And now the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS}, the central bank of the central
banks, has confessed to the gold price suppression scheme.
The confession of the
BIS came last June in a fairly candid speech by the head of the bank's
monetary and economic department, William R. White, to central bankers
and academics gathered at the BIS' fourth annual conference, held in
Basel, Switzerland.
The speech was provided
to GATA this week.
White's speech was
titled "Past and Future of Central Bank Cooperation" and he
said in part:
"The
intermediate objectives of central bank cooperation are more varied.
"First,
better joint decisions, in the relatively rare circumstances where such
coordinated action is called for.
"Second,
a clear understanding of the policy issues as they affect central banks.
Hopefully this would reflect common beliefs, but even a clear
understanding of differences of views can sometimes be useful.
"Third,
the development of robust and effective networks of contacts.
"Fourth,
the efficient international dissemination of both ideas and information
that can improve national policy making.
"And
last, the provision of international credits and joint efforts to
influence asset prices (especially gold and foreign exchange) in
circumstances where this might be thought useful."
That is, central banks
collaborate -- and since they do so in secret, it may be said that they
conspire -- to rig the gold and currency markets.
To use White's word,
the central banks collaborate "especially" to rig the gold and
currency markets.
Thankfully White did
not accuse those who read his speech of being "conspiracy
nuts." We still have Dennis Gartman, Tim Wood, and a few others for
that, even if their band is rapidly diminishing.
Let me begin this
meeting by welcoming all of you, both central bankers and academics, to
this conference on the "Past and Future of Central Bank
Cooperation."
This is the fourth in a
series of annual conferences, all of which have been based on the
premise that these two communities have a great deal to learn from each
other. In particular, we feel that the central bankers, who are on the
firing line of public policy, have some comparative advantage in
identifying the issues that need analysis. The academics, in turn, have
a similar advantage with respect to analytical tools, rigour, and
sometimes, quite simply, the time to do the thinking required.
In this spirit,
participation in the conference this year does mark a further step
forward. Whereas in the past we primarily invited academic economists
and economic historians, this year we have extended the writ to a number
of political scientists interested in political and other processes, and
the development of institutions to support such processes. I am pleased
about this, in part because I have felt for a long time (and I think
there is evidence to back this up) that the multidisciplinary approach
often leads to big breakthroughs in terms of understanding. But, more
particularly, I am also pleased because it responds to a specific
concern that I have had for many years here at the BIS. Namely, that, as
we were trying over the years to make the BIS more relevant and useful
to the global community, we were relying too much on the views of
economists, like myself, with no real training in such organisational
matters. As I mentioned to Ethan Kapstein a number of years ago, I
thought we needed help and this conference might be the first step down
that path.
As to the choice of the
particular topic for this conference, it was in a way a
"no-brainer" given that this year marks the 75th anniversary
of the founding of the BIS. Since the BIS has been in the central bank
cooperation business since its start, the idea of a conference to look
back at past successes and failures, and what we could learn from them,
had an obvious appeal. Looking forward, there was also a sense that
changes in the structure of international financial markets had likely
made the issue of international cooperation among central banks of even
greater interest than in the past.
On the one hand, it
could be argued that virtually everything has an international flavour
in today's "globalised" world. This might imply even more work
for central banks and regulatory agencies to resolve problems of mutual
interest. On the other hand, however, with deregulated markets playing a
bigger role than ever and floating exchange rates increasingly the rule,
one could also argue that the need for international cooperation has now
been much reduced.
In a nutshell, if
central banks are focused on domestic price stability, and if domestic
financial stability is assured by adequate governance and regulatory
standards (albeit likely to be internationally negotiated), what further
role is there for international cooperation? Moreover, it could also be
posited that the narrower domestic mandate of central banks will further
reduce the scope for international central bank cooperation as well.
Before turning briefly
to an assessment of past efforts and likely future challenges, it is
perhaps worth spending a minute on what is meant by central bank
cooperation.
I think that the
terminology developed for domestic monetary policy might have some uses
here; namely, the ultimate objectives, the intermediate objectives and
the operational instruments. The ultimate objectives have always been
monetary and financial stability, though clearly the focus of attention
has often shifted over the years.
The intermediate
objectives of central bank cooperation are more varied.
First, better joint
decisions, in the relatively rare circumstances where such coordinated
action is called for.
Second, a clear
understanding of the policy issues as they affect central banks.
Hopefully this would reflect common beliefs, but even a clear
understanding of differences of views can sometimes be useful.
Third, the development
of robust and effective networks of contacts.
Fourth, the efficient
international dissemination of both ideas and information that can
improve national policymaking.
