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WHAT TO DO NEXT:
5 FINANCIAL
ALTERNATIVES
(TO STOCKS) FOR THESE VOLATILE TIMES
by George
Kleinman
Editor, Commodities
Trends
August 7, 2007
In the financial markets, all we know for sure is that nothing’s for
sure.
The way I see it, financially speaking the stock market doesn’t appear
to be the place to be right now. Stocks have retreated in recent weeks,
but they certainly could go lower, possibly a lot lower. For the
foreseeable future, I plan to steer clear of most stocks, investment
real estate and any bond below investment grade.
The question of the hour is what to do next? There are viable
alternatives for both safety and for high-potential speculation.
In this special two-part Commodities Trends (part 2 will be
e-mailed on our next scheduled release date, August 20) I’ll first
explain why stocks look risky to me right now, and then outline five
viable and tradable alternatives.
These are alternatives I personally have invested in, trade in, or am
looking to diversify into. You won’t be reading about certain of these
alternatives in the mainstream financial press. The objective of this
two-part series is to help you prosper in today’s financial world, one
fraught with risk and uncertainty.
You may have noticed the plethora of IPOs, mergers, acquisitions, junk
bonds, financings, hedge funds and deals of all sorts in recent months.
This type of mania often takes place just prior to stock market crashes.
It occurred just prior to the stock market crash of 1987 and again right
before the dot-com mania in 1999-2000. It occurred before the Japan
crash in the early 1990s, the Southeast Asia crash in the late ’90s
and, yes, even prior to the Great Depression of the early ’30s. It’s
the smart money’s way of cashing in and cashing out.
I’ve observed this phenomenon before, and believe I understand the
reason so many smart people have been looking to cash in and cash out
right now. The reason is the liquidity that fuels a bull market is
quickly drying up, and this could create a big problem not just in
stocks but also in a variety of financial markets.
The liquidity problem was created by the Fed’s (Greenspan’s) easy
money policy, and has recently come to a head with the subprime loan
problems. At first I didn’t fully understand what a contagious problem
this was. Originally I thought, like most investors, that the subprime
problem only affected some naïve homebuyers enticed by teaser loans and
a few hedge funds.
However, now I’m beginning to understand how this problem is a
spreading monster with implications for the entire stock market.
Here’s why: We already know foreclosures are skyrocketing. The worst
is yet to come. Before the end of 2007 more than $200 billion in
subprime, adjustable rate mortgages will adjust upward from low teaser
rates. Many subprime borrowers will see their monthly payments increase
by 30, 40, and even 50 percent. And it’s a fact that many, many more
of them will default.
How do I know this? It’s already happened on billions of subprime debt
that has already adjusted in the first half of this year. This is why
two Bear Stearns hedge funds are in collapse. This is why the
chart for American Home Mortgage, the tenth-largest mortgage
lender in 2006, looks like this:
American Home Mortgage

Source: Commodity.com
This is why the chart for the largest mortgage lender in the US, Countrywide
Financial Corp, looks like this:
Countrywide Financial Corp

Source: Commodity.com
With housing prices falling, these borrowers who thought they could
always sell their homes are finding out they have negative equity and
can’t refinance and can’t sell.
We also now know about the Bear Stearns problems, explaining why it’s
chart looks like this:
The Bear Stearns Companies

