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Economics is the
branch of social science that deals with the production and distribution
and consumption of goods and services and their management. And, to a
large extent, economics is a set of beliefs. Many of the beliefs cannot
be proven. Nobel Prizes for economics are handed out when beliefs are
more-or-less proven. In order to separate false perceptions that the
immediate hype and spin induce sometimes it is necessary to go back to
the beginning and re-ask basic questions. Yet another reason exists to
do this. Unfortunately, historians and theoreticians rarely are in
positions to see the true workings of what they choose to write about.
Once I was responsible to provide input to the historical summary for
the year for my organization. I found myself depicting only the best and
coloring the rest to be clean and shiny. People do not want a precise
and truthful depiction of events. They would much rather read history as
it is depicted History of the English Speaking People by Winston
Churchill. What we think we know is often just a popular story. So, we
really need to ask if what we think we know really dovetails with our
views of how we humans think and act. How can any historian really get a
feel for the greed, that money induces? How can a historian convey the
intense desire for power that some people feel or explain the mentality
of Alexander the Great? How can historians explain that human nature,
interwoven with time, created the present financial system?
The
economic theories (Adam Smith, J. M. Keynes or whomever) are often
quoted as if their theories were facts. These so called ‘facts’ then
support a particular view of how the economy works. The financial system
is just part of the economy, but nobody can really grasp all the
intricacies of the entire financial system. So, while economics exists
on a higher plain of principles, finance exists on a much lower level of
interests, intrigue, and political agendas. Finance is where the rubber
(money- no pun intended) meets the (economic) road.
The
Financial System
By
definition the financial system is the system by which money is
accounted and tracked. The financial system is the plumbing through
which money flows. Like plumbing with its spigots, cut-off valves, air
chambers, etc. to control the water flow; the finance system controls
money flow with its equivalents: interests, politics, laws, rules,
definitions, institutions, accounting standards, perceptions, and
emotion. But, unlike plumbing all these controls are in continuous flux.
Politics has buried within the financial system; mechanisms that
intentionally thwart market principles. Finance is a political
battleground for fighting over the allocation of money. So while
economic theory seeks to address what happens in a market, its major
sub-element, finance, does not operate on the principles of a free and
open market. All one can hope to do is take a thin slice of the
financial system and examine it and how that slice of it interacts with
the economic system.
If
money did not exist, the financial system would not exist. Trading sheep
for grain does not need a financial system. Perhaps the invention of
numbers and the subsequent acceptance of a medium of exchange forced the
development of accounting. Clay tablets dating back thousands of years
show rudimentary accounting. The modern double entry system of
bookkeeping is only a few hundred years old. At some point the concept
of debt came about. Debt is built upon the belief that something
borrowed can be used to produce three specific benefits:
-
Repayment
of what was borrowed, plus
-
Interest
or benefit to the lender, plus
-
Benefits
for the borrower.
If
any one of these three criteria is not met, debt is not practicable.
Debt acts like a time machine. Debt is the means by which benefits in
the future can be exchanged for benefits that exist today. The reverse
is true for the creditor/lender: the benefits of today can be exchanged
for the benefits of tomorrow. Debt is central to modern financial
systems.
Underlying
debt and making it work is the cultural ethic calling for integrity in
the repayment of debt. That cultural ethic became part of contract law.
After the state assumed responsibility for enforcement of contract law,
banks really developed. We credit the Greeks with the creation of
elected political leaders. But, we often fail to credit the Germanic
tribes of Europe with the cultural basis for elected leaders. The
crucible of the Dark Ages and Feudalism were the foundation upon which
western society is built. Nascent democracy slowly gained prominence as
Europe slowly unbound itself from feudalism. Feudalism used control of
land to exercise power. But land is finite and power depended upon how
much land was controlled. There existed no real way to expand the
productive capability of land. Wealth and power became synonymous with
landholding. Then from handicrafts came the guild system. Within it grew
the concept of “business” without roots in land. Individual
competence replaced ‘birth right’. The power of business grew in a
geometric progression. The feudal aristocracy lost power to more
competent operators in the ‘bourgeoisie’. The bourgeoisie preferred
to elect their own political leaders. So the feudal power and its
nobility that had control of the land, lost power to productive power of
business and individual competence.
