no
return, when rising debt levels make one outcome or the other
inevitable? How do you invest to make sure you’re covered either way?
I’ve been keeping a file of the best stuff written on the subject,
some of which is pasted below:
John Embry, Sprott Asset Management
I think that we face either increasing inflation, or ultimately
deflation. We’ve lost the middle ground, so consequently with all the
debt that is in the system, they are going to have to print more and
more money to keep that debt load afloat, and this will lead to mounting
inflation. And because we’re dealing with fiat currency, and Ben
Bernanke coming in at the head of the Fed has already telegraphed what
he wants to do with his speeches 3 years ago, talking about printing
presses and money from helicopters, etc. I basically believe that the
greater risk is hyperinflation. Eventually it will probably end up with
some deflation, but not before we go through a bout of infinitely worse
inflation.
Ben Bernanke, chairman, U.S. Federal Reserve
Some observers have concluded that when the central bank's policy rate
falls to zero--its practical minimum--monetary policy loses its ability
to further stimulate aggregate demand and the economy. At a broad
conceptual level, and in my view in practice as well, this conclusion is
clearly mistaken. Indeed, under a fiat (that is, paper) money system, a
government (in practice, the central bank in cooperation with other
agencies) should always be able to generate increased nominal spending
and inflation, even when the short-term nominal interest rate is at
zero.
The U.S. government
has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic
equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes
at essentially no cost. By increasing the number of U.S. dollars in
circulation, or even by credibly threatening to do so, the U.S.
government can also reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and
services, which is equivalent to raising the prices in dollars of those
goods and services. We conclude that, under a paper-money system, a
determined government can always generate higher spending and hence
positive inflation.
Jay Taylor, J. Taylor’s Gold and Technology Stocks
Ultimately, debt becomes such a burden that it can no longer be
serviced. And when that happens systemically through the economy, as it
does every 60 or 70 years in the Kondratieff cycle, we get a major
economic contraction that results in massive bankruptcies, debt
repudiation, high levels of unemployment, and plunging prices. If policy
makers would not engage in manipulation, the markets would self-adjust
on an ongoing basis in a gradual manner and there would be minimal
upheaval. Unfortunately, politicians and their crony banker friends are
helpless market manipulation addicts who can’t resist intervention.
So, imbalances are pushed to an extreme until they reach a breaking
point. The correction and restoration back to equilibrium is enormously
painful and disruptive.
Why does the system
ultimately break down? Why can’t Mr. Bernanke or his successor simply
print enough money to avoid a day of reckoning forever? In very simple
terms, there are two factors. First, the more excessive the amount of
money, the more artificial is economic growth. That is, resources are
allocated in a very inefficient manner. So for example, during the 1990s
high-tech stock market bubble, we saw billions upon billions of dollars
lost in tech stocks because those enterprises were not viable
businesses.
Had we been on a gold standard and money had been hard to come by,
capital resources would not have been misallocated. Instead we would
have had capital allocated to businesses that would have generated
profits. But here is the real problem. Even though money is carelessly
thrown into mal investments as a result of the excessive creation of
money via the banking system, the debts from which this money was
manufactured remain to be repaid. And so you get a situation where debt
is growing exponentially while income is constrained by the physical
laws of nature. In other words, in a fiat currency system like the one
we have now, in which debt is the raw material from which money is
manufactured, it is possible—for a time—to create the illusion of
wealth via the “printing press.” But it is not possible to create
sufficient income from bad investments with which to repay the debt.
Secondly, I am not so
sure that the Fed cannot afford to turn us into a deflationary collapse
if it is faced with the prospects of the U.S. dollar becoming
increasingly worthless vis-à-vis other currencies and the U.S. losing
the benefits of owning the world’s reserve currency. If the dollar
tanks, I do not see why we cannot expect a repeat of 1980, when Volcker
saved the dollar by stomping on the monetary breaks and causing real
interest rates to rise to their highest levels since the Civil War. Had
Volcker not done that in 1980, the U.S. would have been toast back then.
The same people, or at least the same ruling-elite families who were in
charge then, are in charge now. I do not see why they would relinquish
their power as “landlords of the world” now by allowing the dollar
to head toward zero vis-à-vis other currencies and gold.
Yes, I know we have
much more debt now and that we are a debtor nation and a similar policy
now would really send us into Ian Gordon’s Kondratieff winter. While
the elected officials and even the Fed chairman may need to act like
they care about the pain and suffering of common, ordinary Americans,
their willingness to inflate wealth away from us does not suggest they
care two hoots about common people. I believe the establishment will
inflate as long as they can get away with it, but that they will once
again pull a 180 degree policy turn on monetary policy and interest
rates if draconian measures are required to save the dollar as the world’s
reserve currency and the Anglo-American controlled world economy.
