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THOUGHTS
ON THE POSSIBLE EVE OF WAR
by Joseph D.
Douglass, Jr.
February 10, 2003
The risks – chemical warfare, biological warfare, urban warfare, massive casualties among both military and civilians, greatly increased terrorist strikes in the United States, including nuclear – are simply too great to initiate an invasion prematurely.
Many commentators have indicated that it is important to attack before the summer heat sets in. In the past, this has meant before the end of February. However, according to the Washington Post, the major combat units will not be in place and ready until mid-March.
Perhaps we should ask whether the concern about heat is all that critical. There are pros and cons as with everything. Hot weather is tough on the soldiers and those who have to work outdoors, such as aircraft maintenance crews. Presumably it is tough on the Iraqis too.
Alternatively, there may be an advantage to hot weather because of its impact on chemical warfare agents. These agents will evaporate and dissipate much more rapidly in hot, dry weather. Maybe it does not hurt that much to attack later. It could be considerably to our interests if Hussein’s munitions were less effective then.
There are many such considerations that are important and need to be resolved. There is little information in the open press that tells what has or has not been done in this respect. Some of these considerations, however, are very important and, based on past experience, have often been ignored because they are not “good news.”
Operational Security
Secrecy is very important, especially respecting avenues of attack and timing. The risks are substantial. In the Middle East we are operating from hostile territory. It would not be prudent to think of Iran, Jordan, or any country in the area as being “friendly.” They have their own agendas, and will probably play both sides against the middle: help the United States and provide intelligence to Saddam.
It is also clear that Saddam has agents or “allies” in high places in countries such as France, Germany, Russia, China, and the UN. Note, that in the past in many cases, mostly unknown to the public, even people in the U.S. government have intentionally communicated U.S. military plans to the enemy so that the plans would be thwarted. This was particularly evident in the case of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and special operations during the 1980s. Efforts to include various Middle East countries in the “coalition to attack Iraq” only exacerbate an already impossible situation.
A telling present-day example is the advance warning Saddam received on where UN inspectors were headed and when, sometimes two days in advance.
Such information can be used to relocate targets, position decoys, and shut down critical command/control centers and electronic emissions. Knowing where U.S. invasion forces are headed and when they begin their assault would be very valuable. This information can enable defenses to be modified and can be used to target chemical and biological munitions without precise target acquisition information. Because of their nature, in using chemical and biological munitions it is more important to know how the wind is blowing than precisely where the target is.
If there is one thing that both President Bush and Secretary Powell made clear, it is that Saddam has many tens or hundreds of tons of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents available and, thus, has enough to blanket large areas if he knows the wind and approximate U.S. avenues of approach and departure times. A prudent planner should assume he would have this information.
Border Surveillance
Last week the Washington Post reported that U.S. diplomats were busy seeking the assistance of border countries like Iran to stop and detain fleeing Iraqis. Evidently we learned very little from the failure of this approach during the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
It would also seem that there are not ample U.S. troops available for border patrol and surveillance, which could be very important respecting the capture of Saddam, his key staff, and mobile weapons of mass destruction including, for example, mobile biological warfare agent production trucks and rail cars.
If we attack without first sealing the country by dependable forces – not Middle-Eastern or Russian – it tends to suggest that capturing Saddam and many of his weapons of mass destruction, especially those most valuable to terrorists, is not a priority U.S. objective, contrary to numerous high-level pronouncements.
To attack without the capability in place to stop Saddam, his key people, and material related to weapons of mass destruction from escaping, would be counterproductive. It could deny us the very objectives behind the invasion.
The fact that this would be very expensive is not a valid excuse. The war itself is very expensive, not including the expected hundreds of thousands of casualties.
It was our failure to take precisely this problem and operational security into account that contributed mightily to our ignominious defeat in Vietnam.
Hidden Facilities
How can we attack and place at risk over 100,000 of our own troops without first knowing where Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – the tens and hundreds of tons of CBW agents and munitions – are so that we can target or capture them ASAP?