Still
some remnants of feudalism remained. One such remnant was control of the
medium of exchange. The control of coinage eventually passed from a king
to an elected body. But, the bourgeoisie insisted that the medium of
exchange be real, not promises. Gold and silver remained as money. The
next step in this evolution was the replacement of actual precious metal
by a promise of repayment in those metals. It responded to the practical
need to get away from the cumbersome weight of gold and silver. Gold and
sliver had little practical use. They could not be eaten or used for
much beyond jewelry. But our culture kept them as valuable and desirable
possessions. Today, money has become a promise is to pay with another
promise. In part, this is in response to the need to reduce the weight
and volume of paper money. Humanity needs more than a single layer of
promises in order to believe what someone claims. The belief in money is
no different. It also requires layers of justification as well. So
instead of rarity and historical significance, we use modern ideas like
supply and demand, etc to fulfill the human need for justification of
link between money and value.
Political
office conveys a form of status. For some, political office is immensely
desirable. Money is always needed to reward supporting interest groups.
The financial system, offered a bountiful opportunities for political
abuse... for the sake of the country, of course. So, it should not seem
strange that political power has a close relationship with money and is
absolutely captivated by the concept of debt. As pointed out earlier,
debt has the unique ability to increase current revenues by taking from
future revenues. Those in political office were able to see that
encumbering future tax revenues with promises could make more money
available for immediate use. Debt could be used as a vehicle to morph
future tax revenues into the present. The trick was making lenders
believe that future tax revenues are a sure thing and would be actually
be used for debt repayment. There is one major fly in the ointment. The
three criteria mentioned earlier must be met. Debt is a three-part
equation. The relationship between public debt and the third criteria is
an interesting one to contemplate.
The
Politics of Debt
Over
time, the concept of debt became divided into rights and obligations. As
it did, the parties no longer consisted exclusively of borrower and
lender. At the same time, the concept of ownership also became divided
into a ‘bundle of rights’. This splitting of obligations of a debtor
and responsibilities of an ‘owner’ became ambiguous and focus on the
three before mentioned debt criteria could easily be lost. Perhaps the
biggest change of all was with the cultural ethic calling for repayment
of debt. Today, debt is viewed as nothing more than a promise to pay
stream money. Collateral can be any right in the ‘bundle of rights’.
All of these changes wrought huge changes in the financial system. For
politicians, the instrument of public debt, unbound a seated congress
from the constitutional bonds that prohibited committing a future
congress to a course of action. Despite these changes, we retain in our
being the remnants of cultural belief that debt means something borrowed
must be returned. But, various laws such as bankruptcy and corporate law
have served to shred the reality of this belief. Debt can be walked away
from with no more discomfort than partial loss borrowing power, if that.
The
measurement of potential benefits from lending and debt is found in the
time-value of money. That concept says that those future cash flows have
a value in the present that can be calculated. This concept means that
future tax revenues possess a specific value in the present. Commitment
of those revenue flows can mean more spending money for the present
political incumbents. However, future cash flows have an absolute
physical limit on how much present value they can produce. One such
limit is fixed by a hard backing to the currency. Creating public debt
meant that the government was committed to expanding the backing of the
currency (debt must increase future benefits (monetary). But, the dollar
was denominated in terms of a specific weight of gold and silver. This
situation meant that in order to take on public debt, the Congress had
to increase the amount of gold and silver in the treasury as backing for
the dollar. Increasing the velocity of circulating money could
ameliorate the problem somewhat but it, too, had its physical limits as
well. This problem was one heck of an inconvenience. In order to borrow
from the future ran into the reality of actually having to acquire gold
and silver to accommodate the needed increase in money supply.
