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The Daily Reckoning PRESENTS
A genuine hard landing for
U.S. housing will send up dust all over the world. Most people can't
bear thinking about it...which is exactly why we like to write about it.
Bill Bonner explores...
We
end this week in a state of low dudgeon. Everyone we ever heard of who
was in a state of dudgeon was in a high one. As contrarians, we felt the
need to do something different.
A
state of dudgeon is nowhere near Indiana. Instead it is merely the
condition of being good and mad. So maybe it is closer to the West
Coast. Why the typical resident of dudgeon should be high is a mystery
to us. But we leave that for another day. The subject of today's
reflection is, instead, why the typical resident of the 50 states should
be festering with resentment in the first place.
A
genuine hard landing for U.S. housing will send up dust all over the
world. Like the impact of a giant meteor it threatens to block out the
sun...and lead to the extermination of whole species of investments.
Most people can't bear thinking about it. We at The Daily Reckoning, of
course, make it our business precisely to think what most people can't
bear thinking.
And
in keeping with contrarian principles, we will begin out thinking at the
extremities of the bubble and work backward. We perambulate east to
understand what is happening here in the west. There, we find that even
the lowliest of Chinese factory workers depend on companies that export
to America. These exporters depend on mass importers, such as Wal-Mart,
who in turn depend on millions of average Americans to continue buying
their goods.
Poor
Mr. Typical has not had a wage increase since 1972, according to the
U.S. Department of Labor's website. He earned the equivalent of $334.60
a week back 24 years ago. Now, the figure is just $277.96. But he didn't
cut back spending just because his income fell. To the contrary, he put
his wife to work...and now he has got himself a wallet bursting with
credit cards, along with a neg-am, payment optional mortgage, a credit
innovation as popular with Americans today as Crispy Kreme donuts at a
police benefit.
Approximately
40% to 50% of all new mortgages written in the last two years were ARMed...and
dangerous. To fully understand how these mortgages work, you probably
have to have been hanged...or at least been to a public hanging. Then
you would have noticed that when a man dropped from the scaffold, there
would be a considerable give in the rope...until it snapped taut and
broke his neck.
Mr.
Ramiro A. Ortiz, president and CEO of one of Florida's most aggressive
lenders, described the slack in the noose last month when he was asked
what would happen if a homeowner couldn't make his payments.
"In
our situation, the customer has some flexibility and can choose some
other options to weather the storm till the times are better."
Yes,
he can skip a payment if he wishes, and let the principal of the loan
rise - to a maximum of 115% of the original amount. So, if he merely has
a month to wait for his bonus check...or suffers some other one-off
calamity....he can make it up the next month and all will be well. But
when he hits 115%, the rope tightens on his neck, no matter how many
checks are in the mail.
When
just a few yahoos get themselves into trouble nobody cares. But should a
general cyclical turndown put many people into his situation, the
results could make the whole world shudder. The U.S. economy is still
25% of the entire world's economy. Foreigners depend on the United
States to continue buying...the U.S. depends on its lumpen-consumers to
continue spending...and these same consumers depend on debt for their
spending, debt backed by house price gains.
Reading
the papers and talking to homelanders we conclude that the housing
bubble is over...and unlike other observers, we believe it will come to
a rude end, for three reasons:
The
first is demographic. The typical baby boomer has a total of $60,000 in
net worth. For the last 10 years or so, he has not had a reason to save.
Why get 3% in the bank when you could get 12% from housing? Counting
leverage, most people probably got at least twice that. The typical
retirement financing plan was simple: buy a house in Florida...then sell
the house in New Jersey. Naturally, the Sunshine State boomed. But where
did the boom come from? Housing, of course. In the period, 2001-2005,
employment growth averaged 2.2% per year - third highest in the nation.
But job growth in the property sector grew more than twice as fast, at
5.6%.
Naturally
too, house prices seemed hitched to a rocket launch at Cape Canaveral.
In the three years, 2002-2005, property prices rose 77% compared to
income growth of only 1.4%.