Go back to the first Gulf War in 1991. Notwithstanding all the tremendously effective U.S. Air Force operations, they never did find or attack most of the CBW agents and munitions, including the SCUDS. It was not that they did not try or ran out of munitions, they simply could not find them.
Even back in 1991, we knew that Saddam had constructed numerous secret underground facilities that housed CBW production capabilities as well as storage facilities for bulk agent, munitions, and delivery systems. Since that time, the construction has continued, thanks to the support provided by many of our “allies.”
Judging from Secretary Powell’s speech to the UN, it looks like our information today is little better than it was in 1991. This is unfortunate, but it need not be the case if an invasion were delayed. Commercial capabilities exist that are capable of locating underground facilities, tunnels, communication and power lines, and POL supplies as deep as several hundred meters. The capabilities are airborne and with reconnaissance speeds limited only by the aircraft speed. Moreover they are for all practical purposes covert and can operate beyond the reach of Iraq air defenses. Would it be worth delaying an attack by a few months to know where the hidden underground facilities are located?
The importance of this point is people. The United States cares. If delaying an attack for six months or even a year might save 10,000 or more lives, wouldn’t it be worth it? – especially if at the same time Hussein could, in effect, be rendered immobile? This could be accomplished by a whole host of activities such as increased and more aggressive inspection to find violations rather than just verify a “nothing new” declaration, serious border surveillance, and restrictive blockades. Why not use intelligence assets to focus public attention on all his efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction or assist terrorists and on all those – people, organizations, countries – from whom the assistance or supply is sought. Publicizing rather than withholding information has been about the only proven technique for stopping Western industry and the Communist and former Communist countries from continuing to supply people like Hussein. Or would this be contrary to “policy”?
Protection of Civilian Populations
Another reason for caution is the need to figure out how to avoid massive civilian casualties. Iraq has a population in the neighborhood of about 23 million. That’s where Saddam may be, hiding in the cities or shuttling between them. That’s where many of the underground facilities and weapons stockpiles may be – underneath buildings, parks, and lakes. That’s where the U.S. Army is going to have to fight and that is where there is a tremendous threat of massive CBW use.
It would be unforgivable for the United States to claim to be concerned about human rights and then launch an attack without knowing how to protect the population or move the people, and this is a much larger problem than asking Iran to pitch some tents to house a few hundred thousand refugees.
This problem cannot be shrugged off as Hussein’s problem or blamed upon him. It has to be addressed and solved in advance. Like it or not, if we attack it is our problem. If we are not prepared to accept it as such, we should not be contemplating an attack on Iraq.
What little information there is suggests this planning has not been done. Until it has been done, and done well, initiating war would be tantamount to reckless abandon.
Invasion Force CBW Defenses
In television news and specials on Iraq, U.S. general after general has confidently stated how well our combat men are equipped and trained to fight in a CBW environment. They may be right. My own reaction is: “Bunk.”
In 1991 our forces were neither well equipped nor trained and we knew Saddam had tons of chemical weapons. Today, our forces are better equipped and trained, but it is still no comparison to how well the Soviets were equipped and trained because they intended to use CBW in a major war and, thus, they even trained in live agent environments. They lost quite a few people in the process, but they were serious. The U.S. military has never been very serious, to my knowledge.
One of the problems indicated earlier is the effect of heat while in protective posture – wearing CBW protective garments. You cannot stay in such garments more than an hour or two in 110 degree heat. The sweat rolls off by the pint and erodes the defensive capability of the garments. Doing any labor or maintenance while wearing such garb is very difficult. Even firing a gun with any degree of effectiveness is difficult, as any one can imagine.
We have been informed that Saddam’s military have already been instructed to use chemical and biological weapons in the event of war. It is hard to imagine that their objective is not to force our troops into a protective posture the instant they cross the border, if not before. Judging from past experience, it is likely that Saddam will know when we are going to attack and the avenues of attack before our own front line commanders know, for all the reasons put forth previously.
