We’re coming up on five years since the collapse of ENRON roiled the
utility world. The good news is things couldn’t be more different now
for utilities.
Before Enron fell, even
the sleepiest utilities felt compelled to change the way they did
business for the “new era.” Today, the focus is back on the basics
of running good businesses, meaning efficiently providing solid power,
gas, water and communications service.
During the Enron Era,
utility managements piled on the debt to build everything from new power
plants to broadband capacity and the result was a colossal supply glut
of everything, which in turn drove down prices to depressed levels. That
debt then became unmanageable for many companies, with the result of a
wave of dividend cuts and dramatically lower credit ratings.
Today, the supply glut
is being rapidly soaked up in all utility industries and companies are
building again, even as they pay down debt. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS
(NYSE: VZ) continues to successfully roll out its nationwide fiber optic
network for wireline broadband, even as its wireless unit expands
capacity and services. Wireless spectrum is in high demand. Water
companies continue to make acquisitions at a feverish clip, as are
energy infrastructure outfits. Energy utilities are drilling more oil
and gas.
Most remarkable is the
renaissance in power plant construction. As my colleague Elliott Gue
points out in The Energy Strategist (http://www.energystrategist.com),
utilities have announced plans to build some 153 new coal plants in the
US alone over the next decade with a total capacity of 90 gigawatts.
Much of this capacity will replace the natural gas plants that were
built in the 1990s on the supposition that gas prices would stay at $2
per million British thermal units indefinitely. These of course proved
uneconomic as baseload plants, with devastating consequences for their
owners. Now they’re being absorbed by stronger players as a new
generation of peaker plants, to be used when demand reaches its zenith
in the winter and summer months. And they’re far more competitive than
the old, polluting, expensive mostly oil-fired peakers.
At the same time,
S&P is issuing a record number of upgrades in both credit ratings
and credit outlooks. The agency noted that the second quarter was the
best for rating upgrades in “many years.” That’s a clear
confirmation of utes’ success in getting their acts together
financially over the last four plus years.
The collapse of Enron
marked the low point in a year (2001) of unprecedented degeneration of
utility/regulator relations.
California then made
its demand for $9 billion in damages from power producers to compensate
for the spike in power prices from the previous year--money the
companies simply did not have. And several other Western states were
following its lead with their own lawsuits. The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission was piling on with its own version of market
manipulation investigation in the rest of the country.
In stark contrast,
today’s utility/regulator relations are as positive as they’ve been
at any time since the ‘60s. Even in states in line for major rate
increases--such as Maryland and Illinois--regulators and politicians
have been mindful of utility credit quality. The legislation that passed
in Maryland over the governor’s veto wasn’t ideal in that it fired
the state’s Public Service Commission and undermined the governor’s
historic power to shape regulation. But it did allow for full recovery
of CONSTELLATION ENERGY’S (NYSE: CEG) power costs will no direct hit
on earnings. Illinois, meanwhile, is going through with a power auction
and looks set to implement at least some of the promised rate increases
that go along with it.
The greatest risk for
most electric utilities in the next five years is that Congress or the
courts will impose extremely onerous regulation of their CO2 emissions.
The catalyst could be a decision by the courts to force an
extra-legislative solution to implement harsh controls.
As I wrote two weeks
ago in Utility & Income, there’s now a movement among utilities
and other industries to head that off by getting the current Congress to
enact legislation for a relatively benign “cap and trade” system.
This would allow some to continue emitting CO2 by purchasing credits
from utes that reduce their CO2 emissions. This is the same system used
to successfully reduce acid rain-causing SOX and NOX in the US. It’s
already being employed in Europe for CO2 and, ironically, one of the
beneficiaries is EXXONMOBIL (NYSE: XOM), which is squarely in the
anti-CO2 regulation camp in the US.
The result should be
that CO2 regulation is a financial disaster for neither utilities nor
the US economy. In fact, because regulated utility rate bases increase
with investment--including that designed to reduce pollution--it could
actually help increase earnings for some.
Perhaps the biggest
difference between now and then is management caution and skepticism. At
least in the utility industry, executives are less likely to follow
strategic moves used by their fellows.
The only exception is
mergers and acquisitions, which are heating up again. In the past couple
of weeks alone, we’ve seen the acquisition by WPS RESOURCES (NYSE: WPS)
for troubled PEOPLES ENERGY (NYSE:PGL). Also, MDU RESOURCES (NYSE: MDU)
has inked a deal to buy CASCADE NATURAL GAS (NYSE: CGC) and a private
capital firm is gobbling up DQE (NYSE: DQE). The theme is primarily
larger players gobbling up smaller ones, punctuated by the occasional
attempt by investors to snap up an undervalued bargain, as is the case
with DQE.
