If you want to thoroughly understand something, examine its origins. With regard to nations, examine the nations’ founders; for nations draw their character from men; and the character of men may be read in their words and deeds. Today the world stands on the brink of a great transformation: what Marxists call “The Revolution.” Through global economic distress and upheaval, with help from its Russian partner, China hopes to become the world’s chief power in East Asia, the Pacific and North America. Through the Trojan horse of peaceful trade, the tentacles of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have already entangled Canada and Latin America. What do the Chinese want? What is their political character? The national objectives of China, like those of the United States, derive from the founding of modern China – and from its founder, Mao Zedong.
Mao emerged as a new type of leader after Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin ordered the Chinese Communists to form their own armies and initiate a civil war. Mao famously said, at this time, that “power flows out of the barrel of a gun.” According to Mao biographers Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, in their book titled Mao: The Unknown Story, “It was now that Mao embarked on a series of steps that would take him to the top of the Communist ladder in the space of four years.” Through a campaign of intrigue and murder, Mao Zedong took possession of divisions and regiments. At one point he told his soldiers that they would be “bandits.” When they objected to this, he assured them that they would be “special bandits.”
Mao took command of the Red Army in China through a process that can only be described as usurpation. In a bold move, he declared himself to be a Communist Party commissar when he wasn’t. Lacking provisions and supplies, his troops were maintained by looting. Rivals within the army were executed. When it became known that Mao had taken over the Red Army without authorization, some units revolted from his control. Peasants in looted districts also rebelled. Mao and his brother-in-law crushed these rebellions; and though his brother-in-law was killed in the back-and-forth of infighting, Moscow finally supported Mao’s claim to ultimate authority because his terrorist methods were favorably compared to Stalin’s.
The rise of Mao Zedong as leader of the Red Army is revealing. First, it reveals the character of the man who established the current regime in Beijing. Second, it reveals the character of the regime. The same can be said of the United States, whose chief founder, George Washington, did not murder anyone to take command of the American revolutionary army. He did not put himself at the head of troops without authorization. Instead, the Continental Congress at Philadelphia – to which he was a delegate – appointed him. On 14 June 1775, John Adams declared to the Congress that he “had but one gentleman in mind for that important command, and that was a Gentleman from Virginia who was among us and very well known to all of us, a gentleman whose skill and experience as an officer, whose independent fortune, great talents and excellent universal character, would command the approbation of all America, and unite the cordial exertions of all the colonies better than any other person in the union.”
How did Washington react to this nomination?
He fled the room in panic. In one of only two surviving letters to his wife, Martha, Washington revealed his true feelings about the nomination: “You may believe me … when I assure you, in the most solemn manner, that, so far from seeking this appointment I have used every endeavor in my power to avoid it not only from my unwillingness to part with you and the family, but from a consciousness of its being a trust too great for my capacity and that I should enjoy more real happiness and felicity in one month with you, at home, than I have the most distant prospect of reaping abroad, if my stay was to be seven times seven years.” He further explained to Martha that “it was out of my power to refuse this appointment without exposing my character to such censures as would have reflected dishonor upon myself, and given pain to my friends….”
Is this attitude really so incredible? What sensible person wants to spend months or years in the saddle, away from his home, braving bullets and eating stale rations? And being the commander of a newly formed army is hardly promising. How would he win a war with such an army? Suddenly, his country’s prospects have fallen to him. The very existence of the nation depends on him! A man who is sympathetic to his country and its people cannot help feeling overwhelmed, even frightened, by such a responsibility – far different from the attitude of the Red Army commissar Mao Zedong.
Here is what Washington said in his acceptance speech to the Second Continental Congress: “Tho’ I am truly sensible of the high honor done me in this appointment, yet I feel distress, from a consciousness that my abilities and military experience may not be equal to the extensive and important trust: However, as the Congress desires it I will enter upon the momentous duty, and exert every power I possess in their service and for the support of the glorious cause. I beg they will accept my most cordial thanks for this distinguished testimony of their approbation.” Washington wanted his countrymen to understand that he was only a man, and that men sometimes fail. “But lest some unlucky event should happen unfavorable to my reputation, I beg it may be remembered by every gentleman in the room, that I this day declare with the utmost sincerity, I do not think myself equal to the command I am honored with.”
Who, in fact, could be equal to such a command? This question in itself demonstrates a quality of character shared by all those in history who are both great and good. On the other side of the coin, the usurper who robs and murders his way to command presents us with an entirely different personality. Mao was great and malevolent. The regimes founded by these respective figures draw from the spirit of their founders. It cannot be otherwise, and we are foolish to ignore the genealogy of two respective world powers.
