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FANNIE
MAE:
ANOTHER NEW DEAL
MONSTROSITY
by Eric Englund
and Karen DeCoster
July 3, 2007
The shortcomings of
Fannie Mae have been overlooked on the basis that Fannie plays a
critical role in driving the housing sector, and thus the American
economy. As Fannie goes, so goes the nation.[1]
Fannie means housing, and accordingly, Fannie is the conduit that
takes one from "inequitable ownership" to the American
Dream.[2]
In a nation where equality is everything, and where advantage need not
be earned, but only redistributed, how can anything be more virtuous?
Fannie Mae (FNMA or
Federal National Mortgage Association), a government-sponsored
enterprise (GSE), finances
one of every five home loans in the United States. In 1938 this
GSE was founded by the federal government with a mission to increase
home ownership across the United States. It is subject to
congressional oversight via the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO). Fannie Mae stock (FNM) is actively traded on the
New York Stock Exchange and is part of the Standard & Poor's 500
Composite Stock Price Index.
Fannie Mae may be one
of the most ill-fated welfare creations, ever, on the part of the United
States government. In the beginning, Fannie Mae's impact was negligible,
however, from the outset there were plans to swell Fannie's waistline by
expanding her purchasing authority. At about the time the American
soldiers were coming home from WWII, Fannie was enabled to purchase
loans guaranteed by the Veterans Administration, in addition to the
Federal Housing Administration-insured mortgages it was already
purchasing. This creation and expansion of a secondary market for
mortgages was a vital boost to the supply of lendable money in the
United States.
Privatizing
Government
The notion of a
"right" to home ownership by means of government subsidies is
so firmly entrenched in the American mindset that Fannie could only grow
— and grow she did. In 1968, as a part of Lyndon Johnson's societal
engineering agenda, Fannie was converted into a private[3]
corporation and the ability to guarantee government-issued mortgages was
switched from Fannie to the federal government's newest creation, Ginnie
Mae (Government National Mortgage Association). This meant that Fannie
would begin to operate with private capital on a self-sustaining basis.
Fannie was growing up, and she was going on to bigger and better things.
In 1970, Richard Nixon
authorized Fannie Mae to purchase conventional mortgages, launching a
national secondary market for home mortgages. As Fannie's foray into the
conventional mortgage market began to surge upward, in the 1980s it
began to purchase second mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages, and it
also commenced its mortgage-backed securities scheme.
Fannie Mae advertises
itself as "a shareholder-owned company with a public
purpose." True to its words, in January of 2000 Fannie introduced
its "Mortgage Consumer Bill of Rights" program. This rundown
of entitlements promised the consumer the "right" to access
credit and the "right" to qualify for the lowest-cost mortgage
possible. No de facto private corporation can or will guarantee any
consumers' rights whatsoever — that is, unless it has the authority of
government behind it to bolster its business model and guarantee its
guarantees.
Between Fannie Mae and
its "little brother" Freddie Mac (another GSE), you have the
largest source of cash for home buying in the United States — they
accounted for almost 50% of all mortgage bonds sold through April of
2007, according to Insider
Mortgage Finance. Since the beginning of 2006, over fifty
mortgage companies have discontinued operations, claimed bankruptcy, or
are seeking a buyer. Yet Fannie Mae continues to flourish. Since the end
of March 2007, Fannie Mae's stock price has increased by almost 20%
whereas the S&P 500 Index has risen only 8.1%.
Remember that
corporations are generally chartered by states, and Fannie Mae
was a New Deal innovation — created by and for the federal government.
The sole purpose of this federally chartered, quasi-private entity was
to directly intervene in the housing market while avoiding a more
conspicuous regulatory apparatus governed by rules, thus allowing the
government to advance and steer the government's progressive entitlement
programs while in a semi-mute mode. Meanwhile, Fannie has expanded into
mortgage insurance, sub-prime mortgages, and non-mortgage investments,
exposing taxpayers to a massive risk of default or bankruptcy.