In
the run-up to their retirements, the baby boomers were net buyers of
houses. It was a way for them to finance their golden years. Now that
the boom is over, they will most likely be net sellers - because they
will need the money.
What
is seldom appreciated, especially by America's homeowners, is that
housing prices do not go up reliably. In fact, for most of the last
century, they reliably went nowhere. According to Robert Shiller, during
the entire period from 1890 to 2004, property rose at an average annual
rate of just 0.4%. And in many parts of the country, over long periods
of time, prices went down. The price of farmland in Western Kansas, for
example, hit a high in the commodity boom of the late 1880s and has
still not recovered.
The
International Monetary Fund analyzed home prices in a number of
countries from 1970 to 2001, and found 20 "busts" - when real
prices fell by almost 30 percent. All but one of those busts led to a
recession.
Japanese
property prices have fallen for 14 years in a row, by 40 percent from
their peak in 1991, and consumer spending has been weak, leading The
Economist to conclude, "Americans who believe that house prices can
only go up and pose no risk to their economy would be well advised to
look overseas."
And
The Economist of May 29, 2003 adds:
"House
prices have fallen in nominal as well as in real terms in Germany and
Japan over the past seven years. A house in Tokyo now costs less than
half what it did in 1991, after a now legendary property-price bubble in
the late 1980s. Yet the 36% real increase in average house prices in
Japan in the seven years to 1991 was less than the increase over the
past seven years in half of the countries we track in our index.
"German
houses used to be the most expensive in Europe: in 1975, they cost three
times as much as French ones. Today the two have more or less evened up,
largely because German house prices have been steadily declining in real
terms. Germany is still suffering a hangover from a massive construction
boom after unification, encouraged by government subsidies and tax
breaks. Prices in eastern Germany are still falling in response to
excess supply, though in western Germany they have risen slightly over
the past few years.
"Over
time, housing booms and busts in Europe, and especially in Britain, have
been more pronounced than in the United States (see chart 5). House
prices have also been more volatile in cities, where the supply of
building land is more limited. For example, London house prices soared
by 120% in the five years to 1989, then fell by 30% over the following
four years.
"In
real terms, price declines of one-third or more are nothing unusual,
examples being Australia, Italy and Spain in the early 1980s. Falls in
nominal prices are much more common in big cities. Not only London but
Boston, New York and San Francisco, too, saw prices drop steeply in the
early 1990s."
The
second reason we give, for why this property decline is not likely to be
soft and easy, is technological. The invention of the modern automobile
in the early 20th century seemed to doom America's cities. The cities
were noisy, dirty, bustling places of commerce. Americans who could
afford to do so dreamed of living outside the city centers. The
automobile helped to make it possible.
The
best neighborhoods of Baltimore peaked out in the 1920s. Even now, at
the height of the greatest bubble in history they still have not
recovered. Another example comes to us from Grant's Interest Rate
Observer:
In
Boston, Mr. John C. Kiley, writing in 1941, observed that prices had
been going down for 11 years. He noted "in some of the older
business and residential sections of the city of Boston have returned to
levels below those of the pre-Civil Wars years." One hundred years
of price appreciation - wiped out.
What
had happened to Boston? Many of the richest people had moved
out...driving out to the suburbs in their new Oldsmobiles.
"When
I was I young man in the early 1980s, I used to play in a rock and roll
band in Minneapolis," writes George Paulos at freebuck.com.
"Like many bands of the era, we rented a "band house" to
live and rehearse. Most of the band houses were located in Southeast
Minneapolis. There were many large homes in that area for rent and the
price was cheap. Our band house was a large two-story home that was
built sometime in the 1920s. It was a two-unit rental with an upstairs
kitchen and bathroom. We packed four guys into the house and still had
plenty of room for rehearsing and all-night beer bashes.
"We
often wondered about the original owners of these mansions. It was
obviously a wealthy neighborhood at one time. Many of the homes in the
area were huge and intricately designed. What happened to these people
and why was the area now so downtrodden? Many years later I learned
about the Depression and how it affected land prices and neighborhoods.