The
necessary expansion of the money supply became increasingly
uncomfortable to the office holders and aspirant politicians. The
obvious fix was to declare such an obligation, barbarous, a relic, etc.
and free the will of American government from the golden chains. The US
Government simply changed the denomination of the debt from payment in
work done to payment in a promise to do work. Where gold and silver
represented work done, the new form for money the politicians wanted was
a promise to do work (debt). With that, money morphed from work-done to
work-to-be-done. Debt became a promise to repay with a claim on work to
be done.
This
change necessitated modification of the way in which the financial
system managed money flows. Money would not possess a fixed value. In
fact it would have no value at all and be just an idea in the human mind
that would act as an arbiter between things of value. In order to make
the pieces fit, the Federal Reserve Board was added to the then existent
financial system. The stated purpose was to ensure the banking system
against failure, but the real purpose was to change the financial
system. It also added the appearance augustness and came with the
promises that it would not suffer from political interference.
This
served the political process well until debt bumped up against the
ceiling of interest rates. So the third limit the politicians needed to
get rid of was the limit current interest rates imposed on how much
present value future tax revenues (cash flow) could generate. Low
interest rates generate high value for future cash flows. The lower the
interest rate, the more value can be mined out of future cash flows. The
homebuyer knows that low interest rates allow their income to qualify
them for a bigger mortgage. So, to accommodate the political
establishment, the Federal Reserve Board module to the financial system
initiated manipulation of the interest rates for political purposes.
This
subtle but telling change could not happen without changes in the
political system and the way the voters think. The public became
compartmentalized into interest groups. The responsibility of governance
to do what is best for the whole nation became lost in the blizzard of
interest groups. America became a stew or separate interest groups.
Education may also have played a role. Competence in the three R’s as
a basis for promotion changed to social/psychological needs. Social
promotion became an accepted reason for promotion to the next grade. As
a result, graduates had few tools to comprehend economics. Stimulation
of the economy sounded very appealing. Stimulation of the economy, not
fixing the economy, became the reason. So, the Federal Reserve
manipulated interest rates downward to provide additional value to the
future tax revenues and anyone with an income stream could command huge
sums of money to buy houses, cars, vacations, etc. Money just came down
from the sky. Everyone seemed to win with low interest rates. Nobody
talked about the reverse side: The FED created a way for Congress to
avoid the necessity of decreasing appropriations to match revenues. But
this is the political story. There is a more technical story about the
financial system as well.
Concepts
of Money and The US Dollar
As
the financial system changed so did the concept of money. Gold and
silver cannot be stuffed through a fiber optic cable or a computer. Nor
can paper money. Technology and the constant nibbling away of costs by
an economic system in search of zero overhead cost per transaction
created the need for something other than physical coins. These kinds of
circumstance are reality. There is no sense pretending otherwise or
bemoaning the fact.
A
US dollar has no intrinsic value… unless the inherent ability of
government to misuse the medium of exchange fiat to expropriate private
assets can be considered ‘value.’ Instead, the dollar has been and
continues to be a very secure medium of exchange. Without exception, it
can be used for every transaction. Use of the dollar in the United
States is unimpeded by caveats or restrictions. The goods or services
that it purchases can move freely. It is also a convenient way for our
mind to grasp the relative exchange weights between two items. Some
people want the dollar to have qualities that it does not possess. It is
not a store of value. It does not store the price of a loaf of bread or
an ounce of gold. It acts only as an arbiter between the bread and gold.
If the economic system is stable, then the price of bread relative to
gold will remain the same in dollar terms. So, swings in relative prices
are not the result of the dollar but, instead, they represent the
instability (or simply flux) within the economic system. Because the US
economic system has been very stable, dollars have become falsely
thought of as a store of value. With all these attributes, it is broadly
accepted. Its importance lies in the dollar’s unfettered utility and
the stability of the American economy. The dollar has no intrinsic
value. It is only a yardstick to measure value.
Within
the economy, the American financial system exists as a counting,
accounting, and allocation operation to handle layers of collateral
within layers of financial instruments issued by various parties with
various obligations payable in a promise of variable value. But the
bottom line is that the financial system has become nearly entirely a
debt-based and, therefore, a collateral-based system. Despite being a
promise of variable value, the dollar is still the arbiter between
collateral and most acceptable definition of value of an asset. The
direct interaction with the rest of the economy affects prices of
everything.
