The
combined influence of the mythology surrounding the Year Seven
Phenomenon is often used by perma-bear newsletter writers into scaring
their readers away from the stock market during the seventh year of any
given decade. A reflection of this latent fear, which all
investors have had at one time or other, is found in the following
e-mail I received recently: “I am still scared about that history of
all years ending in 6 & 7 suffering one 20% correction since
1856.”
The
so-called Year Seven Phenomenon is discussed at length in the classic
book, “Tides in the Affairs of Men,” by Edgar Lawrence Smith.
Edson Gould, Yale Hirsch and Larry Williams have also written
extensively on this subject and have helped to promote the Year Seven
phobia.
Yet
not every seventh year of the decade was bearish for stocks and a few
were actually quite bullish. The year 1927 was one notable
example. A survey of stock market trading patterns for every
seventh year of the decade, spanning from 1857 until 1997, shows that
when the market had a particularly bad year during a Year Seven, the
market usually started off on a sour note. In other words, bearish
Year Sevens saw the market start declining almost from the get-go and
continue its slide into the year end. If the market started off
the year in a bull market there was a good chance the Year Seven would
end with gains in the major stock averages.
There
were, however, a few notable instances in the most notable declines that
occurred in the past 140-years of our survey of the Year Seven
Phenomenon. For instance, there were mid-to-late-year selling
panics that occurred in 1957, 1987 and 1997. What accounted for
these sudden appearances of weakness during the seventh year of each of
these three decades? While the factors contributing to each
separate decline were unique in their own right, all three instances had
similar characteristics in that investor sentiment became euphoric, in
varying degrees, at the market ops of each of these years. The
common element in the 1957 and 1987 experiences was the 6-year cycle,
which peaked in both of those years. Six-year cycle peaks tend to
produce sharp declines in the stock market, especially when investor
sentiment is high. That was most certainly the case heading into
the 1987 stock market crash.
In
our present case the last 6-year cycle peak occurred in October 2005,
which produced the September-October market correction. The 6-year
cycle peak not being a factor this year, what other cycle of major
magnitude could act as a catalyst to a stock market crash? Answer:
none of any importance. The 10-year cycle is up until 2009 and
that’s the most prominent longer-term cycle in any given decade.
Therefore cycle considerations are beyond the scope of this discussion
for now.
Now
that we’ve seen that fears founded upon seasonal concerns for the year
2007 are largely unfounded, what other influences could bring about the
widely feared stock market crash this year? Probably single most
important consideration when analyzing the securities market for crash
potential is investor psychology. Investor sentiment isn’t the
most important *cause* of crashes, but it frequently serves as the
trigger for them. Crashes are *caused* by, among other things,
overvaluation of the asset class under consideration. Let’s
discuss both of these factors for a minute.
My
formal response to questions I’ve been asked this year pertaining to
the Year Seven Phenomenon and the risk it poses for a stock market crash
is that there are two considerations in that respect: 1.) It’s
possible the market has already taken its obligatory Year Seven hit for
the year with that late February decline. That bout of panic
selling came out of nowhere, catalyzed by bearish comments by former Fed
Chairman Greenspan and the Chinese authority. The late February
selling panic pushed the investor sentiment figures to their lowest
numbers we’ve seen in years. In fact, one such survey of
put/call ratios fell to its highest level of puts versus calls in its
history! This shows investor sentiment in the U.S. is currently
very bearish by historical standards, and that’s actually quite
bullish for stocks in the intermediate-to-longer term. 2.)
If we are to take another hit later this year, I can’t imagine it
being in the vicinity of 20%. That’s because valuation is still
very low (stocks are 28% undervalued according to the IBES model and the
S&P 500 forward earnings yield is still well above the T-bond
yield).
To
get a 1987-type crash you really have to have a combination of things
going on. You have to have a cycle peak. You also have to
have investor sentiment beyond the boundaries of normal (i.e., WAY too
bullish based on the standard measures). Clearly it’s too early
in the game for a stock market crash to happen anytime soon.
There
also needs to be a reversal in internal momentum (as defined by the rate
of change in the number of stocks making new highs against new lows).
Once again we see that it’s too early in the decadal cycle for a crash
to occur since internal momentum is actually very strong and has been
since the major market low in June-July 2006. Even the 200-day
momentum indicator of net new highs for the NYSE is still in a strong
rising trend. It will take a long time for this kind of momentum
to reverse and create dangerous undercurrents for the stock market.
