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IRAQ
WAR POLICY CROSSROADS
by Joseph D.
Douglass, Jr.
November 10, 2003
Historically, these estimates have most undependable. Why are we still in Bosnia? Authorities said we would be out over five years ago. Or, how about Korea? We have been there fifty years and South Korea is amply prosperous and able to be on its own. Why are we still there and in Europe? What reason is there for not expecting Iraq to pose an equally long-term and tremendously expensive stay?
By all indications, for the near term at least, we have to expect that casualties, deaths, and costs will continue to rise. While considerable progress may have been made in repairing the infrastructure and in training Iraqi security forces, that progress has not stopped the casualties, deaths, and costs from increasing. Is this a sign of success, as President Bush has claimed, or just an indication that more serious problems lie ahead?
Since the announced end of formal hostilities this past May, we have watched the weekly step-wise increase in guerrilla attack violence, sophistication, and coordination. The recent introduction of rockets, mortars, and SAMs, is most significant, especially the SAMs. US officials have stated there are thousands of SAMs in Iraq, not to mention Iran and Syria. This use puts at risk US mobility and rapid response capabilities. Troops can not dash about freely in helicopters in response to trouble. This increase in guerrilla fire power further increases casualties, deaths, and costs. It also increases the need for more US forces because those already deployed can not move about as freely as they were able to do a few weeks ago. The SAM threat also facilitates other terrorist movements and operations.
The growth in guerrilla attack frequency and effectiveness slows down repairs, training, and population support. As Secretary Rumsfeld explained in his now famous memo, the cost exchange ratio is not in our favor. It is about 1000 times harder and more costly to repair something than it is to throw some grenades or apply some explosives to wreck the repair.
The US tactic of hiring contractors, mostly retired military, to perform “non-combat” activities such as training and security police – thus reducing military death statistics and deployment numbers – tremendously escalates costs. These contractors are paid large salaries, tax free. They also cause military moral to fall because the military salaries do not begin to compare with what their retired colleagues make and with much less risk.
Intelligence also suffers. It is heavily reliant upon reports from within the population. This support falls off as the people understand they had better hedge their bets and not be seen as informers. They understand too well what the risks to their lives are should the United States suddenly decide to pull out.
The cut back in UN and Red Cross contingents is also noticeable. It represents a lack of confidence in US security.
As a possible countermeasure to the guerrilla attacks, there is growing interest in creating an Iraqi internal security police force that can “run their own affairs and combat the forces of evil.” This would be a domestic security force that could act on internal information right away with its own strike force.
But, how does one paper-over the obvious comparison with what such internal security police forces have traditionally meant in the Arab countries. We just went to war in Iraq to force a regime change because of Hussein’s practices that were based on the power of his internal security police force. It is especially bothersome that the same people who provided the faulty intelligence on Hussein’s aggressive development and stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction are now touting the use of their “well-established intelligence networks” as the basis upon which their rapid response strike forces would be triggered. What an invitation to possible disaster!
Problems in Afghanistan are also on the rise. Reports on the movement of the Taliban back into Afghanistan have become more frequent. Tribal chiefs are reducing their support to US forces and the new government. They are concerned about the turn in events and are hedging their bets. Iraeli-Palestinian problems are likely also to increase, which will fan the resistance fires even more.
It is not difficult to realize that the growing concern in US policy and planning today is how to save the Bush Administration. Since the announced end of hostilities, President Bush’s popularity has been falling. More people now question his leadership than support him. His popularity will fall further if a few more helicopters are shot down, or perhaps a transport plane, or a successful attack on an army barracks that kills or maims several dozen soldiers. Trained snipers targeting military and civilian leadership will pose further complications. The message successfully delivered by the opposition is that all people are at serious risk: military, civilian contractors, civil officials, government officials, diplomats, repair crews and so forth. There is no indication that the “cost-exchange ratio” will suddenly change to our favor.
On the home front, there are clear concerns that the post-war occupation is far more expensive and dangerous than Americans were led to believe would be the case. There is rising frustration at home. Both the American people and the news media are becoming upset. These concerns are exacerbated because of the relative absence of substance from administration spokesmen, administration efforts to prevent Congress from obtaining classified records (such as those dealing with fore knowledge of 9-11 and with the manipulation of Iraq threat data), and the continued Presidential bluster and bravado. Is it any wonder that the Democrats are beginning to smell blood for the first time since 9-11?