The
Quality of Collateral
Inflating
the value of assets that can be used as collateral to secure debt
created the appearance of wealth even if the assets were no more
productive than before. I use collateral and “debt security”
interchangeably even though collateral is a real item and debt security
can be anything that assures the payment of debt. I am using them
interchangeably with the full realization that security is a much
broader term than collateral. I do so, because collateral is something
specific and real where as security can be nothing more than a promise.
Many
methods are used to value the quality of the collateral (meaning the
ability to service the debt and pay the principal.) But even after using
such methods to test the quality of the collateral, the result is still
just a perception, nothing more. Perception forms the basis for faith
that permits lending. Perceptions combine facts with human emotions and
therefore can and do change with incredible speed. Perception of the
quality of the collateral can be a Trojan horse within the financial
system.
Lending
involves two major risks. The first is that the pledged collateral will
be of lower quality than perceived. The second is that the buying power
of the medium of exchange used for payment will be less than expected
(note: with gold and silver based money this was not a risk). The first
risk comes in two “flavors”. One risk ‘flavor’ is the
possibility that the amount due on the loan (or the principal) will not
be repaid. The second risk ‘flavor’ is that the interest on the loan
will not be paid. Then of course the Second major risk is that lender
will not receive a ‘real return’ (inflation will erode the buying
power of the medium of exchange that is used) on the loan. I ask the
gentle reader to keep these in mind along with the debt criteria. The
real estate market offers some help in this complexity with fairly
straightforward examples of how these risks are managed. These
techniques are less convoluted than financial asset-based loans and much
easier to grasp.
Many
types of real estate loan/mortgage insurance can be purchased to insure
against the occurrence of each of the above risks. Syndication of
mortgages and syndication of other debts is completely dependent upon
insurance that removes risk. For debt backed by real estate, combining
several types of simple mortgage insurance removes most of the risk to
the lender posed by the collateral. The biggest insurer is the US
Government. Through FHA, other governmental agencies, and quaisi-governmental
institutions, the U. S. Government takes on almost all the risk for the
lender. This leaves banks able to create packages of mortgages and sell
them within the capital markets. The syndicated mortgages become a
secure source of future cash flows for paying retirement benefits etc.
The mortgage backed security holders have the perception that the risk
to such cash flows is virtually zero. The inflation indices published by
the government form the basis for faith in the medium of exchange.
Again, all of this is only a perception.
FED
activities have reduced the short-term interest rates to something below
the rate of inflation. One perspective is to conclude that the FED has
engineered an artificial increase in the value of collateral. Of course,
by doing this it has imposed a risk that dollar denominated debt
instruments will not provide a ‘real return’ to investors. The rates
are below inflation and therefore, with regard to being able to provide
real returns, the debt instruments start in deficit (One has to wonder
what is implied when the financial system does not demand that debt be
discounted.) The FED module to the financial system has passed this
artificial interest rate through to both intermediate and long-term
rates. This feat was and is still being accomplished through the
internal operation of the capital markets using the power of
substitution of one form of debt for another, to force down longer-term
interest rates. Tax codes that subsidize/reduce taxes and regulation
establish the incentives and systems for a pass-through system. The
combined influence of the tax code, FED, and Treasury, can and do modify
the yield curve.
The
problem facing the FED has been to make people believe that the
enhancement of asset value is not simply depreciation of the currency.
After all, the assets are no more productive and no more valuable
relative to foreign assets of the same types. So the Fed resorted to
enhancing certain perceptions and minimizing others (jawboning) and
Federal Agencies helped through manipulation of statistics they issue.
Another means by which longer-term interest rates are manipulated is
through money management institutions in which compensation to money
managers does not bear any relationship to the performance of the
investments over the term of the investment. Almost no risk managers’
or money managers’ salaries or bonuses are contingent upon the
long-term results of the securities under their management. A clear
example of this operating is that rewards in the carry trade come from
short term trading gain, not long-term earning capacity of the financial
instruments. One way of looking at all this is to see what happened as a
temporary devaluation of the dollar. More on that later.