It turns out that Southeast Minneapolis was at the frontiers of
development in the 1920s.
"Although
within the city limits, they were essentially the suburbs at that time.
Homes like our band house were the McMansions of the day. They were
built for a burgeoning upper middle class who had increasing incomes and
easy access to credit.
"When
the Depression arrived, these neighborhoods were hit pretty hard.
"The
real estate bust of the 1930s had a permanent impact on many
neighborhoods. The once wealthy neighborhood that surrounded our band
house was still suffering 50 years later. ... Even in the middle of a
huge real estate boom, these neighborhoods are so blighted that they are
still shunned."
What
technological innovation threatens America's suburbs? The Internet. The
automobile meant you know longer had to live near your work. You could
just live within commuting range. Now, the Internet means that many
people and many businesses can put themselves anywhere. We think they
will turn their backs on the suburbs.
Our
third reason is the most important and the easiest to understand. Why
will the bust in American housing be extraordinary? Because the boom
that came before was extraordinary.
In
the last two years, homeowners in America took out $1.3 trillion from
their house price gains, an amount greater than the GDP growth figures
for those years.
While
prices rose only 0.4% per year from 1890 to 2004, they soared by 6.2%
from 1997 to 2005. According to Shiller, it would take a 22% drop in
residential real estate prices to bring house prices back to their
long-term trendlines. Other experts have predicted a 40% retreat.
Falling
prices in the housing sector mean that homeowners no longer have any
"equity" to take out. Instead, the flow of liquidity
reverses...mortgage resetting, taxes, maintenance, debt restructuring,
foreclosures - all of a sudden money must be put back in! A 5% fall in
house price takes $1 trillion out of the net worth of American
homeowners. A 40% drop would probably set the economy back about as much
as the Great Depression.
"The
real estate bust of the 1930s holds important lessons for today,"
continues Mr. Paulos. "It showed that homeowners are bound together
with their neighbors by chains of finance. Even responsible homeowners
who maintain low debt can be undermined by their financially
irresponsible neighbors. It may be that your best neighbors, the ones
who have been aggressively upgrading their homes, are the ones who have
been racking up the most debt. A closure of a large local employer or
even a large tax increase could be the tipping point for homeowners on
the edge.
"I
recently visited my old band house. It was just as I remembered it. The
hedges were massively overgrown, the siding was still rotting, and the
porch was still sagging. It was a bittersweet vision. The rest of the
neighborhood was a mixed bag. Some homes have been nicely renovated and
others were still crumbling. Judging by the condition of the local
businesses, the neighborhood is even more distressed that it was in the
1980s. Seventy years after mass foreclosures and the place still hadn't
recovered. How will it fare during the next real estate bust?"
Mr.
Paulos should plan to drive by in a year or two to find out.
By
then, the chains of finance that chaff against the skin of the middle
and lower-middle class might be tightening upon us all. And the dudgeon
festering on the wrong side of town might have oozed over to the good
neighborhoods.

© 2006 Bill Bonner
The
Daily Reckoning Archives
www.dailyreckoning.com
Bill
Bonner is the founder and editor of The Daily Reckoning. He is
also the author, with Addison Wiggin, of The Wall Street Journal best
seller Financial Reckoning Day: Surviving the Soft Depression of the
21st Century (John Wiley & Sons). In Bonner and Wiggin's follow-up
book, Empire of Debt: The Rise of an Epic Financial Crisis, they wield
their sardonic brand of humor to expose the nation for what it really is
- an empire built on delusions. Daily Reckoning readers can buy their
copy of Empire of Debt at a discount - just click on the link below:
"Now Perhaps Someone
Will Listen!" http://www.isecureonline.com/Reports/RCKN/E_O_D/
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can sign up for a free subscription to the Daily Reckoning here: http://www.dailyreckoning.com.
This
essay was originally published in The Daily Reckoning.

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