Fannie is a very
willing lender with the power of prominence behind it. Its GSE status
allows it to get away with not maintaining the necessary underlying
capital and enables Fannie to borrow on more favorable terms than its
state-chartered competitors. In addition, Fannie Mae is exempt from
paying state or local income taxes and from filing with the Securities
& Exchange Commission (SEC).
In February 2004, the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, testified
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:
Because Fannie and
Freddie can borrow at a subsidized rate, they have been able to pay
higher prices to originators for their mortgages than can potential
competitors and to gradually but inexorably take over the market for
conforming mortgages. This process has provided Fannie and Freddie
with a powerful vehicle and incentive for achieving extremely rapid
growth of their balance sheets. The resultant scale gives Fannie and
Freddie additional advantages that potential private-sector
competitors cannot overcome. Importantly, the scale itself has
reinforced investors' perceptions that, in the event of a crisis
involving Fannie and Freddie, policymakers would have little
alternative than to have the taxpayers explicitly stand behind the GSE
debt. This view is widespread in the marketplace despite the
privatization of Fannie and Freddie and their control by private
shareholders, because these institutions continue to have government
missions, a line of credit with the Treasury, and other government
benefits, which confer upon them a special status in the eyes of many
investors.
The perversion here is
that the rating agencies, and the financial markets overall, have
interpreted the GSE status to mean that there is an implied government
backing, and thus their securities have been priced accordingly.
Cooking
the Books for Fun Special Favors and Profit
In 2004, Fannie Mae was caught cooking
its books.[i]
The Office
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) alleged
widespread accounting errors on Fannie’s books. James Lockhart,
Director of the OFHEO, commented that “The image of Fannie Mae as one
of the lowest-risk and ‘best in class’ institutions was a façade.
Our examination found an environment where the ends justified the means.
Senior management manipulated accounting, reaped maximum, undeserved
bonuses, and prevented the rest of the world from knowing.” [ii]
The latest tally will have Fannie Mae
restating its earnings to the tune of $11 billion. Flagrant accounting
errors go back to at least the 1990s, when the company was improperly
deferring expenses in order to boost reported net income as it paid out
huge bonuses to top executives. [iii]
Upon being hit by the scandal in 2004, Fannie Mae stopped filing its
financial statements with the SEC. It’s interesting to note that past
and present Board members of Fannie Mae - some of whom are appointed by
the President - have been highly representative of the Beltway elite: a
former Reagan chief-of-staff, lobbyists, a former aide to Nixon, a
Reagan Secretary of Labor, a U.S. trade representative, and a top
economic advisor to President Bush. [iv]
The company plans to hold its shareholder meeting in December of this
year, for the first time in three years.
Maintaining
the Momentum
So here we have a
company surrounded with much misconception in the financial markets and
accused of deceit by its own government overseers. It has chunked away
nearly 40% of its profits via restatements of its fraudulent financial
statements for recent years. Certainly, then, we can predict the
collapse of this mortgage giant due to (1) a lack of audited financials
and thus no conveyance of reliable information to the public, (2) an
accounting scandal that produced achievements which the
OFHEO described as "illusions deliberately and systematically
created by the Enterprise's senior management with the aid of
inappropriate accounting and improper earnings management," (3) and
a collapsing business model in light of a bursting housing bubble, along
with an imploding sub-prime mortgage market.
Wait. Not so fast.
Instead we witness a
publicly traded company with four high-profile attributes:
- Fannie Mae's
financial condition serves as a proxy for Congress's oversight;
- Fannie Mae's
"health" serves as a proxy for the health of the housing
market;
- Fannie Mae's stock
price has an influence on one of the world's most closely watched
stock market indexes;
- Leading up to the
2004 Presidential election, President Bush had an aggressive housing
agenda to "…dismantle
the barriers to homeownership…" with Fannie Mae playing a
significant
role in "financing" this agenda — and perhaps
garnering more than a few votes for Bush and those congressmen who
hung on to the coattails of this agenda.