It’s too soon to say
if last year’s repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act will
really set off a frenzy of takeover activity or whether it will lead to
less creditworthy ownership of utilities. But thus far, the tenor has
been considerably more sane than the frenzy of activity in the ‘90s,
when companies were merging but also creating operations in areas
outside their core businesses--like energy marketing--which later came
back to burn them. In fact, it looks like most deals are designed to
increase economies of scale, which has always been a plus in power.
The most telling
evidence of how far we are from the Enron collapse is how utilities have
performed in the stock market. 2002 was an even worse year for many
companies, as the after shocks of the failure of the industry’s
biggest player were felt. By the end of that year, some two dozen
utilities were at risk of bankruptcy and the Dow Jones Utility Average
traded at barely 40 percent of its highs in late 2000.
Since then, utilities
have staged their most dynamic rally since World War II. And while the
averages have given back some of that in the recent market turmoil, the
strong are still trading at levels well above the 2000 highs, and even
the weakest are trading at several times their lowest levels. Even
extremely volatile interest rates this year haven’t been able to crack
utilities’ strength, as they remain one of the best performing groups
in the market.
Now with earnings
growing, valuations have come down dramatically from their levels of the
September peaks. And with more growth expected this year--in both
earnings and dividends--the best of the group is setting up for another
leg up. That could come very quickly, if interest rates start to head
south, or if the market continues what appears to be a rush to quality.
But no matter what
happens with rates, utilities will hold their own as long as
fundamentals stay strong. And that looks virtually certain for at least
the next few years, and probably a lot longer.
After all, total
meltdowns of the 2001-02 variety have occurred only once a generation,
the last crusher being in the 1972-74 period.
LESSONS LEARNED
There’s nothing like
a multi-year rally to calm the nerves and bury old sins. My own from the
2001-02 bear market were not as great as those of some--Utility
Forecaster was credited in Forbes as one of only five investment
newsletters to recommend selling Enron before its final death
plunge--but they were painful enough.
Nearly a dozen of my
favorite stocks, companies I’d recommended over and again, melted down
completely in the face of the Enron collapse and its fallout on the
industry. Most, such as DOMINION RESOURCES (NYSE: D), which is now at
twice its bear market low, have made it back. Some, like AQUILA (NYSE:
ILA) and CMS (NYSE: CMS), are still trying but are slowly and surely
making progress. My worst two were MIRANT (NYSE: MIR) and WORLDCOM, both
of which I rode almost all the way into bankruptcies that wiped out
shareholders.
The 2001-02 bear market
was easily my toughest period in the investment business. Not every
recommendation, of course, was losing money. In fact, my Income
Portfolio collection of bonds, preferreds and very safe “old school”
utility stocks actually made money in both 2001 and 2002. But many of
the stocks I’d talked about most in the ‘90s--for their growth
potential--were among the worst performers in the bear market.
For the 20 years-plus I’ve
been in this business, I’ve always fielded subscriber correspondence
personally. This was not a pleasant pastime in the 2001-02 bear market.
Utility Forecaster readers were losing money. I faced a daily barrage of
letters, phone calls and e-mails from subscribers who were alternately
despondent, worried and/or angry with me. The volatile downward-biased
market action forced me to make almost daily decisions on whether to
advise pulling the plug on certain stocks. And I can’t say I always
responded correctly, holding onto some too long and selling others at or
near their ultimate bottoms.
One of the oldest
maxims in the investment advisory business is you always feel the worst
at the bottom; the problem is you don’t know how much lower you’re
going to go first, i.e. how much worse you’re going to feel. As it
turned out, late 2002 was the bottom. And since then, things have
consistently turned up. Those who stuck with UF and followed the letter’s
advice have not only healed their wounds, but have enjoyed some of the
best returns ever enjoyed in any market, particularly for
income-oriented stocks.
For me, however, the
memory of the 2001-02 bear market still looms large, and I’ve resolved
to keep the lessons learned close to me.
Lesson one from the
Enron crackup is your worst bear market losses always come in a few
situations where fundamentals have cracked up.
The companies stay
healthy may also lose ground, but they’re going to come back. There’s
no such assurance for companies whose businesses are melting down.
All utilities certainly
felt some pain during 2001-02, with very few exceptions. That’s
typical, since investors will tend to sell off all the stocks in a
sector when it’s weak. And it’s generally best just to hold on at
such times if you’re a long-term investor and particularly if you’re
looking for income.
My mistake was hanging
onto companies after they showed fundamental weakness as well as market
weakness. For example, had I unloaded Aquila, Mirant and WorldCom when I
first noticed earnings starting to buckle, I would have spared myself
and Utility Forecaster readers a great deal of pain. In fact, the UF
Growth Portfolio would have vastly outperformed the utility averages as
well as almost every major stock market sector, with the exception of
real estate investment trusts.
