When you dare to analyze things that are viewed so differently by so many, there is hazard involved. First comes the hazard of innocent error. Then comes the hazard of man's ever-present irrationality. After all, man is not the "rational animal" of Aristotle's genus and differentia (i.e., genus "animal," differentia "rational"). Man is the animal that feels, and feelings outweigh rational thought on most occasions. In fact, reason is more often the efficient secretary of the feelings, and frequently rationalizes the most irrational propositions, the very lies of the hour, the cherished hatreds and fancies of sect and party. So analysis is never easy; and if the analyst's "objectivity" doesn't square with another's subjectivity, then he is derided as a hypocrite, a liar or worse. I therefore proceed at my own hazard (in very hazardous territory).
It is amazing to watch the pundits go on and on about President George W. Bush and the Iraq situation. You have those, like David Frum, who think the President is fully justified; while others, like Justin Raimondo, think George W. Bush "is practically in a coma." Admittedly, I didn't have a favorable impression of presidential candidate Bush when I first saw him on television four years ago, and the impression only darkened after reading Molly Ivin's Shrub: The Short But Happy Political Life of George W. Bush. Molly picks "W" apart with 179 pages of witty, gossipy, hostile biography. But taken as a whole, the book is unfair. Whatever the truth about a human being, it does not consist in lining up, end-to-end, every uncharitable thing that has ever been said about them.
And here it comes again.
Ron Suskind has put together a book, ironically titled The Price of Loyalty, making use of testimony from former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill (who compounded his error by appearing on "60 Minutes"). During the "60 Minutes" interview, O'Neill described President Bush as "a blind man in a room full of deaf people." This was due to the fact, as O'Neill explained, that Bush listens patiently when his advisors talk (failing to interrupt them with silly questions). Setting this grave criticism aside, O'Neill broke open a hornet's nest by stating that from the beginning of the Bush presidency, "there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go."
Perhaps those with a selective memory should be reminded about the "Iraq Liberation Act" of 1998, which enshrined into U.S. law the idea that "Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go." The U.S. Senate passed the "Iraq Liberation Act" by unanimous consent. The House of Representatives passed it by a majority of 360-38. If you could point to a bipartisan notion in U.S. foreign policy when George W. Bush took office, it was the notion that Saddam Hussein should fall (and the main option preferred by Bush, up to 2002, was covert action). The elimination of Saddam had been on Washington's mind - in both political hemispheres - for a long time.
Hostile journalists with an axe to grind don't usually care about historical accuracy or context. Note the featured incriminating document entitled "Foreign Suitors for Iraq Oilfield Contracts." The implication is that Bush's greedy oil buddies were drooling to get their hands on Iraq before 9/11. There is one catch, however. The document is not about the toppling of Saddam Hussein. It is from the vice president's Energy Task Force study on global oil supplies. And it had nothing to do with post-war Iraq or the carving up of oil fields by Bush cronies.
The "60 Minutes" program, far from objective journalism, confused the public's foreshortened memory with retrospective nonsense. It isn't that O'Neill told blatant lies or meant any harm. It's a case of a naïve man's ill-considered statements being manipulated by Ron Suskind and the reality-distorters at CBS. O'Neill would have been better served had he spoken against excessive government spending, with special attention on social spending. At least he would have been talking sense.
If anyone is interested in a scholarly account of the Iraq terror threat and Bush's decision to invade, it's best to set aside Paul O'Neill's unfortunate collaboration with Ron Suskind (as offered in The Price of Loyalty) and pick up Laurie Mylroie's Bush vs. The Beltway. Mylroie gives us a close-up account of State Department and CIA obstructionism. She explains the intelligence community's institutional incapacity to "connect the dots, and she celebrates George W. Bush's remarkable perseverance and common sense.
Of special interest, Mylroie documents the role that the media has played in maliciously distorting the facts surrounding the war against Saddam. By delaying its assessments, the CIA has refused to acknowledge the April 8, 2001 meeting that took place between 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and Iraqi intelligence officer Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani. In this and other instances, the liberal press has purposely twisted the record, relying on anonymous sources to debunk open sources. Instead of confirming the myth of administration dishonesty, Mylroie reveals the stonewalling of the CIA. It is the CIA that missed the al Qaeda-Iraq connection from the beginning, and media liberals do not want Bush justified.
Mylroie recounts evidence that the 9/11 hijackers were involved with anthrax, that the anthrax was probably from Iraqi sources, that the Iraqi official press dropped hints about 9/11 beforehand and more. Mylroie also offers testimony from defectors who heard Saddam's plans for "revenge" against America in personal meetings. Mylroie gives us a catalogue of facts, testimony and suggestive evidence that al Qaeda was working with Saddam's intelligence services before, during and after 9/11.
In light of Mylroie's brilliant presentation, in light of the dishonest "60 Minutes" hit-piece against President Bush, a fair-minded person might say that truth has been buried under drama and emotional commitments have trumped honest analysis - in the press and within the intelligence community.
In closing I would like to relate a striking incident from Mylroie's book. In December 1994 Mylroie briefed a group of intelligence officials, including two members of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center. These two officials had done very little homework, according to Mylroie. They were stumped by the problem of getting Ramzi Yousef's fingerprints, for example (which Mylroie told them how to do). One of the two "sat silently through the presentation, staring at the ground. When I had finished," wrote Mylroie, "he sniffed that he would have wanted 'better information.'" She later learned that he had no prior familiarity with the documentation she presented. Too lazy to do the research himself, ignorant to the core, he turned up his nose for reasons that only a bureaucrat can understand. As Mylorie explained, "the CIA had become unshakably attached to this radically erroneous understanding of terrorist activity. Over many years the agency ignored, and even suppressed, substantial evidence regarding Iraq's possible role in at least two major acts of terrorism against the United States.... This pattern of self-deception would have critical implications for the agency's response to the attacks of September 11."