Steve Saville, Speculative Investor
Inflation is an INEVITABLE consequence of the current monetary system.
It is inevitable because the current monetary system is, in effect, a
giant Ponzi scheme (a scheme that can only continue as long as there is
enough money coming in from new investors to pay previous investors),
and once you've created a Ponzi scheme you can't just stop paying people
for a while. This is why there won't be an intervening period of
deflation between now and when inflation eventually destroys today's
money; rather, the inflation will continue -- interrupted by the
occasional deflation scare but not by actual deflation -- until a
monetary collapse occurs.
The current monetary
system's Ponzi-scheme-like nature stems from the fact that each new
dollar borrowed into existence creates a liability in excess of one
dollar due to the obligation to pay interest. This characteristic has,
over the decades, resulted in the obligations to pay dollars becoming
many times greater than the total supply of dollars, so the dollar
supply must continue to expand in order for the system to survive. Or,
putting it another way, if there ever was a chance for the Fed to allow
the US to experience a 'cleansing' period of deflation that chance is
long gone. The issue, therefore, is not whether the Fed will ATTEMPT to
maintain the inflation (it doesn't have another option), but whether it
will be ABLE to maintain the inflation.
As long as the laws
of supply and demand remain in force then someone who can increase the
supply of some 'thing' by an unlimited amount will always be able to
reduce the value of that 'thing' if that's what they choose to do. The
central bank has the power to create an unlimited amount of currency, so
those who argue that the Fed will be unable to prevent the dollar's
purchasing power from rising are claiming, in effect, that the laws of
supply and demand don't apply to money. Such claims are patently false.
By engineering a
$180B increase in the money supply within the space of only a few days
during September of 2001 the Fed demonstrated just how effective its
direct money-creation powers can be when 'push comes to shove'. The
devastation wrought by terrorists that prompted this sudden injection of
money came without warning, so just imagine what the Fed could do given
a few months to plan.
But despite a) the Fed chairman having clearly explained why the central
bank will never be at a loss when it comes to reducing the purchasing
power of the currency and b) the fact that there is solid empirical
evidence of the Fed's power to inflate under adverse circumstances, many
analysts continue to argue that the Fed will be powerless to inflate if
the US consumer ever begins to cut back on his/her borrowing.
What we think the Fed fears more than anything else -- certainly a lot
more than it fears deflation -- is an uncontrolled surge in inflation
expectations. The dollar's slow-motion collapse can continue almost
indefinitely, with the Fed injecting money in response to the occasional
deflation scare and pushing short-term interest rates up when
inflationary pressures begin to show through, as long as the public
doesn't come to believe that the dollar will lose its purchasing power
at an ever-increasing pace. However, if the public began to anticipate
acceleration in the rate at which the dollar loses its purchasing power
then prices would begin to rise much faster than would be justified by
increases in the money supply alone, and bond yields would rocket
upward. This is why the Fed must keep hiking short-term interest rates
until inflation expectations are most definitely under control,
regardless of how much damage the rate hikes are perceived to be causing
to the economy. If they overdo the rate hikes they can always inject
enough new money later to re-energise the inflation trend, but sharply
rising inflation expectations would be a life-threatening problem for
the current monetary system. The bottom line is, soaring long-term
interest rates -- a guaranteed effect of letting inflation expectations
get out of hand -- would be far more damaging than any problem caused by
overly tight monetary policy.
Yes, we know this is exactly the opposite of conventional wisdom. Almost
everyone thinks that the Fed will do anything -- including tolerating a
much more rapid decline in the purchasing power of the dollar -- to
mitigate the risk of a deflationary outcome. And Fed representatives
never miss a chance to bolster this line of thinking because such
thinking is necessary in order to keep the game going. After all, who
would invest in 30-year US Treasury debt yielding 5% if it were known
that there was no chance of deflation and that an additional large
decline in the purchasing power of the dollar was all but guaranteed?
The Bank of Japan might, but no private investor in his/her right mind
would.
The truth of the matter, as we see it, is that the Fed has the tools to
keep the inflation going and it KNOWS it has the tools to keep the
inflation going. The Fed's biggest fear is that everyone else figures
this out…
Mike Shedlock, Mish’s Global Economic Trend Analysis
It seems that everyone feels the Fed is all-powerful, and that the Fed
can defeat the business cycle by forever printing money. That is the
fallacy of the inflationist arguments. It cannot be done. The root cause
of the great depression was an overexpansion of money and credit.
