Two books have recently appeared that describe America's progress in the War on Terror. Each presents the view that America is winning the war, and that the Iraq invasion was strategically useful. The first of these two books is Richard Miniter's Shadow War: The Untold Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror. The second book is Stratfor chairman George Friedman's America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies.
Richard Miniter writes of strong links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. (These links have also been discussed at length by Iraq expert Laurie Mylroie in Bush vs. the Beltway: How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror, and by Yossef Bodansky in a 1999 book titled Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America.) Differing from Miniter, Stratfor's George Friedman claims "there was not only little evidence of any collaboration [between Iraq and al Qaeda], but good reason to believe there hadn't been very much, if any."
Friedman ambiguously winks at the Iraq invasion in a half-hearted manner, arguing it "was simply the best decision available given the limited menu." But the public justifications offered by President Bush for invading Iraq were unfortunate, according to Friedman. In the wake of 9/11 America was compelled to take charge of the Middle East in order to apply pressure on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, encircle Iran and paralyze Syria. This, in turn, crippled al Qaeda. The invasion of Iraq was a means to these ends. For Friedman, the administration's emphasis on Iraqi WMDs was a miscalculation because the rationale was flimsy. European and Asian powers did not like to see the U.S. dominating the Middle East. How could this be acceptable to Russia, China and France? Friedman claims that America's "global empire" is now unprecedented, though unintentional. America never wanted an empire; but European and Asian powers are nonetheless nervous and untrusting - a further complication for U.S. diplomacy.
Both Friedman and Miniter think the administration is winning the war (at least for the moment). "I traveled to the front lines," said Miniter, "and interviewed non-American intelligence and military officials as well as their European and American counterparts. More than 3,000 al Qaeda have been captured or killed since 9/11 in 102 countries." In a recent interview on C-SPAN's Washington Journal, Miniter defended his objectivity by explaining, "I am not a registered Republican, I have never voted for a Republican President." Miniter believes that al Qaeda's effectiveness has been demolished. There aren't any al Qaeda training camps in existence, he noted, and al Qaeda recruiters have been rounded up. As for the insurgency in Iraq, says Miniter, "It was designed in advance by Saddam."
Friedman's take on the war is not as positive. "On a strategic level," he writes, "the United States has actually done extremely well." He points out that, "With rare exceptions, such a Syria, the overwhelming majority of Islamic governments ... aligned themselves with the United States." By showing its toughness and resolve in Iraq, the United States won the compliance of one Islamic country after another. "They were drawn into direct conflict with Jihadist forces," Friedman explained, and the jihadists began to make war on the Islamic states. The result was a crushing defeat for al Qaeda.
"The Iraq war at first achieved the two strategic goals it had intended," Friedman admitted. "First, it shifted the psychology in the Islamic world, where the United States moved from being hated and held in contempt to being hated and feared - a substantial improvement in terms of getting nations to act in accordance with U.S. wishes." The second goal, of course, was America's conversion of Iraq into a major basing area. American troops are now ideally positioned for Middle East operations. American forces stand between the rogue regimes in Syria and Iran. They can intervene more readily in Saudi Arabia, seriously complicating any attempt to overthrow the monarchy and disrupt Saudi oil production.
Given President Bush's strategic success, Friedman warns of "tactical and operational" dangers. America must prevail on the ground, and must hold firm. "The foundation of the strategic improvement [in the Middle East]," he wrote, rests on a bed of sand because the Iraq situation refuses to stabilize. Here Friedman differs from Miniter, who depicts the Iraq insurgents as paid mercenaries whose funding may soon run dry. (According to Miniter most of the insurgents in Iraq are not fighting out of belief in a cause, but on account of cash payment, as mercenaries. He also notes that the cash payment is increasing, which indicates that anti-American feeling is beginning to ebb.)
The Arab leaders respect strength and despise weakness. If America weakens its resolve in Iraq, the Arab powers will stop cooperating with America against the jihadists. According to Friedman, failure to pacify Iraq will bring the U.S. into contempt, with serious consequences to follow. Therefore, in Friedman's view, "the Iraq campaign is both a strategic success and a potential strategic disaster." He then lists a number of U.S. blunders in Iraq, including: "The failure to understand that Ahmed Chalabi ... was actually an Iranian agent"; the inability to find WMDs; the failure to grasp that Iraq's Shiites have been "carefully organized by Iranian intelligence"; failure to identify Saddam's guerrilla strategy; late acknowledgement of the strength of the insurgency; and, most strikingly of all, a failure to admit that U.S. ground forces are too small.
It has been argued that America is strategically fixated on Iraq. It also follows, however, that America's enemies are also fixated. By going into Iraq the U.S. has created an irresistible attraction for the Islamists, drawing the fanatics into a U.S. meat grinder. It is possible, indeed likely, that pressure has been taken off the Saudi monarchy. It is pressure that U.S. troops can withstand much better than Saudi security forces, vulnerable as they are to Islamist infiltration. (Already the Saudi royal family has been moving its wealth to Switzerland and elsewhere, openly preparing for exile. Such preparation suggests a lack of confidence in the monarchy's future.)
Miniter paints a picture of success, though he admits the war is not over. Friedman suggests that America's apparent victory may be short lived. While achieving "critical strategic goals" the United States "does not have the ability to close out the campaign." The longer the insurgency lasts, the more America's achievements are jeopardized. With his front line sources, Miniter believes the insurgency is losing steam, and Friedman acknowledges "a quantum leap forward" in U.S. intelligence capabilities. It seems that America has penetrated al Qaeda operations, thwarting or disrupting "several important attacks."
Miniter and Friedman give us facts and ideas with which to evaluate America's progress in the War on Terror. Nobody can foresee the outcome of this war, since the variables are too great for rational calculation. But it does appear that America is winning. Al Qaeda has been weakened.