That’s why my rule
today is to sell any stock where the underlying business appears to be
coming apart, even if overall market conditions are good and the shares
are still at lofty levels.
Whether I’m talking
about Canadian trusts, REITs or US utilities, I want to predict 20 of
the next five dividend cuts; put another way, I’m always going to try
to err on the side of caution, particularly when the overall market is
weakening.
This approach has led
to some unnecessary selling and bearishness.
And at least one of the
weaklings I’ve been most negative on is being taken over at a good
price--notably Peoples Energy by WPS Resources. But with so many stocks,
funds, bonds and preferred shares to choose from--and the long-term
capital gains tax rate at just 15 percent--there’s no excuse for
getting sentimental about a particular stock. You only want to own
businesses that are becoming more valuable, not those losing ground.
The second important
lesson the Enron meltdown taught me is that insiders can conceal
essential facts from virtually everyone until it’s too late. The story
of how Wall Street analysts were shown around a fake trading room is
well known now. Less appreciated is how Enron went bankrupt owing
virtually every electric utility millions (if not billions) of dollars,
but in perfect proportion to their size. In other words, no one was
given enough exposure to bankrupt them, and so no one did sufficient
digging until there was nothing left to do but write it off.
One of the things that
sticks out in my mind from that era was a Bloomberg Forum on the power
industry moderated by Lowell Miller, whose FLEX FUNDS TOTAL RETURN
UTILITY (FLRUX) is the only broad-based, open-end utility stock fund I
recommend. The conference featured speakers and attendees from all
corners of the industry.
But the highlight was
an appearance by Jeff Skilling, who was essentially Enron’s point man
on Wall Street. The late Ken Lay, by contrast, was more on the country
club back-slapping circuit.
Skilling swaggered into
the room accompanied by a number of Enron employees and promptly told
the utility executives in attendance that within five years his company
would be doing 73 percent of their current business. What made the
biggest impression on me was that these supposed competitors all seemed
to be nodding their heads, almost without question.
Why were they so cowed?
Because Wall Street was also saying they were toast unless they acted
aggressively, from the credit raters who were downgrading traditional
utility balance sheets to the stock analysts who projected virtually
geometric earnings growth for Enron, presumably on the basis of numerous
conversations and hundreds of hours of up-close research. In essence,
despite Enron’s extremely high profile, its executives managed to
conceal need-to-know information even from those paid rock-star salaries
to look at companies skeptically. Given that, it’s impossible to
expect individuals would have spotted the trouble.
As it turned out, only
a handful of iconoclasts published skeptical opinions, and you can bet
they didn’t have all the facts, either.
The only real defense
anyone had was a very good nose, which I only developed after the stock
had fallen to the low teens.
One way to protect
against this kind of fraud is keep a careful eye on anything that’s
losing ground in the stock market. If you can’t explain or readily
find out why a stock or bond is falling dramatically, sell it. Note that
I’m not endorsing a “sell first, ask questions later” approach.
And sometimes stocks sell off and rebound for no discernible reason. But
negative market action can be a pretty good early warning sign that
something is fishy, and is at least worthy of a look.
The best way to protect
yourself is simply to diversify your portfolio. The better balanced your
portfolio is and the more its value is spread among several quality
holdings, the less an unexpected disaster will hurt you. No one really
saw how badly Enron’s crackup was going to bite in advance. But the
hurt was a lot less for those who held the stock in a balanced portfolio
than it was for those who held it as the bulk of their retirement
accounts, as many former Enron employees did.
The third lesson from
the fall of Enron is not to expect the government to make good on a
fraud. Some Americans today look to Uncle Sam to do everything from
providing them a comfortable retirement to regulating what children
read. But even these true believers who lost with Enron haven’t
recovered more than a smidgeon of what they’re rightfully owed. And no
matter how hard judge and jury throw the book at Skilling or anyone else
involved with the biggest corporate fraud in US history, that’s not
going to change.
One reason is Enron had
numerous friends in the high halls of government, and on both sides of
the aisle. In my opinion, it did this for two reasons. The first was to
get what it wanted from the federal government in terms of regulation
and deregulation, which it did routinely in the ‘90s. Second, it was
to create a massive group of co-conspirators that could be counted on
never to really blow the whistle, for fear of self-incrimination. And
thus far, despite the trumpeted trials of Lay and Skilling, we don’t
know the half of what happened at that company or how so much wealth
vanished so quickly.
The bottom line is when
you invest no one but you is really looking out for your interests. Even
companies run by honest, intelligent and well-meaning people can fail.
And as the Enron wipeout proved, the woods are full of the other kind of
folks.
The bottom line: Take
care of yourself.

© 2006 Roger Conrad
Editorial Archive

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