Editor’s note: As the war on terror develops, more attention in being placed on hindering the ability of terror groups to raise money for operations. In this analysis, Dr. Duarte explores a key area of financial activity for Hezbollah, and perhaps other terror groups, and the implications for U.S. security and future strategies. This analysis appeared on 9-27-06 at Joe-Duarte.com

The Tri-Border Area: Terror's Financial Center
 
Three South American countries and the United States are expected to open "an intelligence center aimed primarily at combating criminal and militant activity" in the triangle where the three South American countries share a border, says intelligence service Stratfor.com.

This little known, but highly important area is well known to be a financial center for Hezbollah and perhaps other terror linked organizations.

The announcement marks an interesting shift in the way the U.S. is fighting the war on terror.

Long Term In The Making

The Tri-Border Area (TBA), where Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay meet, is increasingly becoming the focus of the U.S. intelligence community, due to the rising threat of terrorism in the post 9/11 era.

Of significant importance is the rise of organized crime in the TBA area, which is also giving militants an opportunity to thrive.

As with most scenarios that seem to suddenly burst onto the scene, the TBA issue has been decades in the making, and thus will not likely be solved anytime soon, although its effects could be felt at any time.

According to the U.K. intelligence service Janes.com: "The tri-border area where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay meet is unusual within the relatively homogenous region for being home to a variety of nationalities, with mass immigration since the 1960s having produced a community with people from places such as Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank, Taiwan, South Korea and China, and to a lesser extent from Ukraine, Germany and other Eastern European countries. Some of these groups often retain strong ties to their country of origin, and this has encouraged the development of strong trading and financial links."

Citing "lax border controls and differentiated tax, customs and police systems," Janes reports that this and other factors in the area have "facilitated illegal activities, as groups in each of the three countries exploit the differences between the various regimes."

Stratfor describes the geography of the TBA: "The TBA, which sits at the intersection of the Parana and Iguazu rivers, comprises Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, Foz do Iguazu in Brazil and Puerto Iguazu in Argentina. Ciudad del Este is connected to Foz do Iguazu by the east-west Bridge of Friendship, while Puerto Iguazu is connected to Foz do Iguazu by the north-south Tancredo Neves International Bridge."

The TBA area, is increasingly important to the regional economy as "20 per cent of Paraguay's commerce takes place in Ciudad del Este and as much as 30 per cent of its tax income comes from the city's customs, in large part fuelled by illegal trade such as the selling of counterfeit goods, drugs and arms smuggling."

In other words, there is so much money now being made in the area, that changing the situation is likely to prove challenging.

As a result, the only real solution is for the governments from Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay to establish some kind of surveillance center in the area, in combination with the United States.

Rising U.S. Concerns

According to Jane’s: "The US has long been concerned by the smuggling through the tri-border area, but the perceived possibility of terrorist financing led Washington to increase political pressure, largely via rhetorical means, to increase surveillance and control of the area. In 2002, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and the US formed the 3+1 Group, which monitors events in the tri-border area, including units for financial intelligence."

Stratfor added: "Money laundering, cargo theft, drug trafficking, gun-running and other criminal activities all take place in the TBA. Beyond the lax law enforcement, the TBA also is popular with criminals because the rivers, roads and bridges in the area provide easy access to transportation networks. The Parana River, for example, leads to the port of Buenos Aires and the Atlantic Ocean, from which stolen or diverted shipments can be sent anywhere in the world."

Stratfor added several key points, linking terror groups to the region:

1. "Hezbollah has used the area as a logistics and transshipment base for years."

2. "The U.S. government also has investigated money-laundering and counterfeiting operations linked to Hezbollah and Hamas in the region."

3. "Hezbollah has used the TBA to support attacks against Israeli targets, most likely including the 1992 and 1994 attacks against the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires."

4. "Other groups, especially the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also use the TBA to support themselves via drug trafficking and other illegal activities."

Paraguay, according to both Jane's and Stratfor has been the focus of U.S. attention, partially due to the fact that since it is the poorest of the three countries in the TBA, it has been more willing to accept support.

According to Stratfor the U.S. has been training Paraguay's armed forces since 2005, and the FBI plans to open an office in the Paraguayan capital of Asuncion, in 2007.

Timing Is Crucial

The timing of the U.S. activity in the TBA is not accidental, by any means. Although this information has been known for some time, and we have reported on it before, there is now a new sense of quasi urgency.

The rationale for this new activity can be found in the detail of the recently declassified 'Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States," which notes the following key points:

1. "the global jihadist movement—which includes al-Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts."

2. "If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide."

3. "Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders."

4. "While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from being exploited by terrorists."

5. "The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint."

Conclusion

The Lebanon war has increased the stature of both Hezbollah and Iran, with the former certainly tied to the TBA area, while the latter may be a behind the scenes player, given its relationship to Hezbollah.

There is no way for the U.S. to stop all of the activity in the TBA area.

Yet, the five points detailed above are clear proof that the U.S. intelligence community has finally grasped the gravity of the situation, and that it has made it clear to the President of the United States.

More important, the TBA is not a source of rhetoric or ideology for terror. It is a source of financing. By monitoring and attacking the financing center of terror, the U.S. may be more successful in the long run, than by going head to head with individual groups, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In other words, it looks as if the U.S. is setting up a listening post in what could become the next staging ground in the war on terror, the TBA.

© 2006 Joe Duarte, M.D.
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