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In
several past issues I have commented on how the unstable political
situation in Venezuela could lead to supply disruptions.
There is now substantial evidence to suggest that Venezuela’s
oil production has entered into a permanent and irreversible decline.
Until
recently, Venezuela had been home to one of the world’s most efficient
national oil companies. Unfortunately, much of Petroleos de Venezuela’s (PDVSA)
proud past is now a fading memory. To
get a better understanding of the oil industry in Venezuela, let’s
take a look at its history.
Venezuela’s
first oil well dates all the way back to 1878 when a well was drilled
into an oil field in the Lake Maracaibo area.
However it was not until 1907, with the arrival of foreign oil
companies, that Venezuela’s modern oil industry was born.
Major oil companies of the day such as Shell, Standard Oil of
Indiana (which later sold its stake in Venezuela to Exxon for shares in
the company) and Gulf Oil of Pittsburgh enjoyed tremendous success in
Venezuela. These three companies
were the main drivers of Venezuela’s production growth after World War
I, from only 300,000 barrels of oil per day (bopd) to nearly 2 million
bopd by 1970. However, by the
1950’s, it was becoming apparent that the role of foreign oil
companies in Venezuela was about to change.
With
the founding of OPEC in 1960 and the nationalization of oil interests by
several Middle Eastern OPEC members, Venezuela decided to begin
nationalizing the country’s oil assets.
By 1976, the nationalization process was complete and all foreign
concessions were declared void. To
replace the foreign operators, Venezuela’s national oil company, PDVSA
was born.The company is now the country’s largest business and source
of government revenue. In 2001,
the country’s hydrocarbon laws were once again changed to allow for
foreign participation in the country’s oil industry.
The new hydrocarbon law stipulates that PDVSA must retain at
least a 51% stake in any new exploration and production license.
A
branch of the Andes Mountains divides the country into two oil producing
provinces: the Maracaibo Basin in the
West, and the Eastern Venezuela Basin in the East.
One of the largest oil fields in the Lake Maracaibo region is the
Boscan field. Originally
discovered by Chevron (NYSE:CVX) in 1946, operatorship of the field was
turned over to PDVSA following nationalization.
However, CVX was invited back into Venezuela in 1995 to assume
operatorship of the Boscan field. The field currently produces approximately 100,000 bopd. It should
be noted that CVX has no equity interest in the field and acts solely as
a contractor for PDVSA.
Venezuela
contains billions of barrels in extra-heavy crude oil and bitumen
deposits, most of which are situated in the Orinoco Belt, located in
Central Venezuela (estimates range from 100 - 270 billion barrels of
recoverable reserves). There are four congressionally approved joint
ventures between PDVSA and foreign partners to develop extra-heavy crude
oil. The four projects, which are at different stages of development,
aim to convert the extra heavy crude from approximately 9° API crude to
lighter, sweeter synthetic crude, known as syncrude. These projects
produce about 450,000 barrels a day (bbl/d) of synthetic crude oil (this
is expected to increase to 700,000 bbl/d by 2005), much of which is
destined for the US.
The
country’s aging oil fields, minor exploration prospects and political
turmoil have all combined to put the country’s oil production into a
permanent and irreversible decline. Below is a table of the country’s
production and exports to the US over the past six years.
Venezuelan
Oil Production & Exports to US
(Thousand barrels per day)
|
Oil
Production*
|
Crude
Oil Exports to US*
|
Refined
Product Exports to US*
|
|
1998
|
3,127
|
1998
|
1,719
|
1998
|
342
|
|
1999
|
2,776
|
1999
|
1,493
|
1999
|
343
|
|
2000
|
3,105
|
2000
|
1,546
|
2000
|
323
|
|
2001
|
2,830
|
2001
|
1,553
|
2001
|
262
|
|
2002
|
2,556
|
2002
|
1,398
|
2002
|
197
|
|
2003
|
2,229
|
2003
|
1,385
|
2003
|
192
|
|
*
Source: U. S. Department of Energy
|
Few
market observers understand the implications of falling oil production
for Venezuela and world oil markets. The figures above make very clear
the impact falling production has had on exports to the United States.
It
should be noted that during the PDVSA strike in late 2002, several of
the company’s refineries had to significantly increase their purchases
of heavy Mexican Maya crude to replace lost Venezuelan production. Given
that Mexico’s oil production is in decline outside of the Cantrell
field, any future supply disruption from Venezuela would send refined
products prices skyward. (For more information on Mexico’s oil
production problems see the October 1, 2003 issue.)
Any
discussion of Venezuela’s oil industry would not be complete without
touching on the subject of politics. PDVSA, like all other national oil
companies around the world, is a political animal. As mentioned earlier,
the firm is the country’s largest employer and provides half of
Venezuela’s governmental revenue. Venezuela’s 1999 constitution
forbids the country from privatizing PDVSA.
PDVSA
is run by presidential appointees. Since taking office, President Hugo
Chavez has appointed five directors (CEOs) of PDVSA. After
resolution of the oil worker strike in February 2003, Chavez fired
18,500 PDVSA managers and technical staff calling them “opposition
sympathizers.” While the cleansing of political opponents from PDVSA
may have strengthened Chavez’s political power base among the lower
economic classes, it has also helped ensure that Venezuela’s oil
production will continue to decline.
Politics
also plays a vital role in Venezuela’s oil export decisions. Much to
the chagrin of the Bush Administration, President Chavez continues to
support Cuba’s Fidel Castro through the export of approximately 53,000
bopd for nominal payment. Despite generous financing terms, the
Cuban government has accumulated a debt of $266US million in unpaid
petroleum deliveries. Cuba's state oil company, CUPET, has had to
refinance and make irregular lump-sum payments to PDVSA, at least twice
since April 2002 to allow the embattled Chavez administration to save
face with his constituents and maintain the flow of oil to the island.
In
recent years, Chavez has made a lot of noise about LNG and Venezuela’s
148 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas reserves. After signing an
agreement with Royal Dutch/Shell and Mitsubishi in 2002 to study the
possibility of building an LNG export facility, both companies have
gotten cold feet at the prospect of investing billions of dollars in a
politically unstable country. I find it highly unlikely that a LNG
export facility will be built until the political situation in Venezuela
stabilizes.
Venezuela’s
declining production has taken its toll on the country’s economy and
society. While there have been varying reports on the health of the
country’s economy, it is fairly safe to say that Venezuela’s economy
experienced a significant contraction in 2003. Chavez has made various
attempts to offset these economic hard times. These efforts include
actions such as devaluing the country’s currency earlier this year and
offering additional social services to lower income neighborhoods.
Chavez’s continued pandering to his lower income power base has led to
a strong and growing political opposition. The opposition party, largely
made up of the country’s higher wage earners, has attempted various
maneuvers to remove Chavez from power. Recently, Venezuela’s Supreme
Court declared void over 800,000 signatures collected by the opposition
party in an effort to hold a mid-term presidential recall election.
In
conclusion, I see Venezuela’s declining oil production leading to a
number of outcomes. Despite today’s high oil prices, declining oil
revenues will cause the country’s economy to further contract, which
in turn will cause more political unrest. Second, reduced oil production
from Venezuela will send crude and refined product prices to new all
time highs. With very low inventories of gasoline and distillates in the
US, any reduction in imports will have an exponential impact on prices.
Lastly, the country’s declining oil production will send tanker rates
to new all time highs. With the trip from northern Venezuela to the
Houston ship channel taking only six days and the journey from the
Arabian Peninsula to New Jersey approximately 45 days, we are likely to
see outstanding earnings from the entire tanker sector.