Through
a decades long iterative process involving subtly shifting definitions
and obligations, and amendment of laws; the risk of substantial loss of
collateral value and the ability to service debt has been transferred
from the free market lenders to the government where it becomes the
people’s debt. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and FHA have taken over from
the banks, a huge chunk of risk of loss in the real estate business. The
size is so large, and the insurance premium so low, that the market has
difficulty adding risk premiums to lending in general. Indeed, the debt
held by banks compared to insurance funds, retirement funds, and mutual
funds; is minuscule. Banking profits stem less from interest on
portfolios than from fees for passing through debt to the capital
markets. The potential payout on the insurance will not cause government
to reduce expenditures. Instead the payouts would pass through to the
people as public debt. It will become public debt as such actions have
done in the past. An example of this is the S&L crisis. The savings
and loan crisis added some $350 billion to the public debt. It caused no
pain to the government or even the taxpayer because that $350 simply
went into the public debt and was lost. Congress never had to come up
with a net savings of that amount from the annual appropriations. The
government has trillions of dollars of insurance in effect and virtually
no capability to pay it should the need arise. Government risk-removal
insurance payouts are a cost waiting to be tallied. The Pied Piper will
appear to demand payout when there is a deflationary economy.
The
Taxpayer Bears The Burden
Not
only is the taxpayer loaded with personal debt, but the taxpayer must
also the bear the weigh of paying for public debt. Looking to the
future; clearly, taxes cannot support planned government expenditures,
so adding even a small part of the trillions in exposure held by Fannie,
Freddie and FHA would just add to the already unsupportable load.
I
have no idea of the extent of the ultimate cost of all this risk being
assumed by the government. FHA premium for multifamily residential real
estate is about 5 tenths of one percent of the loan…same premium
regardless of the real estate risk. That money paid as a premium does
not just stay with FHA as money in the bank. It is spent on affordable
housing programs and made available to the government to ‘borrow’.
What is in the FHA float is not money but treasury debt instruments. No
oversight of FHA exists beyond that specified to the Congress under the
US Constitution. So FHA is a savings and loan-style crisis just waiting
to happen. Should FHA not be able to pay on its insurance, the response
will simply be another “OOPS!.” The perspective of Congress is that
the cost can become part of the public debt. So, the Congress has no
real fear of an FHA failure. This total lack of fear has a sound basis.
Despite the savings and loan crisis/scandals, the Enron and WorldCom
scandals, scandals from applying improper pressure on the SEC on behalf
of favored clients, not a single one of these travesties resulted in a
change in any committee leadership. The Congress is confident that the
taxpayer will not feel a thing because the costs will get rolled into
the Treasury debt outstanding and get lost. Congress will feel no pain
because there exists no evidence that such events would force a
reduction in Congressional appropriations.
It
is a fact that no discipline remains in the system by which government
acquires debt, and risk. No way to stem the tide of debt exists. At
best, only the perception of its magnitude can be managed. Mr.
Greenspan’s position on the risk acquired by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac shows that he is well aware of this. With the fine tuning of
perceptions of risk and future inflation, the thought of having an sick
ox pulling one of the most important carts in the financial systems
wagon train, became too much to ignore. If that cart overturned and the
true extent of the obligations suddenly came to light, it would severely
damage the perceptions of the American financial system. Overnight the
critical perception of risk to those ‘risk free’ investments in
United States would change. The ripple effect of suddenly changing
perceptions of the ability of the United States to service its debt
would become apparent. Suddenly debt holders would face the reality that
the sheer size would force payment from current appropriations. That
would reduce funds for essential services with the follow-on political
uncertainty with unknowable repercussions. The bottom line would be to
substantially change the fortunes of the debt holders.
