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Saudi Arabia was able to
rapidly ramp up oil production in the 1970s to meet global demand. This
was particularly important given that US production peaked in 1971-72
and then began a gradual downtrend. The Saudis picked up the slack.
The fact that Saudi Arabia
was able to increase its production by a factor of nearly five in only
15 years is amazing; such rapid and sustained production growth has not
been repeated elsewhere. But what’s even more amazing is that it was
comparatively easy to do. Giant oilfields, by far the most prolific ever
discovered anywhere in the world, flowed easily in those early years and
could be produced using relatively unsophisticated techniques. The
country didn’t need a huge number of wells or more advanced horizontal
drilling techniques and “intelligent” wells to produce its fields.
The same basic production
pattern is evident in all sorts of oilfields all over the world. See
“The Alaska Experience” below, a chart of Alaskan crude production
below.

Source: Energy Information Administration
The big
find in Alaska was the Prudhoe Bay field, discovered in the late ‘70s.
Production ramped up quickly through the early ‘80s and then plateaued.
Prudhoe Bay actually stayed at near-peak production for an unusually
long period of time and didn’t peak until the late ‘80s because the
operators were careful not to overproduce the field. By deliberately
producing a field at less than full capacity, it’s possible to sustain
high levels of production for longer periods of time. Overproducing a
field can actually damage the reservoir and lower the amount of oil
ultimately recovered.
While
operators have used increasingly high-tech methods to produce Prudhoe
Bay, it has seen declining production since that late-‘80s peak. The
point is it’s easier to grow or maintain production on the left side
of this bell-curve than on the right side.
Fast-forward
another 25 years to the present day and Saudi Arabia is once again the
focus of the global oil market. It produces roughly 13 percent of global
oil consumption and, more importantly, is the only nation with at least
a plausible claim of spare capacity, and has infrastructure in place to
quickly increase production of oil to meet global needs or offset supply
shocks elsewhere in the world.
It’s no
secret that oil demand is booming. By 2025, the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) projects global oil demand of more than 120
million barrels per day, up from approximately 80 to 85 million today.
That’s a 50 percent jump in demand.
In this
era of booming global demand, the importance of Saudi production can’t
be overstated. The world is already depending on another turbocharged
spurt of production growth from Saudi Arabia to meet future needs (see
the chart below).

Source: Energy Information Administration
This
reliance on Saudi Arabian supply is obvious from the EIA’s 2005 Annual
Energy Outlook survey. The EIA is projecting only slight oil production
growth from the industrialized world. Meanwhile, the developing
world--including Russia and the former Soviet republics--is projected to
kick in slightly higher growth.
But the
real growth in production is projected to come from the Middle East. In
fact, the EIA is projecting a near doubling in annual oil production
from this region, a large chunk of that coming from the Saudis.
The Saudis
have publicly supported this outlook. They’ve repeatedly insisted
they’ll be able to increase their production capacity over the next
few years to meet all that new demand. And historically the Saudis have
lived up to this role, ramping up supply whenever necessary.
But
several cracks have recently appeared in the Saudi miracle (for more
information see my report, The
Saudi Mirage). Rising demand from the developing world has meant
that Saudi Arabia’s spare capacity is shrinking. Annual production
stood at 9 million barrels per day in 1999 and grew to more than 10.5
million barrels last year. Spare capacity is simply mothballed wells
(wells not flowing at full capacity). As oil demand grows, the Desert
Kingdom has been ramping up production and that spare capacity has been
shrinking.
By most
estimates, the Saudis’ current production capacity is 11 million
barrels per day. If they’re producing approximately 10.5 million, that
means they have just 0.5 million in share capacity against closer to 2.5
million to 3 million just six years ago. With global oil demand at more
than 80 million barrels per day, Saudi spare capacity now sits at less
than 1 percent of daily demand--tight by any measure.
This is
why any disruption in the global oil supply can lead to huge jumps in
the price of crude. When spare capacity is large, and there’s a sudden
drop in production somewhere in the world, the capacity cushions that
supply shock. But when Hurricane Katrina hit and oil prices spiked,
Saudi Arabia all but admitted it couldn’t make up for all the lost
production.
Saudi
Arabia’s entire oil industry is veiled in secrecy, and there are
plenty of signs its oil reserve and production potential have been
massively overstated. There’s plenty of evidence the Saudis are
already experiencing high water cuts--they’re producing
increasingly large amounts of salt water mixed with their crude oil.
Rising water cuts are typical of more mature fields and make it more
expensive to produce oil. This is also partly due to the country’s
long-standing aggressive water flooding--injecting water into its
oil fields to push oil towards the wells.
But even
if we hold to the optimistic belief the Saudis can increase their
production capacity, it’s abundantly clear this will require massive
investments. It’s easier to increase production from relatively young
fields than it is to ramp up production from more mature reservoirs. And
Saudi Aramco has described some of its largest fields as mature on
multiple occasions.
Bottom
line: If it is possible for the Saudis to grow their production and
capacity, the task will be neither easy nor cheap.
The Saudis
are looking to boost their capacity from 11 million to 12.5 million
barrels per day over the next few years. This would at least slightly
widen that spare capacity cushion. To that end they’re already ramping
up their drilling activity in a big way; the Saudi rig count now stands
at a 25 year high (see chart “The Saudis Are Drilling”).

Source: Baker Hughes
The rapid
rise of active drilling rigs since the late ‘90s is proof-positive
that Saudi Arabia is working to enhance its production capacity.
Eventually, the Saudis are expected to boost their total fleet of
operating rigs to around 70 or 80 from the current 40. This would
represent a more than tripling of the rig count since the mid-‘90s.
The real
winners of this increased activity and expensive investments are the oil
services stocks, more particularly the big, internationally levered
names.
The
obvious player in this space is Schlumberger, a well-established
player in Saudi Arabia and across the Middle East. It specializes in
technically complex services--exactly the sort of technology that Saudi
Arabia is using to try to increase capacity. Schlumberger’s a leader
in most of the fields in which it operates. More rigs drilling in Saudi
Arabia means more business for Schlumberger.
Schlumberger,
however, represents just the tip of the iceberg with regards in how to
profit from the Saudi oil story.
Sincerely,
Elliott Gue, Editor
The Energy Strategist

© 2005 Elliott H. Gue
Editorial Archive

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