And last, the provision
of international credits and joint efforts to influence asset prices (especially
gold and foreign exchange) in circumstances where this might be
thought useful.
Talking about the
instruments of central bank cooperation brings us more directly to the
services which the BIS has provided to the international central banking
community over the years.
First, I would note the
various meetings of central bankers and regulators which take place in
the "Basel community," if not necessarily in Basel. These now
number over 300 a year and involve governors as well as all types of
specialists (IT experts, auditors, security experts, economists, etc.)
within the central banks.
Second, there is
research and policy analysis directed to international issues. This
conference is a good example of the genre.
Third, there is data
and information, most notably on international bank lending,
cross-border securities markets, and derivatives markets.
And finally, there are
the BIS banking services to central banks, which have allowed us to
maintain the share of global foreign exchange reserves deposited at the
BIS at around 6 percent of the global total. Managing this money gives
us a particular insight into how global financial markets actually work.
Well, if that is what
central bank cooperation is all about, has it done any good?
Since I have been in
the cooperation business for over 20 years now, the last 11 at the BIS,
it would be strange if I did not say yes. The fact that our partners in
cooperation keep coming back, in ever-increasing numbers and asking for
ever more diverse products, also points in the same direction. And by
the standards of other forums for international cooperation, the efforts
of central banks also look pretty good.
Consider, for example,
the issue of collective action clauses in international bond contracts
to facilitate agreement among creditors in case of default. These were
first suggested by a G-10 central bank working group in 1995 (also by
Eichengreen and Portes), advocated by the G-10 deputies in 1996,
endorsed by the G-10 ministers and governors in 1997, overtaken by the
work of the Willard Group in 1998 and 1999, subsequently forgotten
about, and ultimately introduced on a geographically widespread basis
only dating from 2003, and only partially in terms of content.
Clearly, international
cooperation is not always an easy game to play, so even the relatively
modest achievements of the central bank community must be viewed
positively. And I would like to believe that the contribution of the BIS
to this process -- a small staff focused on customer service and the
capacity to see two sides of an argument -- has also been a useful one.
Yet, for completeness,
it must also be noted that central bank cooperation may not always have
been used to good effect. Some have argued that the efforts made here in
Basel to paper over the cracks in the Bretton Woods system served not so
much to buy needed time but as a means to postpone needed and much more
fundamental policy adjustments. My own personal involvement with bridge
loans, directed via the BIS to many emerging-market countries in the
1980s and early 1990s, led me to conclude that some of the later ones
should never have been made in the first place. Increasingly, they were
show rather than substance and threatened to undermine the credibility
of other, more substantial forms of liquidity support.
Looking ahead, a number
of policy challenges might call for more intensive international
cooperation, including among central banks.
The first and biggest
has to do with widening external imbalances. These could catalyse an
international crisis at some point, with potentially disruptive
movements in both exchange rates and the prices of financial assets. At
the textbook level, it is reasonably clear what all the major players
should do to reduce these risks. However, it is equally clear that many
of them face other constraints as well, not least political resistance
to following the required course of action. In this environment, it does
not seem silly to suggest that a cooperative response might be required.
A second challenge for
central bank cooperation will be to find ways to better integrate their
cooperative efforts with those of regulators and supervisors in the
pursuit of international financial stability. Central bankers are
increasingly aware that injections of liquidity to support financial
stability may lead to excessive increases in asset prices as well as
moral hazard. Regulators are also increasingly aware that their domestic
efforts also have a macroeconomic dimension. These are conceptual
advances.
Nevertheless, the
cross-border aspects of crisis prevention and crisis management need
still greater attention. In particular, how a large, complex and
globally active financial firm might be wound down while keeping its
vital functions intact remains a puzzle at best.
And a third challenge
has to do with regional central bank cooperation and how this fits into
the broader framework of global cooperation.
The BIS was
instrumental in helping Europeans prepare themselves for monetary union.
Today similar interests are being expressed in the Gulf, parts of
Africa, and Central America. In Asia a framework for greater monetary
cooperation seems gradually to be taking shape, underpinned by
increasing trade integration. Everywhere in the emerging markets there
is a keen interest in learning about central banking issues from those
more experienced with liberalised economic and financial systems.
To conclude, whether
looking back or forward, a number of interesting questions pertaining to
central bank cooperation remain unanswered. I have every confidence that
the presentations and the subsequent discussions will move us a long way
toward rectifying that situation. May I take this opportunity to thank
all those who have prepared papers, to thank the discussants, and to
encourage all members of the audience to participate actively. As I said
at the beginning, we all have a lot to learn from each other. So speak
up.