Finally,
for a major stock market crash to happen there has to be a fundamental
over-valuation of stocks as reflected in the IBES valuation model and/or
by the spread between earnings yields and Treasury yields. For
instance, in 1987 and 1997 the IBES model spiked well into
“overvalued” territory just prior to the crashes in those two years
– somewhere in the vicinity of 40% overvalued in ‘87 and around 25%
overvalued preceding the mini-crash of ‘97. Today it’s the
exact opposite with the model showing stocks to be 28% *undervalued.*
I just don’t see a crash happening this year with this kind
of massive undervaluation. Note the IBES valuation chart from
Haysadvisory.com.

Also,
keep in mind we have record liquidity today, a Fed committed to pushing
up money supply with abandon, shrinking supply of stocks, and the
fundamental strength just mentioned. Throw in investor psychology
being quite bearish compared to 1987 and 1997 and it’s hard to see how
this bull market will end before the crowd joins in a massive
capitulation of euphoric frenzy -- just like in the late 1990s before
the tech stock crash.
Another
e-mail I received is worth mentioning because it gets to the heart and
soul of the issue as to why stocks should continue to offer value
despite the nay-saying of the super-bears. He writes:
“Corporations have been retiring billions of dollars worth of shares
each month for the last 3 plus years. Additionally an enormous
amount of U.S. shares have been removed over the same period through
M&A activity and private equity transactions for a total net share
loss worth a few trillion dollars. Furthermore, to the point of
your bearish individual investor, they have been directing 90+% of their
equity investment funds into foreign equity funds over the last 2-3
years -- chasing performance. When the Dow passes 15 or 16
thousand, perhaps a few will take notice and begin to ignore the folly
which has been continuously written about old news items like
‘sub-prime’: all of which has no doubt been priced into the ‘Wall
of Worry.’ The stubborn holdouts will focus on tomorrow’s old
news items and miss until perhaps the DOW hits 19 or 20 thousand and
they panic and dive in with all they’ve got. The top will likely
coincide when the Private equity players attempt to cash in their chips
and offer a flurry of old company IPO. Maybe it tops in 2010
to 2011 -- who knows? Not me.”
The
fear of a stock market crash has never been stronger than it is today.
One reason for that is that we’ve all been conditioned by at least one
or more major stock market crash in our lifetimes and a few mini-crashes
and selling panics to boot. These market reversals and the damage
they inflict tend to leave deep-seeded memories and emotional scars that
are not easily healed with the passage of time. These
emotionally-charged memories have bubbled to the surface in recent years
as the corporate scandals earlier this decade along with massive pension
losses have left millions with an uneasy feeling about the future of the
U.S. financial system.
A
survey of history shows that aggregate psychology at any given time is
reacting to the problems and fears of at least 3-4 years ago. In
other words, mass psychology is *always* behind the reality of the
here-and-now. These deep-seated fears that were seeded earlier
this decade are at the forefront of the mass investor psyche but they
will soon be replaced by gradual acceptance of the bull market, then
outright embracement. This transition will probably take place
over the next 1-2 years. Until the shift in investor psychology
goes from firmly bearish (today) to decisively bearish, the downside
risks to the stock market will continue to be limited and a crash of
major proportions such as the super-bears are currently preaching is
most unlikely.
The
“recipe” for a stock crash as outlined in the above paragraphs is
nowhere to be found in the equity market kitchen today. When the
ingredients begin showing up (in the form of diminishing liquidity,
overvaluation of stocks and bullish investor sentiment) we’ll know a
top of major proportions is near with a possible risk of a market crash.
Until then, fear will continue to be just another tool used by the
mainstream press to keep the public from participating in this bull
market.
Clif
Droke is editor of the 3-times weekly Momentum Strategies Report which
covers U.S. equities and forecasts individual stocks, short- and
intermediate-term, using unique proprietary analytical methods and
moving average analysis. He is also the author of numerous books,
including most recently "How to Read Chart Patterns for Greater
Profits." For more information visit www.clifdroke.com.

© 2007 Clif Droke
Editorial Archive
Clif
Droke
P.O. Box 3401
Topsail Beach, N.C. 28445-9831 USA
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