With mortgage defaults
on the rise, a financial meltdown at Fannie Mae would certainly
demonstrate that foreign policy wasn't President Bush's only major
weakness, and it could prove embarrassing for members of Congress
aspiring to move into the White House.
Considering the four
aforementioned attributes, and the fact that this GSE is deeply mired in
scandal,
Fannie Mae is no doubt being closely monitored by the Working
Group on Financial Markets (a.k.a. the Plunge
Protection Team — which reports directly to the President of the
United States).[8] Accordingly, we
would take great pleasure in seeing Ben Bernanke, a member of the
working group, asked the following questions — including the
supporting commentary — the next time he appears in front of the House
Committee on Financial Services.
- After the collapse
of the NASDAQ bubble in 2000, and after the shock of 9/11, the
Federal Reserve came to believe that the United States was heading
into a deep recession. As is typical of any central bank, the
prescription to reinvigorate the economy entailed creating more
money and granting more credit. By June of 2003, the Fed funds rate
had been reduced to 1%. To be sure, this set America's housing
market ablaze. And this is exactly what the Federal Reserve desired
because it views housing as "…a
key channel of monetary policy transmission."
A strategic cog in the
monetary transmission mechanism is Fannie Mae. In the four-year period
from 2000 to 2003, Fannie Mae's outstanding Mortgage-Backed Securities
grew from $706.7 billion to an astounding $1.3 trillion. Moreover, its
mortgage portfolio ballooned from $607.7 billion to $901.8 billion. With
Fannie Mae financing one in every five home loans in the United States,
didn't it ever occur to the Federal Reserve that it should look into
this financial institution's accounting, management control, and credit
quality systems? If this massive transmitter of money — Fannie Mae —
was not up to the task of responsibly lending such vast quantities of
money into existence, did it not occur to the Federal Reserve that it
may have to clean up the mess it had a hand in making? Does the Federal
Reserve have a plan to bail out the second largest financial institution
in the United States?
-
Since the Federal
Reserve is so focused on consumer confidence and expectations,
wouldn't the share price of Fannie Mae's common stock be of keen
interest to the Federal Reserve and the Working Group on Financial
Markets? After all, the Federal Reserve engineered
the housing bubble, and the health of Fannie Mae may be viewed as a
proxy for the health of America's housing market. Interestingly
enough, America's housing market is experiencing a significant
decline while Fannie Mae's stock price has appreciated by about 50%
from its 52-week low, and it recently hit its 52-week high. There
seems to be a disconnect here, especially when factoring in rising
interest rates and the meltdown in subprime mortgages. In light of
this, does the working group exercise any influence on the price of
Fannie Mae's stock?
-
On May 2, 2007,
Fannie Mae filed its latest form 10-K with the SEC. One would assume
that this 10-K contained Fannie Mae's 12/31/06 audited financial
statement. With Fannie Mae's internal accounting nightmare, it turns
out that this 10-K contains audited financial information as of
12/31/05. Management hopes to have the 12/31/06 audited financial
statement available by next
quarter. Since you have a PhD in economics, you must be
cognizant of the fact that security analysis begins with examining a
publicly held company's fiscal year-end audited financial statement.
Does it not strike you as odd that of the 16
Wall Street brokerage houses tracking this security, 9 had
"buy" recommendations, 5 were "neutral" and 2
had "sell" recommendations? Considering that the
investment community has waited a couple of years to receive any
kind of credible financial information, and that the 2006 audited
financial statement is still not available, doesn't it seem a bit
unethical for any brokerage house (including Bank of America and
Morgan Stanley) to recommend buying the stock of a company for which
only stale audited financial data exists? Therefore, it begs the
question as to what influence the Working Group on Financial Markets
is exercising over the powerful Wall Street brokerage houses? Quite
candidly, this smacks of a cozy relationship between certain
powerful brokerage firms and the working group.
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$22 |
| "There's
nothing American about this dream." |
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The Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission also serves on the Working Group.
