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THE FINANCIAL TSUNAMI
Part 1: Deutsche Bank's Painful Lesson
by F. William
Engdahl
November 24, 2007
Even experienced banker friends tell me that
they think the worst of the US banking troubles are over and that things
are slowly getting back to normal. What is lacking in their rosy
optimism is the realization of the scale of the ongoing deterioration in
credit markets globally, centered in the American asset-backed
securities market, and especially in the market for CDOs—Collateralized
Debt Obligations and CMOs—Collateralized Mortgage Obligations. By now
every serious reader has heard the term “It’s a crisis in Sub-Prime
US home mortgage debt.” What almost no one I know understands is that
the Sub-Prime problem is but the tip of a colossal iceberg that is in a
slow meltdown. I offer one recent example to illustrate my point that
the “Financial Tsunami” is only beginning.
Deutsche Bank got a
hard shock a few days ago when a judge in the state of Ohio in the USA
made a ruling that the bank had no legal right to foreclose on 14 homes
whose owners had failed to keep current in their monthly mortgage
payments. Now this might sound like small beer for Deutsche Bank, one of
the world’s largest banks with over €1.1 trillion (Billionen) in
assets worldwide. As Hilmar Kopper used to say, “peanuts.” It’s
not at all peanuts, however, for the Anglo-Saxon banking world and its
European allies like Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Barclays Bank, HSBC or
others. Why?
A US Federal Judge,
C.A. Boyko in Federal District Court in Cleveland, Ohio ruled to dismiss
a claim by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. DB’s US subsidiary
was seeking to take possession of 14 homes from Cleveland residents
living in them, in order to claim the assets.
Here comes the hair in
the soup. The Judge asked DB to show documents proving legal title to
the 14 homes. DB could not. All DB attorneys could show was a document
showing only an “intent to convey the rights in the mortgages.” They
could not produce the actual mortgage, the heart of Western property
rights since the Magna Charta of not longer.
Again why could
Deutsche Bank not show the 14 mortgages on the 14 homes? Because they
live in the exotic new world of “global securitization”, where banks
like DB or Citigroup buy tens of thousands of mortgages from small local
lending banks, “bundle” them into Jumbo new securities which then
are rated by Moody’s or Standard & Poors or Fitch, and sell them
as bonds to pension funds or other banks or private investors who
naively believed they were buying bonds rated AAA, the highest, and
never realized that their “bundle” of say 1,000 different home
mortgages, contained maybe 20% or 200 mortgages rated “sub-prime,”
i.e. of dubious credit quality.
Indeed the profits
being earned in the past seven years by the world’s largest financial
players from Goldman Sachs to Morgan Stanley to HSBC, Chase, and yes,
Deutsche Bank, were so staggering, few bothered to open the risk models
used by the professionals who bundled the mortgages. Certainly not the
Big Three rating companies who had a criminal conflict of interest in
giving top debt ratings. That changed abruptly last August and since
then the major banks have issued one after another report of disastrous
“sub-prime” losses.
A new unexpected factor
The Ohio ruling that
dismissed DB’s claim to foreclose and take back the 14 homes for
non-payment, is far more than bad luck for the bank of Josef Ackermann.
It is an earth-shaking precedent for all banks holding what they had
thought were collateral in form of real estate property.
How this? Because of
the complex structure of asset-backed securities and the widely
dispersed ownership of mortgage securities (not actual mortgages but the
securities based on same) no one is yet able to identify who precisely
holds the physical mortgage document. Oops! A tiny legal detail our Wall
Street Rocket Scientist derivatives experts ignored when they were
bundling and issuing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of CMO’s in
the past six or seven years. As of January 2007 some $6.5 trillion of
securitized mortgage debt was outstanding in the United States. That’s
a lot by any measure!
In the Ohio case
Deutsche Bank is acting as “Trustee” for “securitization pools”
or groups of disparate investors who may reside anywhere. But the
Trustee never got the legal document known as the mortgage. Judge Boyko
ordered DB to prove they were the owners of the mortgages or notes and
they could not. DB could only argue that the banks had foreclosed on
such cases for years without challenge. The Judge then declared that the
banks “seem to adopt the attitude that since they have been doing this
for so long, unchallenged, this practice equates with legal compliance.
