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WAR
WATCH #7
Saddam Hussein's Capture
& The War on Terrorism
by Joseph D.
Douglass, Jr.
December 15, 2003
Not an easy question. A month from now – or a week or a year – it may become apparent that nothing much has changed. Alternatively, significant consequences may become evident.
Clearly, Hussein’s capture has now satisfied one of the primary war aims. President Bush will benefit and be more ready to undertake a new phase or expansion in the war on terrorism. Capturing Hussein alive was an added bonus. Now no one can claim his capture was faked. The images of Hussein, dirty and bedraggled, are priceless.
The likely public relations message to those around the world who may be supporting terrorism is clearly “end your support or suffer the consequences.” This message will be sent, either explicitly or implicitly. It is unavoidable. The question, therefore, is how will it be received? Are those who sponsor or support terrorists likely to change, or will they just be more careful about covering their tracks while looking for an opportunity to trump President Bush’s hand? Given the personalities involved, it is probably more likely the latter than the former.
To place Hussein’s capture in perspective, consider the following points.
1. His capture eliminates a big thorn in the side of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair.
2. His capture will soften the critics in the United States (especially the Democratic presidential contenders) until they “see what happens.” They now have to praise the efforts of the U.S. military in Iraq. The top people in the Bush Administration have been proven right: Saddam has been captured. The same will happen to bin Laden, the administration spokespeople will state. Few will contest the statement anymore.
3. We should not necessarily expect any significant impact on the insurgents and guerrilla attacks. It is most unlikely that Hussein had much, if anything, to do with the terrorist attacks against U.S. and friendly forces in Iraq. Hussein has been shown to be totally ineffective when the pressure is on in a crisis. He has traditionally gone into “decision paralysis.” The terrorist operations are widely believed to have been driven or guided by other interests; not by Saddam.
4. What will happen is that the capture of Hussein will now free-up a significant portion of U.S. intelligence and special forces. Up to now, their most important mission has been to “get Saddam.” Now that he has been gotten, they are free to concentrate on the insurgents/terrorist cells, organization, communications, planning, and supplies. The guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists – however one cares to label them – will soon recognize that the intelligence microscope is intensely focused on them.
5. In parallel, efforts to capture bin Laden and the remaining Taliban leaders and those from the Iraqi leadership deck-of-cards still at large (particularly Hussein’s intelligence chief) will intensify. Hussein’s capture will spur them on and cause them to redouble their efforts.
6. The top priority military and intelligence task in Iraq now will be to stop the guerrillas. Efforts will be directed to cut coordination links and uncover the leaders within Iraq and, even more important, foreign interests and states that are supporting terrorist operations in Iraq.
Just as insiders eventually led the U.S. forces to Saddam, the same fate awaits those who are behind the terrorist attacks. The rewards are too great to be ignored and bribery has become an accepted and effective U.S. tactic. All of the cell phone communications intercepts and tracking capabilities will be concentrated on the terrorists and their support mechanism. This capability put into play during the operation to track down Hussein is very sophisticated and can adapt to the new priorities almost instantaneously.
The U.S. government will utilize all its resources to identify those responsible so that appropriate U.S. officials can then “reason” with those forces that support the terrorists or take punitive actions against them. This will be kept out of the public view, except where politically useful to justify other actions such as direct military operations against, for example, Syria or Iran.
7. The combination of improving economic conditions in the United States (real or perceived) coupled with this most welcomed news about Hussein’s capture is likely to embolden the special interests (peace keeping or imperialist, depending on one’s perspective) within the U.S. government. The basic U.S. strategy – to spread democracy throughout the Middle East – has not changed and the best way to achieve change under adverse conditions is still war. If the crack down on the terrorist operations in Iraq is effective, the U.S. policy makers could easily decide now is the time to take aggressive action against the next target of opportunity. Here, “opportunity” means a publicly acceptable justification for expanding the war, be it into Iran or Syria, the top priority targets, or even Pakistan if that is necessary to coral bin Laden and the re-grouping Taliban and al-Qaeda.
8. For the past three months, the Bush Administration has been on the defensive. Expect them to resume the offensive. While they may do this with the same unbridled rhetorical “toughness,” the past would suggest that they probably will shift their public relations strategy and adopt a more low-profile statesman-like image. That is, the most likely question is not whether, but when and how. There seem to be two driving considerations. First, to act in such a way that will increase President Bush’s re-election prospects with very little downside risk. Second, to not exceed the U.S. military reserve capabilities, which probably implies significant cut-backs in the U.S. military presence in Iraq.
9. Meanwhile the interrogation of Hussein will proceed. How fast it goes depends quite a bit on Hussein. If he is smart and able, he will drag the process on until his strength and composure returns. Then, it will likely be a question of why should he tell us anything; that is, what’s the quid pro quo? The bottom line is that he is unlikely to tell us anything he has not already told us. The interesting question is how this might change after appropriate medications are covertly administered to him?
From the U.S. side, the principle items of interest are what he knows about international terrorism and state sponsorship, the whereabouts of Cmdr. Scott Speicher, what Hussein and other leaders knew in advance about 9-11, and where all the loot that the Iraqi officials and their families managed to steal from Iraq has been hidden and with whose assistance. Whether there is anything left to know about WMD is also a question.
There are two interrogation problems not necessarily evident. First, Hussein’s knowledge may present a threat to other heads of state and powerful individuals. Thus, if they fear his talking (either voluntarily or under the influence of drugs), he is a prime assassination target. Don’t be surprised if Hussein suddenly dies a natural death.
Second, hopefully the interrogation will be run and controlled by the military without CIA interference. The CIA has been an active participant for four decades in the effort to hide the crimes of the Communists (who actually have been the major state sponsors and organizers of international terrorism) since their birth. More CIA effort has gone into silencing rather than debriefing high level sources with detailed knowledge about the activities of such protected countries. This is still the case today.
All this, however, is about as useful as tilting at windmills because whether or not he talks and, if so, what he has to say, in all likelihood will never see the light of day.
© 2003 Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.
Editorial Archive
Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Ph.D., is a defense analyst, author of The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive and co-author of CBW: The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb and America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare. His most recent books are Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and Betrayed: The Story of America’s Missing POWs.