Reversing the fall in President Bush’s approval ratings has to be taking front stage in the war decision-making process. This can be seen reflected in the manner in which the spokesmen and rent-a-general media experts in press conferences and interviews echo the same line: “No, we do not need to send more troops. We have enough troops now in Iraq, just the right number as it turns out, and no more are needed. We may even reduce the number of troops we have in Iraq.” Clearly this is designed to undermine the tendency to compare the Iraq War with Vietnam.
Actually, moderate troop reductions as Secretary Rumsfeld has said will take place may make sense when examined in a different perspective. More troops are not easy to come by and would be unlikely to ameliorate the problem. The guerilla problem is unlikely to be solved by sending another division, or two or three. An increase in American presence might well be counterproductive by presenting the guerrillas with more targets. The real question is how to counter more effectively the guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents. That is, what strategy changes are needed?
What makes the Secretary of Defense or his war staff so confidant they can stop the guerrilla terrorists? Twenty-three million Iraqi citizens make for a big sea within which an unlimited number of trained Arabs and Muslims can swim, including tens of thousands of Hussein’s former Guards Army that the CIA field operators bribed to retire from the war and return safely to their homes. Aside from Hussein’s sons, most of those pictured in the most wanted deck of cards have given themselves up. Have any been charged with war crimes as President Bush promised would happen? Or, are they all free – unemployed but free to wander the streets and observe and plan their future? The resistance strategy seems to be long-term indirect warfare, harassment, and undercutting the American fire-power oriented strategy. Can the Pentagon planners change their approach?
The administration has been going out of its way to portray and treat the Russians and Chinese as friends and allies. Meanwhile these same people are laughing at our predicament. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese would be dismayed to watch the US go down in ignominious defeat. This is especially true of the Russians. They would love to do to the Americans what the Americans did to them in Afghanistan. How can they be doing anything other than applauding and working overtime running covert support operations to help the resistance? Recall, it was the US introduction of SAMs into the 1980s Afghan war that was the turning point and beginning of the Russian military withdrawal.
Assistance from other nations is badly needed but unlikely (although bribes and blackmail can be applied) because of strong and growing anti-US feelings. The bully approach of the Bush Administration is universally disliked by friends and foes alike. In this respect, it is hard to say which is worse, the “new American century” imperialism that several top US officials have espoused, the hidden agenda of other officials to totally change the Middle East political map, or the arrogant “I do not have to explain anything to anyone” attitude of President Bush coupled with his repeated taunts directed at terrorists and any who would oppose him. His recent statement on November 6 that the whole Middle East needs to be democratized is the latest example of this process.
As for Iran’s nuclear intentions, not withstanding all the bluster and rhetoric, it now seems most unlikely that the US would dare to attack or invade Iran. Israel, it would seem, is also most unlikely to attack Iran. Such an action would solidify anti-US feelings and we (Israel too should they choose to attack Iran.) would be labeled “terrorists” by much of the world. Such an event could have catastrophic consequences if it triggered an anti-war movement such as the world has not seen since 1968. This was the beginning of our end in Vietnam. There is already a growing animosity towards Israel and her supporters. New issues gaining attention include the wall they are building and its devastating impact on the Palestinians, their deliberate attack on the U.S.S. Liberty (and efforts within the US government to lie about what happened at the direction of President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara), and the newly exposed Israeli efforts using biological warfare weapons to terrorize and eradicate the Palestinians in the late 1940s.
What gives the question of how we should proceed at home and abroad more meaning is the stated enemy objectives. These are notably troublesome when placed side-by-side with the above considerations. Several of their objectives have been clearly stated in recent years. Three stand out.
Communist and aligned leaders have expressed the need to get the United States involved in a new Vietnam-like situation. Their objective is to further drain US resources, reveal the serious flaws in US arrogance and superpower status, give rise to more anti-war opposition, and trigger new distrust in our leaders and political system.
Osama bin Laden explained quite clearly that the way to get at the United States is to attack its dollar. The US economy is more vulnerable now to such an attack than it has been for as long as any of us can remember. A movement to replace the dollar as a reserve currency with the Euro has begun. Arab countries might place oil payments on a gold or Euro basis. One should watch for similar signals out of the Latin American countries that have communist or near-communist governments.
The main objective, intensified by the US financial support of Israel in its war with the Palestinians, is to throw the United States out of Middle East, including, or especially, the US regressive culture, which includes democracy, which to the Muslims means (correctly) a direct attack on Islam.