Finally put to the test,” the Judge concluded, “their weak legal
arguments compel the court to stop them at the gate.” Deutsche Bank
has refused comment.
What next?
As news of this legal
precedent spreads across the USA like a California brushfire, hundreds
of thousands of struggling homeowners who took the bait in times of
historically low interest rates to buy a home with often, no money paid
down, and the first 2 years with extremely low interest rate in what are
known as “interest only” Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs), now face
exploding mortgage monthly payments at just the point the US economy is
sinking into severe recession. (I regret the plethora of abbreviations
used here but it is the fault of Wall Street bankers not this author).
The peak period of the
US real estate bubble which began in about 2002 when Alan Greenspan
began the most aggressive series of rate cuts in Federal Reserve history
was 2005-2006. Greenspan’s intent, as he admitted at the time, was to
replace the Dot.com internet stock bubble with a real estate home
investment and lending bubble. He argued that was the only way to keep
the US economy from deep recession. In retrospect a recession in 2002
would have been far milder and less damaging than what we now face.
Of course, Greenspan
has since safely retired, written his memoirs and handed the control
(and blame) of the mess over to a young ex-Princeton professor, Ben
Bernanke. As a Princeton graduate, I can say I would never trust
monetary policy for the world’s most powerful central bank in the
hands of a Princeton economics professor. Keep them in their ivy-covered
towers.
Now the last phase of
every speculative bubble is the one where the animal juices get the most
excited. This has been the case with every major speculative bubble
since the Holland Tulip speculation of the 1630’s to the South Sea
Bubble of 1720 to the 1929 Wall Street crash. It was true as well with
the US 2002-2007 Real Estate bubble. In the last two years of the boom
in selling real estate loans, banks were convinced they could resell the
mortgage loans to a Wall Street financial house who would bundle it with
thousands of good better and worse quality mortgage loans and resell
them as Collateralized Mortgage Obligation bonds. In the flush of greed,
banks became increasingly reckless of the credit worthiness of the
prospective home owners. In many cases they did not even bother to check
if the person was employed. Who cares? It will be resold and securitized
and the risk of mortgage default was historically low.
That was in 2005. The
most Sub-prime mortgages written with Adjustable Rate Mortgage contracts
were written between 2005-2006, the last and most furious phase of the
US bubble. Now a whole new wave of mortgage defaults is about to explode
onto the scene beginning January 2008. Between December 2007 and July 1,
2008 more than $690 Billion in mortgages will face an interest rate jump
according to the contract terms of the ARMs written two years before.
That means market interest rates for those mortgages will explode
monthly payments just as recession drives incomes down. Hundreds of
thousands of homeowners will be forced to do the last resort of any
homeowner: stop monthly mortgage payments.
Here is where the Ohio
court decision guarantees that the next phase of the US mortgage crisis
will assume Tsunami dimension. If the Ohio Deutsche Bank precedent holds
in the appeal to the Supreme Court, millions of homes will be in default
but the banks prevented from seizing them as collateral assets to
resell. Robert Shiller of Yale, the controversial and often correct
author of the book, Irrational
Exuberance, predicting the 2001-2 Dot.com stock crash,
estimates US housing prices could fall as much as 50% in some areas
given how home prices have diverged relative to rents.
The $690 billion worth
of “interest only” ARMs due for interest rate hike between now and
July 2008 are by and large not Sub-prime but a little higher quality,
but only just. There are a total of $1.4 trillion in “interest only”
ARMs according to the US research firm, First American Loan Performance.
A recent study calculates that, as these ARMs face staggering higher
interest costs in the next 9 months, more than $325 billion of the loans
will default leaving 1 million property owners in technical mortgage
default. But if banks are unable to reclaim the homes as assets to
offset the non-performing mortgages, the US banking system and a chunk
of the global banking system faces a financial gridlock that will make
events to date truly “peanuts” by comparison. We will discuss the
global geo-political implications of this in our next report, The
Financial Tsunami: Part 2.

© 2007 F.
William Engdahl
Editorial Archive
F.
William Engdahl
is author of the book, ‘A Century of War: Anglo-American
Oil Politics and the New World Order,’ Pluto Press Ltd. He has a
soon-to-be published book on GMO titled, ‘Seeds of Destruction: The
Hidden Political Agenda Behind GMO’. He may be contacted through his
website, www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net.
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