Source: Commodity.com
Note that Bear Stearns also has a Countrywide connection. Also note the
volume spike in the shares last Friday. Large volume is generally
significant. Volume spikes can occur at bottoms (it’s always darkest
just before the dawn), and I believe it will be important to watch how
Bear Stearns performs over the coming weeks. If it can stabilize here
and head higher, perhaps the worst is over. However, if Bear Stearns
(and also Countrywide) start to move lower still from this large-volume
area, they (and the stock market in general) could move substantially
lower.
Here’s the question this all hinges on: How many more are out there?
I fear many more. Certain of these entities and hedge funds are getting
singed, and the investing public may not even have a clue. Many of the
banks could be getting burned as well. The yields on high-risk money are
going up, and this is the heart of the problem.
The mergers, acquisitions, public offerings and deals of all varieties
and sizes have one common denominator: They’re fueled by cheap money.
And because of the subprime problem, cheap money is fast becoming a
relic of the past.
It’s all related. As home equity evaporates, delinquencies go up,
foreclosures go up, home equity loans go down, with consumer spending
behind it. As the economy weakens we buy less from China. Liquidity from
China starts to dry up, affecting the global economy and energy
consumption fades. Oil money, which has also been fueling hedge funds
and deal making, is less plentiful. There are other hedge funds on the
wrong side of some of these positions, and other hedge fund collapses.
More risk, more leverage. Cheap money is what got deals done. Cheap
money is fueled by liquidity. Less liquidity means money is dearer and
becomes more expensive, and this is definitely not a recipe for stock
market success. And the US government has few options. Overextended with
a costly foreign war, and trillions in debt, one of the only ways out of
this is money printing. This ultimately exacerbates inflation, causing
rates to rise even further and compounding these problems.
Stock market crashes are generally preceded by periods of prosperity and
are seldom predicted. They’re created by periods of easy money that
turn into periods of tight money, ultimately leading to money printing
and inflation.
You get the picture, and I’m not exactly sure how it all shakes out.
But I’ve lightened up substantially on stocks in my personal accounts
(only holding those I consider very long term), investment real estate
and junk bonds.
And this brings us to the meat of the matter.
Five Financial Alternatives (to Stocks) for These
Volatile Times
We’ll discuss Nos. 1 and 2 in this issue and tackle Nos. 3 through 5
on August 20.
Financial Alternative No. 1: Buy Six-Mmonth US Treasury Bills
Six-month Treasury bills are risk-free and as we go to press are
yielding 4.88 percent. Not a bad place to park a good portion of your
funds to safely wait out a market shakeout. (You can check out current
Treasury and other key rates here.)
Financial Alternative No 2: Buy Japanese Yen
My reasoning here has to do with diversification out of the US dollar
and the yen carry trade.
The yen carry trade works like this. Numerous market players (including
Bear Stearns) have in recent years borrowed yen (a low-yielding
currency) to invest in higher-yielding currencies such as the Australian
dollar. When you borrow something, you eventually have to pay it back.
For all the reasons stated above, the hedge funds will be liquidating
large directional positions, and this includes their short yen positions
(reputed to be massive).
Covering short yen should in effect place a bid under the market and
raise the value of the currency. The rate on the yen, the yield, is
virtually zero. Any gains in yen-denominated assets will come from
appreciation of the currency itself in relation to the dollar.
And the Japanese yen has exhibited a bottoming pattern in recent weeks;
last week it broke above the weekly trendline, as shown below:
September Yen

Source: Commodity.com
How can a US investor buy yen? Some banks offer CDs denominated in
foreign currencies, and you can buy Japanese bonds through many brokers.
I trade the Japanese yen futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).
One Japanese yen contract is for 12,500,000 JPY, a value of about
$107,000 at current exchange rates. The CME only requires an initial
margin deposit of $2,700 per yen contract, or less than 3 percent of the
contract’s value. At 3 percent margin, if the Yen price moves only 3
percent you would double your margin money or get wiped out.
It makes more sense, in my opinion, to put up additional margin (say 25
percent). If a trader posts 25 percent margin, the yen would have to
move 25 percent against you before a margin call would be generated. If
the dollar value of the yen appreciated from the current 85 level to the
98 level (it traded there as recently as early 2005, a 15 percent move),
your dollar return would be approximately $16,000 per contract traded.
If you posted the 25 percent margin with your broker per each contract
you bought (about $25,000), a move of this magnitude would return more
than 60 percent. In terms of the risk, I would use a stop loss point at
82, this being an approximate risk of 350 basis points from the 8,550
level. In dollar terms this amounts to approximately $4,500 per contract
traded, or almost a 4-to-1 reward-to-risk ratio.
In our next issue I’ll present Financial Alternatives Nos. 3 through
5.
Good luck and good trading during these volatile times.

© 2007 George Kleinman
Editorial Archive

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Risk
Disclaimer
Futures and futures options can entail a high degree of risk and are not
appropriate for all investors. Commodities Trends is strictly
the opinion of its writer. Use it as a valuable tool, not the "Holy
Grail." Any actions taken by readers are for their own account and
risk. Information is obtained from sources believed reliable, but is in
no way guaranteed. The author may have positions in the markets
mentioned including at times positions contrary to the advice quoted
herein. Opinions, market data and recommendations are subject to change
at any time. Past Results Are Not Necessarily Indicative of Future
Results.
Hypothetical
Performance
Hypothetical performance results have many inherent limitations, some of
which are described below. No representation is being made that any
account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those
shown. In fact, there are frequently sharp differences between
hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently
achieved by any particular trading program. One of the limitations of
hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared
with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does
not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can
completely account for the impact of financial risk in actual trading.
For example, the ability to withstand losses or to adhere to a
particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material
points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are
numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the
implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully
accounted for in the preparation of hypothetical performance results and
all of which can adversely affect actual trading results.
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