Geopolitical analysis should be about strategy, and the business of determining what is going to happen in the future. Strategic paths are often pre-determined paths, involving fixed objectives and the methods used to achieve them. In the case of Iraq, President Bush's democratizing mission was too grandiose. Disarming Saddam Hussein was one thing. Attempting to build a democracy was another. The morale of the American people, the expertise of the U.S. government and the manpower put into the project were insufficient to attain the stated objective. As everyone can see, Iraq has descended into anarchy. The Iraqi parliament frequently cannot achieve a quorum because its members prefer to spend their time outside the country where conditions are safer. When 30,000 people per month are dying, the only description that applies is "civil war." And as President Bush recently stated: "This is not the conflict we signed up for, but it is the one we are forced to deal with."
At the time of the invasion, Secretary of State Colin Powell feared that democratizing Iraq was going "a bridge too far." The foresight of Colin Powell is undeniable. He was the one who attempted to warn George W. Bush. "You know you're going to be owning this place?" he said to the president. "I think I have to," Bush answered. With ownership comes responsibility. And there's another saying too: "If you break it, you fix it." And now that President Bush owns Iraq, and now that the country is broken, he is stuck with trying to fix it. The only respectable, responsible course of action faces insurmountable political opposition - at home and abroad. This could not have been what President Bush envisioned. His own political party lost control of Congress and his popularity has plummeted to record lows.
There is no doubt, if we look at the record, that President Bush feared Saddam Hussein's unpredictable and aggressive schemes. He saw Saddam as "unfinished business" from his father's administration. Furthermore, the old dictator had a grudge against the United States. It cannot be a good feeling to live in the crosshairs of a psychopath. Saddam had invaded two neighboring countries. He had used weapons of mass destruction against his own people, and might use them against Israel. Saddam had plotted against the life of the president's father. Is it really necessary to imagine that some evil advisor or puppet-master urged Bush to invade Iraq? George W. Bush has within himself all the qualities necessary for charting a course to war. The initiative was his, and so was the final decision. According to Bob Woodward's account (Plan of Attack), Vice President Cheney was initially cautious when it came to an actual invasion of Iraq: "If we go against Saddam Hussein, we lose our rightful place as good guy," he told the president. Naturally, the vice president was eager to remove Saddam, and saw President Bush's move in that direction as an opportunity - all dangers set aside and forgotten. And Cheney was not alone. The idea of removing Saddam from power had permeated Washington for years, and was inscribed in U.S. law (i.e., the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, signed by President Clinton). Furthermore, there was genuine fear that Saddam might use a weapon of mass destruction against America. The CIA said that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. DCI George Tenet said the evidence was "a slam dunk." When presented with specifics, even George W. Bush thought the evidence was weak, but Tenet nevertheless assured him. "A slam dunk." It has been said that the CIA is a mean place where "they eat their own." It is no wonder they took a bite out of George W. Bush - who turned, in reply, and ripped huge chunks from the upper echelons of the CIA. The story has been told, and it is an instructive one. The CIA thought Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, and so did many foreign intelligence services. But the CIA would rather embarrass the president than take responsibility for its own inability to track WMDs.
At any rate, George W. Bush trusted the initial CIA assessment of Saddam's position; and on 21 November 2001, less than 75 days after 9/11, he pulled Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld aside and asked what his Iraq "options" were. And so the initiative to invade Iraq came from President Bush. The reviled neo-cons formed a choir, to be sure, with hawks and hardliners like Dick Cheney ready and eager. But the President had a mind of his own, and a remarkable tenacity - like a dog with a bone. It should be obvious by now that President Bush's tenacity may also be likened to stubbornness. Certain traits are positive under specific circumstances. Under other circumstances, these same traits may prove detrimental. An aggressive solution was part of Bush's character, and part of his instinctive reaction to 9/11. He pushed the Pentagon into Afghanistan a few weeks after 9/11, forcing his generals to improvise their plans. This goes to show the president's strength and steadiness of purpose. This is what you will find while reading the testimony gathered by journalists like Woodward about the inception of the Iraq invasion. It is the key to an ongoing tragedy. What was positive in one instance proves negative in another.
Contrary to popular mythology, the man who most encouraged the president to follow through on his war plans was the famed Holocaust survivor, Elie Wiesel, who met with President Bush on 27 February 2003. "It's a moral issue," argued Wiesel. "In the name of morality how can we not intervene?" Bush's thinking blended with Wiesel's. "If we don't disarm Saddam Hussein, he will put a weapon of mass destruction on Israel and they will do what they think they have to do, and we have to avoid that," said Bush. To leave Saddam Hussein in peace, said Wiesel, was to promote and assist evil in its war against innocent victims. According to Bob Woodward, in the days following Bush's meeting with Wiesel, the president "routinely repeated Wiesel's comments." President Bush later admitted, "That was a meaningful moment for me because it was a confirming moment. I said to myself, Gosh, if Elie Wiesel feels that way ... then others feel that way too. And so I am not alone." (See Woodward's account, p. 320.)
The admission is telling. Bush felt alone in his decision for war, and a Holocaust survivor bolstered him. At some level, moral outrage got the upper hand over strategy in Bush's mind. The decision for war was not made because it was a good chess move. Instead, the decision was taken because it was "morally necessary." Ironically, many of those who hate Bush and oppose the war are also animated by moral outrage. Theirs is not a strategic judgment. This becomes clear when we examine their demand that the United States withdraw from the Middle East, as if withdrawal would save lives or create the necessary conditions for global peace or freedom. Regarding these two opposing poles of moral outrage, each is determined to denounce the other. Neither is willing to consider the actual strategic situation. It is a wide highway to destruction indeed, paved with many good intentions. It is like a cross on which American foreign policy is to be crucified. Whether the intention is spreading democracy or embracing global peace, the correct course has been lost to moralizing passions. The cool analyst realizes that peace and universal democracy cannot be achieved. Peace never lasts long, and democracy itself is merely another way of organizing oligarchy. The truth of all this is lost on the moralizing policymaker. This is not to criticize genuine moral sensibilities. But when these utopian objectives are embraced, strategy is set to accomplishing the impossible. Here the great instrument overreaches - with inevitable and devastating consequences for all.
It should not be considered moral to bring disaster your own country. And yet, that is what our modern moralists - on both sides of the fence - promise to accomplish. The passions they arouse lead away from sound strategy. Here we find a realm of miscalculation. It is a realm of wasted effort, wasted money and wasted lives. Is there not a hint of immorality in these passionate moralists? To set aside the question of means while grasping for an impossible end, they undo their own cause. Ironically, the peace movement encourages murderous dictators through the good offices of appeasement. And President Bush has encouraged the peace movement by overreaching in Iraq.
A reader recently asked me: "If you believe your own statement, what should be the next move?"
At this late stage of the game, pulling out of Iraq would force Saudi Arabia into the arms of Russia and China. The United States would suffer an enormous loss of credibility, and its economy would probably suffer a severe shock (due to the erosion of the dollar's position in the oil markets). All this would signify a tremendous strategic defeat for the American side. And so, there is no choice but to prevail in Iraq. First, we should fight to achieve stability, and then we should devise a workable system of checks and balances for the Iraqi people - instead of strict democracy under Shiite domination. More important than democracy for Iraq is a system that protects minority rights. Unfortunately, it may be too late for this solution now, since the Democrats will likely win the presidency and withdrawal from the Middle East in 2009. The various players in the region can see this, and so the Saudis are already moving closer to Moscow as they distance themselves from Washington.
Disaster seems unavoidable. Strategy and morality now give way to destiny.