We have never fought in a CBW contaminated environment. We have no experience. Most previous military thinking was geared to a European environment. How badly does that change when you go to 110 degree temperatures and sand. Non-persistent agents will not last long, but if a shell filled with sarin explodes within a battalion, how many casualties are expected? If persistent agents like soman or VX are used, how long with they persist? Five hours, one day, or longer? When VX falls on sand, will it attach to the sand particles and thus turn every surface particle of sand in a region into a lethal threat? If a night breeze stirs them up, what happens?
As an example of the problem, the newspapers report that the U.S. military has decided to cremate dead soldiers right there on the battlefield because of the decontamination problem and the risk of even attempting to move a body or put it into a body bag.
Compounding these problems, from what Secretary Powell said about Iraq’s CBW stockpile, my impression is that we do not know much more about it today than we did in 1990.[1] Because of the operational differences between different agents and the sparse information we have on their agents, how can we say we are “well prepared and trained.” This applies to both chemical and biological agents.
The Soviets used devastating CBW agents on the Afghans. Does Saddam have any of these? They are quite different from the usual array of CBW. If Saddam’s CBW threat has been growing, isn’t it likely that he might have produced new or different agents over the past decade? There was no such indication, one way or the other in Secretary Powell’s address.
Biological problems are very severe because of the differences in agent survivability, in effects, and in delivery techniques, that can include food, medicine, water, soft drinks, candy bars . . . the list is as endless as the types of diseases available for use.
Anthrax certainly has no problem surviving in the heat and it can be disseminated by the wind or by just spraying or dusting it on the ground and letting advancing forces self-disseminate it.
Land mines can be very effective. What good is one of the tanks shown on television news leading an advance and exploding mines as its way of eliminating them? For that matter, upsetting an advance in Iraq, who needs mines? All the Iraqis have to do is spray agent on the ground and let the vehicles and foot soldiers kick up contaminated dust.
There has been a lot of talk about the need to capture oil fields early in the war to prevent their destruction. It would seem that those troops would be sitting ducks for CBW artillery practice. Have we trained special assault forces to conduct such a task if the grounds around the oil wells are contaminated and mined? For that matter, how can an explosives (EOD) expert in CBW protective garb even think about finding or disabling booby traps on oil wells?
It is safe to say that a lot of thinking has gone into these problems over the past six months. But, is that enough? Only the Army can answer that question, but will they answer it honestly, particularly when the bad news is not what the top brass want to hear?
The expertise, civilian and military, in this respect is in the U.S. Army labs and test ranges. How many of those personnel are about to volunteer to be on the front lines in an invasion? Will we be better prepared in six months than we are today?
Hard to say. But, even if it gives us time to get more replacement masks and garb the answer would seem to be “Of course.”?
If the answer is unlikely, then maybe we should start looking for alternatives. In other words, what is gained, or risked, by going sooner rather than later and is war the answer?
U.S. Homeland Defense
The same question might be posed to Tom Ridge, who now heads the Department of Homeland Defense. How much better prepared will his department be to stop terrorists in 6 months, or a year, than it is today?
Here is another place where we are told mainly just the good news, like how improved airport security is and how the Department of Justice is interviewing all those from the Middle East who are here illegally. Great! But, they can only find less than half of the illegals, which assumes they know the total number, which itself is ridiculous. What percentage of those found is likely to tell the truth?
A more pertinent question might be how many illegals of all nationalities are here, total, and how many have been rounded up and deported and if not why not, if the threat is serious? Recognize that the Latin American terrorists may be more a threat than the Arabs. The Middle East terrorist groups are networked with Latin American terrorist groups, such as those in Colombia that control nearly a third of Colombia.
What efforts have there been to stop the transiting of drug couriers from both North and South into the United States and how effective have they been? The answers will appall you. If the Administration is unwilling to treat international drug trafficking with the same seriousness they seem to be treating international terrorism, how can anyone suggest that as a nation we are more secure today than we were on 9-11?
Illegal drugs still come in by the ton. Customs still only inspects less than 5 percent of the cargo containers. It is no more difficult to smuggle in explosives, like SEMTEX that has no scent, or biological agents, or even a nuclear warhead (See “Realities of Nuclear Terrorism” http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=25248 and “The Rogue Nuclear Threat” http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/nuclear.htm .) than it is to smuggle in a similar weight in drugs.