To
summarize briefly, the management of the perception of risk to holders
of American debt is a critical role for both the Federal Reserve Board
and the U. S. Treasury. Since perception is influenced by the emotions
of greed and fear, it can turn on very quickly. History shows that the
United States has an unfortunate tendency to continue on course until it
hits a wall of some sort. So one can expect that the political
incumbents to ignore the danger of debt until the Trojan horse within
bursts open. This dovetails with operation of the American political
system. The prevailing political beneficiaries represent vested
interests that operate to prevent political change. When America
encounters the proverbial ‘wall’, the public gets stuck with the
consequences as the Congress just lets the interest groups just walk
away. The view of the political character of governance shows itself as
willing to ride a good horse into the ground. The system that is in
place cannot be reined in. The Trojan horse is within the gates of the
financial system. When the Trojan horse is no longer seen as merely and
inconsequential idol of pessimists, its lethal cargo will burst out.
Two
Opposing Scenarios
If
loss of faith in the containment of risk occurs, one of two opposing
scenarios could develop. One scenario would involve a massive return of
debt instruments to the market. Current holders would want to get out.
The result would be rapid ramp up of long-term rates as bonds were
dumped into the market. The problem with this scenario is that it makes
totally invalid assumptions about how the system would operate.
Currently, the vast bulk of the money goes through a system that takes
freely lent money and passes that money through to borrowers who in turn
send back debt service payments. Banks, insurance, mutual funds, serve
only as intermediaries lending money from one set of individuals and
collecting debt service to return to the original lenders of money into
this system. This includes foreign governments that acquire Treasury
paper in order to keep their own currency down and their people
employed. Those important interests will remain in place. The scenario
relies heavily on this system working in reverse as it did going
forward. This is not just doubtful; it is impossible without massive
operational changes. Imagine the specter of banks offering back to
mortgagees their real estate loans discounted to the higher interest
rates. It cannot happen. Of course a small proportion of the holders
exists that could cause much disruption. But most money will stay put
because providing a specified cash flow locks it in. Said another way,
for holders of most debt, the value of the debt instruments is
inconsequential as only the cash flow matters. What has been obligated
is the cash flow. (This creates the obvious derivative market where
asset value and cash flow are separated and the benefits can be
‘owned’ by different parties.)
The
second scenario is that within the overall economy, the cash flow to
service the debt obligations would drop. In this situation, the value of
the collateral would decline in tandem with the declining ability to
service the debt. This would initiate a deflationary spiral in which
lending cannot take place because declining collateral value would make
loans infeasible. The before mentioned criteria for lending can not be
met in a deflationary situation. More and more collateral from more and
more parts of the economy would be drawn in on this downward spiral.
That is known as a liquidity crisis. The government has an intense and
immediate interest in preventing such a crisis. It’s means for doing
so is by creating the conditions for collateral value to rise. Since
value is based upon perceived ability to service the loan, the easiest
way is to increase value is to reduce the cost of borrowing (Basically,
profit is what is left over after operations, and interest payments,
etc. have been made).
Engineering
interest rates to drop accomplishes this objective. Lets look at the
numbers. Lets use the example of a real estate property worth $1.25
million, with an interest-only loan rate of 8% for 30years, a loan to
value ratio of 0.80 and an expense ratio of 30% and is producing an
operating net of $6,000. A drop in interest from 8% to 5% increases the
money left over (or net) from $6,000 to $45,000. The next step can be to
capitalize that added annual income of $39,000 at 5%. This provides for
an added value of $780,000. That new equity can be spent invested… or
used for speculation. The FED thus engineered an increase in collateral
value of nearly 62% just by engineering a drop in interest rates. In
short, the FED can add (or deduct) money going to the profit line and
increase collateral value simply by manipulating interest rates.
The
deflationary spiral can be cured, so the theory goes. All that is needed
is to ramp up lending. To do that the Fed must create the conditions
that allow borrowing. The FED accomplishes this increased borrowing by
inflating collateral value by engineering interest rates below what the
market would dictate. At the very minimum the result of FED action must
be to stop the decline in the ability of collateral to underwrite debt.