In line with the opposition’s objectives, there are some obvious tactics worthy of concern because they have been so potent in the past.
For example, we should expect efforts to exacerbate the declining morale of US deployed forces. This decline has been reported in the US military newspaper, Stars and Stripes. It is simple to advertise the unreasonable conditions the GIs are forced to endure. This was done in Vietnam. The US response is to bring in more beer and enable more R&R. In parallel, efforts are mounted to tempt the troops with heroin, cocaine, and PCP disguised in soft drinks and cigarettes as was done in Vietnam . (This is another reason for thinking twice before increasing US troop deployments to Iraq.)
The Bush Administration could decide to fold up the US tents and walk away. We walked away from Vietnam and no US officials were stoned or fired. The only ones hurt were the soldiers and families of those missing – still missing. This, however, was not much of an issue because the public was very anti-war. Anything was considered better than continuing a bad war and this was the way our leaders approached the pull out. One of the top US leaders even earned a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts!
Such an environment does not exist today. Moreover, no one in the government or news media is advocating a pull out yet. This could be resolved with ease by just turning the reconstruction over to the UN. However, those who put us in Iraq are not about to accept defeat by letting the UN in without a fight. Additionally, President Bush’s objectives go well beyond Iraq as evident in his remarks on the need to give people freedom by spreading democracy and free markets throughout the Middle East. Leaving Iraq would pretty well trash this broader objective.
Another four years in office is a great incentive for the US policy and planning officials to become imaginative. This may have been what triggered the Rumsfeld memo. Either way, we can believe that this is where their minds are focused – subject to the all important proviso of retaining control.
This suggests what increasingly seems to be the new direction: to greatly accelerate the turn-over of all functions to the Iraqis, but in such a way that the United States retains control. Do everything “right”. Reduce US evident presence as reflected in troop levels. As a matter of urgency create an Iraqi internal security police (with internal US controls), an Iraqi military defense forces (also controlled), and a plethora of Iraqi governing bodies (likewise).
Money is obviously no problem. It is cheaper to hire Iraqis than US contractors and military. To the extent Iraqis are killed, that is the price of freedom and good examples of the battle they are waging. It is no longer a US war, especially if – and only if – US deaths and casualties decrease. The point is that the US plan does not have to succeed in the long term; it only has to be perceived as doing the right thing over the next twelve months. Hence, there will also be major news and public diplomacy efforts to show how well the United States is doing what the world wants done.
Will this work? Possibly, but unlikely as it stands. There are two problems. First, both the military and internal security police force options are certain to be heavily penetrated by the enemy. These people will operate to sabotage the operations and use internal information to facilitate terrorist planning. Second, the move does not address the basic problem, which is to devise a strategy to counter the terrorist and guerrilla operations. The hope is that the internal police force will be aggressive and successful in routing out the guerrillas and terrorists and their supporters. But, the forces pushing for this capability have already shown how ineffectual its “well-established intelligence networks” are and how able they are to tell the Bush Administration what it wants to hear. The pressure will be to produce elements of the terrorist and guerrilla support network and! a complement of guerrillas and terrorists to kill in fire fights or throw in jail. And, produce they will, but that process runs a great risk of alienating the population and is hardly likely to deter the terrorists or guerrillas.
Military forces and technology can be of significant importance in determining war outcome. However, the key remains one’s strategy. It is clear that this lesson of Vietnam has not been learned. The officials who put us were we are in Iraq have not demonstrated any competence in fighting a guerrilla war and political correctness militates against their changing their ways. Moreover, the guerrillas and terrorists have a number of alternative options and diversions to take should the new efforts to turn the war over to Iraq bear good fruit. They have more than enough forces and allies to spread terror where ever US forces are stationed. Additionally, America itself, our homeland, remains extremely vulnerable.
Turning the mess in Iraq over to the UN, although this could increasingly become an option and a way out, seems somewhat unlikely in the immediate future. Control would be lost and that would be tantamount to accepting defeat – a bad way to start the “new American century.” However, if news from the war front does not improve, this might be the only way to save the Bush Administration for another four years and, thus, the option should not be too readily discarded. The spin merchants may already be working on the script.
© 2003 Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.
Editorial Archive
Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Ph.D., is a defense analyst, author of The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive and co-author of CBW: The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb and America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare. His most recent books are Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and Betrayed: The Story of America’s Missing POWs.