WHAT
THE MAJORS ARE TELLING US
One
of the most important things investors should consider when making any
investment is the actions of the industry most informed participants.
Three of the world’s largest oil companies have provided significant
evidence that the outlook for oil and gas production growth is dismal
and higher oil and gas prices are here to stay.
ChevronTexaco
recently announced it would spend $5US billion to buyback its shares
over the next three years. Considering the company has a market
capitalization of approximately $96US billion, a $5US billion buyback is
significant.
BP
recently announced that it will reward shareholders by paying out
generous dividends and purchasing its own stock in the open market. In a
press release, the company announced that it intends to distribute
“excess cash flow” to shareholders. BP went on to define “excess
cash flow” as any free cash generated from BP's assets when the oil
price is above $20US a barrel. The company is wasting no time in its
efforts to reward shareholders since it bought back 155 million of its
shares for $1.25US billion so far this year.
ExxonMobil
is continuing its long standing policy of buying back its own shares.
The company has reduced its shares outstanding in the last two years
from 6.87 billion down to 6.56 billion.
Large
share re-purchasing programs provide two very clear signals to the
marketplace. First, they suggest that the marketplace is grossly
undervaluing the company’s shares. Second, returning cash to
shareholders indicates the companies can no longer find adequate
investment opportunities that would generate satisfactory rates of
return. If the majors are not vastly increasing exploration budgets at
times of high prices and low capital costs, I am confident that even
aggressive exploration from independent firms will not be able to
materially increase supplies. This reality
flies in the face of what many have come to accept as “conventional
wisdom.” Many industry observers and economists believe that high oil
and gas prices will bring on additional supplies and lower the market
clearing price. I completely disagree with this line of thinking. I
believe we will see lower supplies of both
oil and natural gas irrespective
of price since there are few significant projects coming online
to replace production declines from mature basins.

© 2004 Bill Powers,
Editor
Canadian Energy Viewpoint
See Mr. Powers' Cover Page for Bio and
Archived Editorials

CONTACT
INFORMATION
Bill Powers
773-271-7574
Email | Website
Information presented in
this newsletter was obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but
accuracy and completeness and opinions based on this information are not
guaranteed. Under no circumstances is this an offer to sell or a
solicitation to buy securities suggested herein. The editor may have an
interest in the companies mentioned. All data and information and
opinions expressed are subject to change without notice.
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