Summary: The macro data from the past month continues to mostly point to positive growth. On balance, the evidence suggests the imminent onset of a recession is unlikely. The largest risk to the economy is the escalation in trade war rhetoric.
The bond market agrees with the macro data. The yield curve has 'inverted' (10-year yields less than 2-year yields) ahead of every recession in the past 40 years (arrows). The lag between inversion and the start of the next recession has been long: at least 10 months and in several instances as long as 2-3 years. On this basis, the current expansion will likely last into early 2019 at a minimum. Enlarge any image by clicking on it.
Unemployment claims are also in a declining trend, reaching a new 49 year low in mid-May (and nearly this low in late-July). Historically, claims have started to rise at least 7 months ahead of the next recession.
New home sales made a new 10 year high in November and were only marginally lower in June. In the past 50 years, at least 11 months have elapsed between the expansion's high print in new home sales and the start of the next recession.
Real retail sales made a new all-time high (ATH) in June. The trend higher is strong, in comparison to the period prior to the past two recessions.
The Conference Board's Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) Index reached a new uptrend high in June. This index includes the indicators above plus equity prices, ISM new orders, manufacturing hours and consumer confidence. This index can fluctuate during an expansion but the final peak has been at least 7 months before the next recession in the past 50 years (from Doug Short).
Why does any of this matter for the stock market?
Equity prices typically fall ahead of the next recession, but the macro indicators highlighted above weaken even earlier and help distinguish a 10% correction from an oncoming bear market. On balance, these indicators are not hinting at an imminent recession; new home sales are the only potential warning flag (its most recent peak was 8 months ago) but it has the longest lead time to the next recession of all the indicators (a recent post on this is here).
Here are the main macro data headlines from the past month:
Employment: Monthly employment gains have averaged 200,000 during the past year, with annual growth of 1.6% yoy. Employment has been driven by full-time jobs, which rose to a new all-time high in July.
Compensation: Compensation growth is on an improving trend. Hourly wage growth was 2.7% yoy in July, while the 2Q18 employment cost index grew 2.9% yoy, the highest growth in the past 10 years.
Demand: Real demand growth has been 2-3%. In June, real personal consumption growth was 2.8%. Real retail sales grew 3.7% yoy in June, making a new ATH. 2Q18 GDP growth was 2.8%, the highest in nearly 3 years.
Housing: New home sales grew 2% yoy in June. Housing starts were at the highest level of the past 11 years in May but fell 4% yoy in June. Multi-family units remain a drag on overall development.
Manufacturing: Core durable goods rose 8.7% yoy in June. The manufacturing component of industrial production grew 2.1% yoy in June. Both measures were at the highest level in 10 years in April.
Inflation: The core inflation rate remains near the Fed's 2% target.
Our key message over the past 5 years has been that (a) growth is positive but slow, in the range of ~2-3% (real), and; (b) current growth is lower than in prior periods of economic expansion and a return to 1980s or 1990s style growth does not appear likely.
This is germane to equity markets in that macro growth drives corporate revenue, profit expansion and valuation levels. The simple fact is that equity bear markets almost always take place within the context of an economic decline. Since the end of World War II, there have been 10 bear markets, only 2 of which have occurred outside of an economic recession (read further here).
The highly misleading saying that "the stock market is not the economy" is true on a day to day or even month to month basis, but over time these two move together. When they diverge, it is normally a function of emotion, whether measured in valuation premiums/discounts or sentiment extremes.
Macro data will likely be better than expected in 2H18. Why? Macro data was ahead of expectations to start the current year by the greatest extent in 6 years. During the current expansion, that has led to underperformance of macro data relative to expectations into mid-year and then outperformance in the second half of the year (green arrows). 2009 and 2016 had the opposite pattern: these years began with macro data outperforming expectations into mid-year and then underperforming in the second half (red arrows). None of this precludes further macro weakening in the short term, as CESI is typically negative before reversing higher.
A valuable post on using macro data to improve trend following investment strategies can be found here.
By far, the largest risk to the economy is the escalation in trade war rhetoric, which reduces global demand, raises prices and eventually leads to lower investment. The macro data is fine; this is a possible wild card (from St Louis Fed).
Let's review the most recent data, focusing on four macro categories: labor market, end-demand, housing, and inflation.
Employment and Wages
The July non-farm payroll was 157,000 new employees plus 59,000 in revisions for the prior two months.
Employment growth has been decelerating. The average monthly gain in employment was 240,000 in 2015, 211,000 in 2016 and 190,000 in 2017. In the past 12 months, the monthly average has improved slightly to 200,000.
Monthly NFP prints are volatile. Since the 1990s, NFP prints near 300,000 have been followed by ones near or under 100,000. That has been a pattern during every bull market; NFP was negative at times during 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1997. The low point of 34,000 in May 2016 and 14,000 in September 2017 fit the historical pattern. This is normal, not unusual or unexpected.
Why is there so much volatility? Leave aside the data collection, seasonal adjustment, and weather issues; appreciate that a "beat" or a "miss" of 120,000 workers in a monthly NFP report is within the 90% confidence interval (explained here).
For this reason, it's better to look at the trend; in July, trend employment growth was 1.6% yoy. Until spring 2016, annual growth had been over 2%, the highest since the 1990s. Ahead of a recession, employment growth normally falls (arrows). The continued deceleration in employment growth in the coming months continues to be an important watch out.
Employment has been driven by full-time jobs, which rose to a new all-time high in July (blue line), not part-time jobs (red line).
