrill Lynch, and even
Goldman Sachs, may have their pictures posted alongside Bear Stearns’
in the “Hall of Shame” when corporate credits turn down. Crumbling
credit combined with deadly leverage can prove fatal to portfolios
invested in financial stocks.

©
2007 Richard Benson
Specialty Finance Group
Benson's Economic & Market Trends
Editorial Archive l www.sfgroup.org
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