As we have seen, the FED has reduced the rates for lending to
institutions that, in turn, lend directly to the public and, this forced
a drop in the interest rates. Banks did not object as their profit
source has switched from interest payments to fees. The need to
re-inflate collateral value is so critical that, as FED Governor Bernanke
has said, the FED would resort to all means possible to counter the
decline, even to the point of giving money away. So, scenario number two
is not only possible it is on going.
The
FED operations are designed to artificially inflate collateral to the
point at which it would re-ignite the upward spiral of value. As dollar
value of an asset increases, the new equity can be used as collateral to
borrow and the borrowed money can be invested or it can be spent. Theory
says that finally it reaches the point where leveraging cash flows
re-circulate the money into the economy. At that point, and the FED
could again allow interest rates to reassume normal levels of a real
return of 2.5% on risk free securities with zero inflation. This
scenario is what the FED wants to accomplish (unfortunately, that upward
spiral requires increased productivity of the assets, so we will see how
this plays out.) In attempting to predict the long-term outcome of such
action, the gentle reader should consider the assumptions upon which
this second scenario is based. Assumptions are those conditions that
must exist in order for the desired result to occur. Another thing to
consider is that the second scenario faces one of the laws of money: bad
money chases good money out of circulation. Since this second scenario
is the course we are on today, the final outcome will be interesting.
What
The FED Has Done
Let’s
be clear about what the FED has done. The Federal Reserve Banking module
to the financial system has intentionally disrupted the market-pricing
mechanism within the capital markets and done so on a huge scale.
This
action has also induced an artificial sub-economy to take advantage of
the government manipulation of asset values. Any profit from such
operations must be categorized as a wealth transfer, not earned income.
Will such market intervention return the US to a thriving economic
condition or will the result be simply competitive devaluation of the
dollar?
Here
is an effect to consider. The intrinsic value of collateral does not
change simply because the FED engineered interest rates to inflate its
value. So, if real value does not change, then what must have changed is
the value of the dollar (medium of exchange) relative to other
currencies (other mediums of exchange). In short the action of the FED
to reduce interest rates serves to depreciate the currency relative to
other currencies. It is not immediately understood as a devaluation of
the dollar because it takes about three years for the effects of
collateral manipulation (inflation) appear. If the depreciation of the
currency is temporary then deflation will occur in that segment of the
market inflated by the FED. The unsuspecting new owners who thought that
the market priced the collateral take the losses. Another way of viewing
the FED price manipulation is that the immediate benefits from inflated
collateral are used today, but the long-term effects are a burden passed
on to the future. The delay between action of the FED and response by
the currency markets is something like three to four years. So, if the
FED can allow rates to return to normal levels in less than three years,
the damage cannot be attributed to the FED. Today, that time window is
rapidly closing for the FED.
Pumping
up of collateral does not appear to be working quite as the
theoreticians predicted. It has created its own pump and dump operation
to which I referred two paragraphs above. Pump up collateral using
artificial interest rates and dump on the innocent and unwise who rally
around the U. S. flag thinking that interest rates are market driven and
collateral pricing is real. This is the same as pump and dump of stocks
(financial assets). The economy has not responded quite as expected or
hoped. It appears increasingly that wealth transfers created by FED
interest rate manipulation does not create permanent demand and supply.
It appears that stoking the economy with the equivalent of sugar for the
human body produces about the same result… fat and very little muscle.
My
current job allows me to see what happens with subsidized housing. I see
that money given away as direct payments to people does not create jobs
or the work ethic. Making money free does not create a willing worker or
a paying job. Instead, give-away money induces people to find ways to
manipulate the give-away system and find inventive ways to use the
system to provide higher net (or discretionary income) than actually
working. Panhandling is one manifestation of free money encouraging
continued/increased demand for free money. Instead of creating new
industries and entrepreneurial wage-creators, the FED appears to have
created a niche for financiers, hedge funds, and market manipulators.
Just as free handouts encourage panhandling, free money encourages
political demand for more free money. The straight fact is that the only
value people feel in money comes from the sweat that they put into
acquiring it. This is vastly different from viewpoint of the FED and the
assumptions economists and financial experts.