The labor force participation rate (the percentage of the population over 16 that is either working or looking for work) has recently stabilized. The participation rate had been falling since 2001 as baby boomers retire, exactly as participation started to rise in the mid-1960s as this demographic group entered the workforce. Another driver is women, whose participation rate increased from about 30% in the 1950s to a peak of 60% in 1999, and younger adults staying in school (and thus out of the workforce) longer.
The prime working age (25 to 54-year-olds) labor force participation rate stands at 82%, down only slightly from its peak in 2000 at 84%, and much higher than anytime prior to the 1980s.
Average hourly earnings growth was 2.7% yoy in July. This is a positive trend, showing demand for more workers. Sustained acceleration in wages would be a big positive for consumption and investment that would further fuel employment.
Similarly, 2Q18 employment cost index shows total compensation growth was 2.9% yoy, the highest in the past 10 years.
For those who doubt the accuracy of the BLS employment data, federal tax receipts have also been rising to new highs (red line), a sign of better employment and wages (from Yardeni).
Regardless of which data is used, real demand has been growing at about 2-3%, equal to about 4-5% nominal.
Real (inflation-adjusted) GDP growth through 2Q18 was 2.8% yoy, the best growth rate in nearly 3 years. 2.5-5% was common during prior expansionary periods prior to 2006.
Stripping out the changes in GDP due to inventory produces "real final sales". This is a better measure of consumption growth than total GDP. In 2Q18, this grew 3.0% yoy. A sustained break above 3% would be noteworthy.
The "real personal consumption expenditures" component of GDP (defined), which accounts for about 70% of GDP, grew at 2.7% yoy in 2Q18. This is approaching the 3-5% that was common in prior expansionary periods after 1980 and prior to the great recession.
On a monthly basis, the growth in real personal consumption expenditures was 2.8% yoy in June.
GDP measures the total expenditures in the economy. An alternative measure is GDI (gross domestic income), which measures the total income in the economy. Since every expenditure produces income, these are equivalent measurements of the economy. Some research suggests that GDI might be more accurate than GDP (here).
Real GDI growth in 1Q18 was 2.3% yoy.
Real retail sales grew 3.7% yoy in June, making a new ATH. Sales fell yoy more than a year ahead of the last recession.
Retail sales in the past three years have been strongly affected by the large fall and rebound in the price of gasoline. In June, real retail sales at gasoline stations grew by 18% yoy after having fallen more than 20% yoy during 2016. Real retail sales excluding gas stations grew 2.5% in June.
This expansionary cycle is not like others in the past 50 years. Households' savings rate typically falls as the expansion progresses; this time, savings has risen and remains at an elevated level.
The next several slides look at manufacturing. It's important to note that manufacturing accounts for less than 10% of US employment, so these measures are of lesser importance.
Core durable goods orders (excluding military, so that it measures consumption, and transportation, which is highly volatile) rose 8.7% yoy (nominal) in June. It was at a 10-year high in April. Weakness in durable goods has not been a useful predictor of broader economic weakness in the past (arrows).
Industrial production (real manufacturing, mining and utility output) growth was 3.8% yoy in June. The more important manufacturing component (excluding mining and oil/gas extraction; red line) rose 2.1% yoy. Total IP was at a new ATH in June; manufacturing IP was at a 10 year high in April. Industrial production is a volatile series, with negative annual growth during parts of 2014 and 2016.
Importantly, about 75% of the industrial production groups are expanding. A drop below 40% will imply widespread weakness that typically precedes a recession (from Tim Duy).
Weakness in total industrial production had been concentrated in the mining sector; the past three years had the worst annual fall in more than 40 years. It is not unusual for this part of industrial production to plummet outside of recessions. With the recovery in oil/gas extraction, mining rose 13% yoy in May.
New housing sales grew 2% yoy in June after reaching their highest level in 10 years in November. Housing starts and permits are near a 10 year high although multi-family unit remains relatively weak. Overall levels of construction and sales are small relative to prior bull markets, but the trend is higher.
First, new single-family houses sold was 631,000 in June; sales in November were the highest of the past 10 years. Growth in June was +2% over the past year after growing +10% yoy in June 2017.
Second, housing starts fell 4% yoy in June. Starts in May were at the highest level of the past 11 years. The cycle high print has typically been well over a year before the next recession (arrows).
Building permits fell 3% yoy in June after rising 10% yoy in June 2017. Permits rose to the highest level in 10 years in March (red line).
Single family housing starts (blue line) reached a new post-recession high in November and were only marginally lower in May and June. Meanwhile. multi-unit housing starts (red line) has been flat over the past four years; this has been a drag on overall starts.
Despite steady employment, demand and housing growth, core inflation remains near the Fed's target of 2%.
CPI (blue line) was 2.8% last month. The more important core CPI (excluding volatile food and energy; red line) grew 2.2%. Core CPI was at current levels between January 2016 and February 2017 before falling back below 2%. Note that CPI growth was at a low 12 months ago (arrow), meaning the yoy growth will moderate in 2H18 all else being equal.
The Fed prefers to use personal consumption expenditures (PCE) to measure inflation; total and core PCE were 2.2% and 1.9% yoy, respectively, last month.
Some mistrust CPI and PCE. MIT publishes an independent price index (called the billion prices index; yellow line). It has tracked both CPI (blue line) and PCE closely.
In summary, the major macro data so far suggest positive but modest growth. This is consistent with corporate sales growth. SPX sales growth in 2018 is expected to only be about 6-7% (nominal).
With the rise in earnings and the moderation in share prices, valuations are now back to their 25-year average. The consensus expects earnings to grow about 18% in 2018 and 10% in 2019. Equity appreciation can, therefore, be driven by both corporate growth as well as valuation expansion (chart from JPM).