"Helicopter Drop Bernanke" could no more cure that by printing
more money than I could take on Michael Jordan in one on one basketball
at his prime.
Banks can print but
they cannot force consumers to either borrow or spend. If bankruptcies
expand faster than borrowing, the net of money supply and credit will
contract. That is deflation.
Although Japan [in
the 1990s] was rapidly printing money, a destruction of credit was
happening at a far greater pace. There was an overall contraction of
credit in Japan for close to 5 consecutive years. Property values
plunged for 18 consecutive years. The stock market plunged from 40,000
to 7,000. Cash was hoarded and the velocity of money collapsed. Those
are classic symptoms of deflation that a proper definition incorporating
both money supply and credit would readily catch. Those looking at
consumer prices or monetary injections by the bank of Japan were far off
the mark. Yes, the US is different than Japan. We are far worse off and
much deeper in debt. That adds to the deflationist case. Wage
fundamentals are much worse now especially with outsourcing and the
internet. That adds to the deflationist case. Ultimately it comes down
to the question of "will the banks destroy themselves and their
wealth" to bail out consumers deep in debt.
The answer to that
question is "Of course not. Why would they?"
So why has there been persistent inflation since 1940? The answer to
that is the Kondratieff Cycle. Three fourths of the cycle there is
inflation. Each season is long (18-24 years). By the time we get to
deflationary winter, many (most) people that have only known inflation
all their lives dismiss the idea. No one believes that deflation can
happen. They have seen nothing but inflation all their lives.
If housing is the
bubble of last resort, what would happen if the Fed turned on the pumps?
I suspect money would go into gold and silver, but no jobs would be
produced, certainly nothing like the housing boom produced. That last
sentence should explain why many deflationists like gold. That answer is
also why it would be game set and match for the Fed. Yes the Fed could
in theory drop money out of helicopters, but only if they wanted to
destroy themselves. There is theory and there is practice. If consumers
are finally at the end of their ropes as I suspect, inflationists are in
for one rude shock.
Doug Noland, PrudentBear Credit Bubble Bulletin
The current Financial Structure, dominated by Wall Street
securitizations, leveraging, derivatives, and asset/securities
speculation, inherently incites and then feeds runaway Credit, asset and
speculative Bubbles.
“Resiliency” is a defining attribute of contemporary “Wall Street
Finance.” As they demonstrated (again) this past quarter, if
market dynamics dictate that particular segments of the
brokerage/proprietary trading/securities financing/investment
banking/derivatives/global finance business face tougher headwinds, it
is simply a matter of tacking a bit in another direction. If one sector
or region is struggling, just push the others. If one area of the market
falls somewhat out of favor, simply fashion and offer buyers
(increasingly hedge funds) the type of securities, instruments and/or
derivative products with the return, risk and liquidity profile they
demand. If clients prefer to leverage U.S. or global securities, fine;
need financing to buy companies at home or abroad, no problem; or any
complex derivative strategy for any market – now so easily
accomplished. And, importantly, championing booms in the
relatively better performing areas, sectors and regions works to
buttress liquidity for the enjoyment of all (hence, bolstering the
lagging – as we witnessed with market pricing this week).
Recalling how the
bursting technology Bubble welcomed the emerging housing finance Bubble,
it is today imperative to remain cognizant of the fledgling Bubbles
waiting to be over-financed at home and abroad. The expansive “energy/energy-related”
sector is primed for unprecedented investment, spending, speculation,
waste and fraud. There are as well intense inflationary biases
throughout global finance, bolstered by a confluence of massive trade
imbalances (foremost the U.S. Current Account Deficits), energized
Credit systems across the globe, the ongoing Chinese/Asian boom,
frenetic worldwide M&A activity, frenzied leveraged speculator
community activity, and the swelling liquidity being accumulated by the
oil exporting economies. And as much as the Fed expects inflation to
abate, the bottom line is that it is a fact of economic life (and
history) that inflationary pressures have a stronger propensity to
amplify and broaden than they do to dissipate.
So, should we expect
today’s financing infrastructure of unprecedented dimensions to be
willing to moderate and downsize, or will the intense expansionary
(inflationary) bias persist? Inflated stock prices – and massive
stock option grants and share repurchases - point to the latter. Thus
far, rising short-term rates and contracting lending margins have
incited a push for lending volume (bank Credit up 11.3% annualize
y-t-d). Stagnating mortgage profits have to this point nurtured
aggressive expansion in capital markets, trading, international and
prime brokerage (hedge fund services) businesses. Until proven
otherwise, I will stick with the view that the profligate Financial
Sphere expansion will run unabated until it is interrupted – and
perhaps terminated – by financial crisis or some exogenous event.