It would not be much more difficult to manufacture extremely lethal toxins, that can be used as biological or chemical warfare agents, inside the United States than it is to manufacture PCP or other designer drugs.
Why has our government refused to treat the illegal drugs as a serious problem going back forty years? For a detailed layout of this condition, the war-on-drugs farce, see Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and the West. There is no comparison between the damage done in any year over the past four decades by terrorism and the far greater damage done by illegal drugs, which, incidentally, are truly used as weapons of war to undermine our country and are smuggled into our country by trained surrogates of hostile foreign organizations, like the Russian and Chinese intelligence services. Since drug traffickers and terrorists are interdependent and highly internetted, what should we conclude about our homeland’s continued vulnerability to terrorism?
The big question is, what does this tell us about the likelihood for increased terrorism at home if we attack Iraq? There are also serious implications respecting the war on terrorism strategy as presented in President Bush’s National Security Strategy that was developed following 9-11.
The Bottom Line
What the above suggests more than anything else is the tremendous extent to which information is being held back and manipulated in the sense of only releasing that which supports the political agenda.
The only straight, non-emotional presentation in a year and a half was Secretary Powell’s message to the UN. However, it was close to a bare minimum needed to established credibility and justify an invasion – from a threat perspective. Even that required some embellishment of the data to communicate a point. Unfortunately, nothing was said to explain why it was so important to invade right now, as opposed to next fall or in 2004. Why has the administration not informed the public of the risks involved in going to war with Iraq?
Certainly, the fact that we have 200,000 men in or deploying to the Middle East does not justify war so long as there are important gaps in our preparation. Similarly, the fact that summer is rapidly approaching in Iraq hardly seems to be a valid reason for rushing into war. The heat will make things rough for the Iraqis too. Unfortunately, that’s the nature of war: it’s always too hot, too cold, too wet, or too dry.
Are we prepared to attack? Certainly, we can drop bombs and invade Iraq. But, from what little information there is, my feeling is that we are not prepared. The items that strike me most immediately are 1) we do not have enough information on the hidden facilities that harbor critical material, 2) we have not figured out how to invade without massive human casualties, and this should be unacceptable in today’s age, 3) Secretary Rumsfeld has not explained how he intends to accomplish the stated objectives without killing hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Iraqis, and 4) there are evidently no plans to stop Saddam, his key commanders, and tons of weapons of mass destruction from escaping. Do we even know that tons of these weapons, especially those most useful to terrorists, have not already been moved into secret storage facilities in neighboring or even in somewhat distant countries?
It is my sense that the risks inherent in an invasion far, far outweigh the potential benefits, which themselves are highly illusory since there is no evident reason why knocking off Saddam will be a particularly hard blow to international terrorism or significantly reduce the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.
At present, we seem headed into a war with real risks of hundreds of thousands of casualties (or many more), massive increases in terrorism at home with inestimable negative economic consequences at home and abroad, and a major war that could spread throughout the Middle East, and all because of just one man, albeit a tyrant who seems to be on his own crusade. Something about this seems very wrong. There has to be another way.
There are always alternatives. (See, for example “Is War Imminent?” http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/douglass/2003/0204.htm .) There are even many not-so-obvious alternatives if one is allowed to challenge the assumptions and precepts upon which U.S. foreign policy has been based for a good fifty years.
If the President’s war cabinet can not come up with some alternatives that are better and far less risky than invading Iraq in the next few months, the only obvious reasons are 1) we have not been told the whole story or 2) President Bush does not want any alternatives.
[1] Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass Jr., “Iraq Won’t Try Now To Use Its Poison Gas,” Newsday, August 21, 1990, p. 57.
© 2003 Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.
Editorial Archive
Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Ph.D., is a defense analyst, author of The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive and co-author of CBW: The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb and America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare. His most recent books are Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and Betrayed: The Story of America’s Missing POWs.
