In the prologue of his book, Countdown to Crisis, Kenneth R. Timmerman asks, "What if the Ayatollah got the bomb?" Well, in an ideal world Iran shouldn't have the bomb. Though it is worth remembering that Stalin had the bomb. Mao had 
the bomb. That is to say, history's greatest mass murderers had the bomb - and now their diminutive hatchlings have hundreds (even thousands) of nuclear weapons. These are mounted on intercontinental missiles aimed at the United States. We should not expect these weapons to be aimed at Brazil or Iceland or New Guinea. And so, when Iran gets the bomb (thanks to Russia), and when Iran gets ICMBs (thanks to Russia again), these weapons will be aimed at America. It is only obvious what big weapons in the hands of bad people are for. They are reserved for the destruction of two or three countries: Israel, the United States and Britain.
And one day the weapons will be used. But in whose hands should we fear them the most?
Let us differentiate big from small. Even a poisonous insect is easily squashed. There are little threats and big threats: poisonous little spiders and great dragons. And in the world of AD 2006, the great powers include Russia and China. The communist bureaucrats that threatened America during the Cold War are still in control. Vladimir Putin is one such bureaucrat. His faithful colleagues still hate America and work against America while they smile and hold out their hands for money and "partnership." The Ayatollah is allied with Moscow, assisted by Moscow, supported by Moscow. This is a known fact, easily checked. If Iran is a threat to America, then Russia has built this threat. To paint Iran as America's most dangerous enemy, ignoring Russia and China, is a bad landscape. Perhaps it tends toward moonscape. The mullahs may be religiously inspired to attack "the Great Satan," but any such attack would only hasten their own inevitable downfall. Properly understood, Iran is merely a pawn in a larger game.
Iraq was also a pawn. The Russians built Saddam's army because instability in the Middle East drives up oil prices. And Russia is the main beneficiary of high oil prices. Iran's nuclear ambitions further Russia's oil strategy. Therefore, Russia has worked to build Iran's nuclear potential. A preemptive U.S. attack on Iran would accomplish nothing except to enrich Russia through a further rise in oil prices. In the Iranian parliament they chant "Death to America." In Russia the leadership quietly builds new weapons, and is far more dangerous. In fact, Iran's bomb is a Russian thing from first to last. And so is Iran's missile program.
As Timmerman points out in his book, Russian companies have been building Iran's long-range missile forces. When the CIA learned of Russian involvement in Iran's strategic missile program the Kremlin sought to neutralize the CIA's sources of information. When America protested Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear program, the Russians insisted the program was "peaceful." America's diplomatic response has been weak. Unlike Truman, Bush will not publicly say the Russian leaders are liars. For many years the news seems to beg the same questions: (1) How do we account for the "see no evil" policy of the U.S. government as it regards Russia and China? (2) Why is the United States focusing its attention on small countries like Iraq and Iran, changing its strategic posture in a way that makes it vulnerable on so many fronts simultaneously? (3) Why is the United States ignoring the steady advance of communism in Latin America?
These are fair questions; and these questions will puzzle scholars when scholarship returns from the politically correct doldrums of today. All too often the United States sees no evil where evil abounds. In attacking Iraq, the American president chose to see evil in one country instead of a dozen countries. In naming the "Axis of Evil" the president forgot the "Dirty Dozen." In chess terms, he took a pawn and exposed his queen. One has to be suspicious as the evidence trickles in about Iraqi and Iranian involvement in 9/11. What would America do if Russia, too, were implicated in the scheme? What if FSB (KGB) defector Alexander Litvinenko is right when he charges that bin Laden's chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is a longstanding KGB agent? Anyone who has learned the deeper meaning of American politics during the last two decades knows that such a discovery is psychologically impossible under America's shopping mall regime. Some truths are out of bounds, and this truth - if true- is in that category. It doesn't matter if you are the most respected analyst in the CIA. It wouldn't matter if Zawahiri were captured and confessed. Solid testimony can always be debunked. Confessions can be declared malicious. Documents can be conveniently lost or buried.
Shortly before the 9/11 Commission sent their final report to the printers in 2004, the Commission's staff director called a meeting. According to Timmerman, "Commission staff members had discovered a document from a U.S. intelligence agency that described in detail Iran's ties to al-Qaeda.... It had been buried at the bottom of a huge stack of highly classified documents on other subjects that had been delivered to a special high-security reading room in an undisclosed location in Washington, D.C."
The 9/11 Commission was amazed at this last-minute discovery. The CIA had lied to the Commission when it claimed no connection between al Qaeda and Iran. The 9/11 Commission demanded to see more documentation. "What the [Commission] team leader found," wrote Timmerman, "was nothing less than a complete documented record of operational ties between Iran and al-Qaeda for the critical months just prior to September 11."
According to Timmerman, a senior Iranian operative had "coordinated the travel of eight to ten of the 'muscle hijackers' between Saudi Arabia, Beirut, and Iran in October and November 2000." All of this is important, relevant information. The U.S. government finds it inconvenient because the U.S. military is overextended in Iraq. We cannot afford a war in Iran, if we want to keep our shopping mall culture. And that is why we ignore the enmity of Russia and China as well. Our policy is a simple one. It is based on hope. We hope that China will become an amiable and trustworthy trading partner. We hope that Russia will become a democracy. And as President Bush indicated in his State of the Union message, he hopes that the Iranian people will spontaneously rise up and free themselves from the mullahs. It's as if the fall of the Soviet Union spoiled us, leaving us to expect the spontaneous collapse of every enemy.
America is a country where economic optimism dictates self-deception.
One should recall the fierce words of President Bush in the wake of 9/11: "I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." Such words from the president sounded good at the time, but America's resolve has melted through time and distraction. We have gradually returned to 10 September 2001. That is where we want to live, the rabbit hole into which we would escape. And so we have. The CIA covered up the Iran connection to al Qaeda. According to Timmerman, the CIA covered up the pre-9/11 warnings from Iranian sources. "The 9/11 hijackers and al-Qaeda planners had been in constant contact with senior Iranian officials and intelligence officers before September 11," wrote Timmerman. "It was not a casual relationship or a chance encounter here and there, but a steady stream of contacts."
Those who think of America as a vast imperialist conspiracy have it all wrong. Those who think President Bush has an itchy trigger finger are mistaken. Those who think it's about oil need to do the numbers - Russian style. The blindness of the CIA is merely the blindness of the American people institutionalized and formalized. The errors of George W. Bush are the errors of a country that no longer thinks strategically. Though America struck back at its enemies after 9/11, it refused to enumerate its enemies, or admit the coordination of these enemies or consider their strategy.
It would be easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle.
