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“Hegemonic empires,”
observed Henry Kissinger, “almost automatically elicit universal
resistance, which is why all such claimants sooner or later exhausted
themselves.”
As the US is currently the
world’s sole superpower, its reaction to new cooperation between and
among old enemies (for example, China and India) in the quest for
economic growth will shape the geopolitical and investment climate for
the 21st century. The US must accept new relationships it might have
previously frowned upon given its deep dependence on foreign capital to
finance its needs. The current global instability brought about by this
realignment of relationships is augmented by a new arms race.
Global and regional
geostrategic developments are of immense importance when making
long-term investment decisions. Investors and policy makers are
similarly situated: Those who understand the purely economic reasons for
the new relationships will prosper, serving their portfolios and their
countries well.
Regarding Asia, the
resolution or clarification of the following issues will have global
consequences:
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China’s
political ambitions and military capabilities
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India’s
desire for first-world power status
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The
outcome of the U.S.-Russia-China race for influence in central Asia
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Russia’s
role as a vital source of energy
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The
potential Korean unification
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Iran’s
importance to Asia
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Japan’s
future security needs
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US
involvement in Asia and how it affects the changing geopolitical
landscape in the region
These issues are
interrelated and are, therefore, extremely complicated, but one central
conclusion can be drawn: The post-World War II status quo in Asia is
unwinding.
This process will take
time and won’t dramatically affect our economic and investment
projections for the next 10 years. During the next decade, the US must
gradually disengage itself from certain security obligations (for
example, Korea, Japan and Taiwan) in a smooth manner. But there’s no
guarantee that a mindless move by any of the major players won’t
derail a peaceful transition. This is a variable that could threaten
stability in Asia and the world.
The
Russia-Iran-India-China axis is a potential force with which the US will
either compete or cooperate. A competition would involve a division of
economic spheres along multipolar lines as opposed to the current
unipolar arrangement. Japan’s response to the rise of such an axis is
also critical; it could be economically beneficial but strategically
unacceptable. Based on its history, Japan will most likely develop
strong ties with the axis, given the profound economic impact such
cooperation will have in Asia.
The West will soon have
to alter its foreign policy model to produce results that bring about
further stability. The current approach seems to emphasize the adoption
by the emerging world of particularly Western ideological values. “It
is sheer hubris,” Samuel Huntington has written, “to think that
because Soviet Communism has collapsed, the West has won the World for
all time and that Muslims, Chinese, Indians, and others are going to
rush to embrace Western liberalism as the only alternative.”
Mark Mazower, writing
in the Financial Times, expressed similar concerns. “States
that believe promotion of their interests depends on export of their
culture and values are doomed to fail...of course China’s rise does
not portend the downfall of the US or Europe but it does challenge the
West’s self-perception as the civilizational hegemon in global
affairs...[T]he world before 1800 was one of multiple power-centers and
value systems: Let us adjust to the fact that it is starting to look
like that again.”
It may be difficult for
many to accept Mazower’s conclusion, let alone imagine a situation
where the US is confronted directly. A rising state must first catch up
with and then challenge the world’s sole superpower. Rather than
resting on the ambitions of a single country, the threat to US hegemony
lies in the possibility that it exercises its power-projection
capability through military action in a number of asymmetric conflicts.
This could push the US into selecting the parts of the world where it
concentrates its influence and power.
The question is this:
How far can the US stretch itself militarily, diplomatically and
economically? The prolonged occupation of Iraq demonstrates that once a
large-scale conflict arises, the majority of resources and intellectual
capacity are concentrated on that particular conflict. Other issues in
different regions are ignored. East Asia is a clear example of this
dynamic, and exposes the previously unthinkable possibility that the
U.S. may still dominate the balance of power, but not the balance of
influence.
Investors who fail to
consider or, worse, treat lightly the geopolitical changes taking place
substantially increase the risk to their domestic and international
investments.
The preceding is
excerpted from The Silk Road to Riches: How You Can Profit By
Investing In Asia’s Newfound Prosperity, published by Financial
Times/ Prentice Hall. The Silk Road to Riches is available at Amazon.com
and is in a bookstore near you.

© 2006 Yiannis G. Mostrous
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