Have you ever asked him why he hasn't recommended that Fannie Mae's
stock be delisted from the New York Stock Exchange? After all, if
any other publicly held company hadn't provided an audited financial
statement for fiscal-years 2004 and 2005 — until December 6, 2006
and May 2, 2007 respectively — wouldn't such a company have been
delisted long ago?
-
Is the Working
Group pressuring Standard & Poor's to keep Fannie Mae in its
prestigious S&P 500 Index? How else could Fannie's presence in
the S&P 500 Index be sustained?
Fannie Mae is not a
free-market entity, nor is it a private body that must compete on the
same playing field as its competitors. Fannie Mae is representative of
all that's wrong with central planning institutions: it is a
government-created conduit for carefully crafted financial and market
socialism that the bureaucrats uphold for the purpose of propping up
their fantasies for pandemic social engineering.
There's nothing
"American" about this dream. In the eyes of the Republic's
visionaries, this particular dream has turned into a nightmare.
Notes
[1]
Back in the "good old days" when GM had mega-market share and
was the nation's corporate powerhouse, the saying was "As GM goes,
so goes the nation." With home ownership being the pinnacle of
equality nowadays — and thus the focus of government's interventionist
policies — perhaps Fannie should be given that honorable distinction.
[2]
In 2001, Fannie Mae introduced its American
Dream Commitment (ADC) — a promise to increase home ownership
rates through minority ownership initiatives; keep families from losing
their homes; and support housing for the chronically homeless.
[3]
The FNMA was partitioned into two separate entities: the GNMA remained a
wholly owned corporation of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development and Fannie Mae became a "private" corporation by
virtue of the government "retiring" its stock in FNMA. The
fact that Fannie became shareholder-owned and is therefore
"private" is a hoodwink.
[4]
Freddie Mac had its own book-cooking going on. This company misstated
earnings by $5 billion and is still trying to figure out how to fix what
it did. In spite of that, on the week of June 18, 2007, one brokerage
house upgraded Freddie Mac's stock.
[5]
Fannie had to conclude in a management assessment — required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley law — that internal controls over financial reporting
for both 2004 and 2005 were ineffective. That's putting it lightly.
[6]
The May 2006 report from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) is truly an eye opener. Yes, it is a government
oversight organization, and that's why the report's frankness and
vitriol is a refreshing surprise. (The report is available here
in PDF.)
[7]
Naming
names: Kenneth M. Duberstein, a lobbyist and former chief of staff
to President Ronald Reagan; Frederick Malek, an investor and former aide
to President Richard Nixon; Ann McLaughlin Korologos, a former secretary
of labor under Reagan; Stephen Friedman, formerly President George W.
Bush's top economic adviser and former co-chairman of Goldman Sachs with
Robert Rubin; Robert Zoellick, US trade representative.
[8]
The Working Group on Financial Markets is not a figment of any one
person's imagination, nor is it a twisted conspiracy theory created by
"whacko" conspiracy theorists. The mainstream press has, for a
long time, been calling this issue to the carpet, with nary a response
from its members. See Karen
and Eric's July 2006 article on the working group and their
suspicion regarding GM stock prices. Note that Ron
Paul used this article as the basis for questioning Ben Bernanke
about the inner workings of the group during a House Financial Committee
hearing. Also see
the Washington Post on plunge protection.

© 2007 Eric Englund
Editorial Archives
Eric
Englund has
an MBA from Boise State University and lives in the state of Oregon.
He is the publisher of The
Hyperinflation Survival Guide by Dr. Gerald Swanson. You are
invited to visit his website.
Karen
De Coster is a Certified Public Accountant and has an MA in
Economics. She works in the securities industry. Send her mail.
Eric Englund has an MBA
from Boise State University and works in risk management. He lives in
the state of Oregon. He is the publisher of The
Hyperinflation Survival Guide by Dr. Gerald Swanson. Send him mail.
Comment on the blog.
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