Conclusion
So,
where do we stand? The U.S. dollar is only a medium of exchange. It is
an arbiter, between and among labor, capital, and land (as Adam Smith
might put it.) There exists no collateral behind the dollar. If one
wants one, the only direct link to collateral is that the government can
print new tender that can be used to buy (expropriate) assets. That same
fiat does not provide for any fixed value in exchange for goods and
services. It takes about three years for the currency exchange markets
and masses in the economy to realize that acquiring each dollar takes
less sweat.
Pumping
up collateral value by engineering below market interest rates and then
issuing additional money is entirely governed by political interests.
I
have a pessimistic view of the character of the political animals in
whose hands these enormous powers are entrusted. I cannot imagine that
they would, under all conditions ignore personal benefit and refuse,
absolutely, to succumb to the siren song of self-interest or the
necessity of ‘national interests’ or war. Further, this financial
system exists within a system of checks and balances, so refusal of one
institution, like the FED, to go along is impossible. Without a means to
pull in the reins on debt, the monetary system is out of control. The
FED has taken an immense risk that it can single-handedly bring money
creation under control without being in a position to control debt
creation.
For
this business cycle the FED has corrupted the market pricing in a
breathtaking manner. The financial system is rigged and has insiders who
understand what the FED is doing and therefore leverage their positions
to engineer massive transfer of wealth without adding a penny of value.
As the FED corrupts the financial system, it corrupts the entire economy
and the work ethic. FED interference with the capital market has added
greatly to the portion of risk that involves assurance of real returns.
Below market interest rates creates above market collateral value. This
has an end point. Natural resources are sold only because profit from
the sale and investment of the proceeds exceeds the rate at which the
unsold resources gain value. Engineering interest rates below that
necessary return creates economic incentives to stops natural resource
extraction. The course chosen by the FED could eventually create
economic conditions that would encourage oil companies to leave
petroleum in the ground. The below market interest rates has resulted in
creation of a financial constituency with welfare-like mentality that
scoffs at production of goods and services and rewards short-term
get-rich-quick schemes.
The
FED is now faced with rising raw materials costs, a natural result of
shortage from the misallocation of capital within the economy. The FED
is faced with outrageous promises of medical care and social security
that feed on the FED-built welfare mentality. These acts by the FED
simply add more burdens upon collateral that cannot perform at real
market ratios. Anemic rate of saving by the American people and business
provides very limited investment capital to use as a prayer rug. This
leaves the FED with little evident choice but to continue to clip the
value of collateral. In FED-speak this is payment transfers into the
future. As Alan Greenspan said in one of his European trip speeches:
‘…it appears to be going well, so far.”
At
present, Chairman Greenspan and Secretary Snow have some economic
‘wagons’, such as the energy and raw materials markets, with
economic flat tires; while others, such as the housing market, have
bulging tires. The speeches that have been made would seem to be in
keeping with what I see as the top priority for both Treasury and the
FED. The urgency with which the interest rates are being raised in a
‘measured way’ is perhaps evidence of concern that the window to
which I referred is closing rapidly. This will induce obvious economic
instability and breach of the dollar-faith (what makes the dollar so
acceptable.) My economic concerns are amplified by my belief that the
most solemn obligations will be forgotten and that personal
interest/ambition will combine with self-preservation in the mad
scramble that may result in a systemic breakdown.
Put
yourself in the position of Congress, the President, or the Federal
Reserve Board member. What would you do if you realized your tools were
not effective against the implosion?
Perhaps
the Patriot Act is the first of the measures needed for the next step on
this monetary adventure. Perhaps the extent to which the dollar has
spread throughout the world is an indication of bad money chasing good
money out of circulation. Who knows! It is all perception anyway.

© 2004 Richard K. Brawn
Editorial Archive
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INFORMATION
Richard K. Brawn, CCGA, MPA
Petaluma, CA USA
Email
California
Certified General Appraiser (CCGA)
Master Public Administration (MPA)
The
opinions of FSU contributors do not necessarily reflect those of
Financial Sense.
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